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Nadejda Mazur 
The Visible Effects of an Invisible Constitution: 
The Contested State of Transdniestria’s Search for Recognition  
through International Negotiations 
 
Most scholars agree that modern states share several defining characteristics: a 
population, territory, government, and the capacity to enter into international relations.  More 
recently, this list has expanded to include the criteria of democracy, the rule of law, and the 
protection of human rights. These traditional and contemporary criteria for statehood are 
likewise essential for settling the status of de facto states, entities that seek international 
recognition yet are rebuffed by the world community.  
By examining the criteria for international recognition from the perspective of 
constitutional law, this dissertation reveals the existing but overlooked relationship between 
the recognition process and constitutionalism. As is shown, a constitution performs more than 
its usual functions of organizing and regulating a polity, limiting the government, and 
ensuring individuals protection. It also plays a key role in asserting and realizing both the 
traditional and contemporary criteria for state recognition. This linkage between 
constitutionalism and the recognition process is then tested on the case study of 
Transdniestria, an entity within the Republic of Moldova that has all the attributes of a state 
and seeks recognition of its statehood. 
As one of the first analyses of unrecognized foundational legal frameworks, this 
dissertation offers insight into how an “invisible” constitution affects the recognition process 
and the political status of an unrecognized state. It shows that, while the Transdniestrian 
constitution has not influenced the entity’s search for recognition, it has had other important 
effects on the negotiation process, such as consolidating Transdniestrian statehood, hardening 
iii 
the entity’s position in negotiations, and influencing the nature of its interactions with 
international actors. These outcomes broaden the understanding of the contemporary criteria 
for recognition and the functions of a constitution with respect to their application in 
unrecognized states. They also demonstrate the limitations of the prevailing approach in the 
literature that democratization is necessarily beneficial for the purposes of conflict resolution. 
In such a way, this research additionally helps to present a more nuanced picture of post-Cold 
War politics, law, and international relations in Europe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The end of the Cold War brought the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and 
led to a proliferation of new states on the world map. These developments also increased the 
number of entities that have declared their independence but remained fully or partially 
unrecognized by the international community.1 The unsettled political status of these entities 
creates regional and international instability, threatens security and peace, complicates the free 
exercise of people’s rights and freedoms within those entities, and increases tensions between 
these entities and the outside world.2 The existence of these unrecognized states also highlights 
the discrepancies between their claims to statehood and the norms of international law, which 
raises questions over what criteria should be used for assessing and evaluating entities’ claims 
for recognition.   
A number of disciplines, such as international law, international relations, and conflict 
resolution, have examined these claims to independence and the options for settling their 
political status by focusing on the principle of states’ territorial integrity. As a result, the 
disciplines mentioned above mainly justify the non-recognition of these entities and suggest an 
autonomous status for them within the already recognized states. However, the insistence of de 
facto states on having their independence and international recognition, as well as their long-
lasting existence, suggest that the traditional approach towards these category of entities is 
inefficient, and that the settlement of their political status requires a more in-depth understanding 
of their nature, claims, and internal development, considered together from an interdisciplinary 
perspective.  
                                                 
1 For more on the definition of unrecognized states, see Chapter 2. Here and throughout this work, the term “entity” 
refers to unrecognized states: those state-like entities that have declared their independence and seek international 
recognition as a state, but whose claims are rejected by most or all members of the world community. 
2 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “Human Rights Do Not Have Any Borders: Pillay.” 
News Release, February 14, 2013. 
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This dissertation seeks to contribute to the interdisciplinary analysis of de facto states and 
their claims from the perspectives of international and constitutional law. More specifically, this 
work seeks to add to the scholarship on the functions of a constitution and the criteria for state 
recognition – in particular, their contemporary elements – in relation to their practical application 
in unrecognized states. It approaches recognition from hitherto unexplored perspectives, pointing 
out the existing but overlooked relationship between the process of recognition and 
constitutionalism, and its importance for the determining the status of an unrecognized state. In 
particular, this dissertation explores whether an unrecognized state’s constitutional framework 
has any effect on the process of granting a state-like entity international recognition. 
This research demonstrates that, during the process of granting international recognition, 
the international community expects the internal practices of a state seeking formal recognition 
or admission to an intergovernmental organization to be based on constitutional principles. It 
also suggests that, by pursuing constitutionalism on a domestic level,3 an unrecognized state may 
consolidate its claim based on the contemporary criteria for recognition. As a result, a 
constitution plays a more prominent role in an unrecognized state as it becomes an instrument to 
win the trust of international community in the entity’s search for recognition. In addition, the 
assessment of an entity’s claims for recognition becomes a more complex process in which the 
entity’s internal constitutional dynamics matter for the negotiation process and for the ultimate 
decision of the actors involved in negotiations. Thus, this dissertation explores how the elements 
of constitutionalism (a) are integral to the process of recognition; (b) shape the response of an 
unrecognized state in its search for recognition; and (c) influence an entity’s international 
political status.   
                                                 
3 Here and throughout this work, the term “domestic” in reference to an unrecognized state implies its internal 
structures and affairs. 
3 
The first chapter defines the concepts of international recognition, a constitution, and 
constitutionalism. It then analyzes the existing political and legal doctrines on the formal 
recognition of states and governments, as well as on states’ potential to become members in 
international organizations. This chapter develops a doctrinal framework that argues for the 
importance of a constitution for the international recognition of a state and lays the groundwork 
for analyzing the effects of an unrecognized constitution for the recognition of a state-like entity.  
The second chapter defines the concept of unrecognized states and introduces the case 
study of Transdniestria. It argues that the particular features of unrecognized states – their long 
existence, control over the territory, governance through independent state institutions, and their 
search for recognition – make them ideal environments in which to study the relationship 
between a constitution and the recognition process. It then details the example of Transdniestria 
as an unrecognized state and justifies its relevance as a case study. 
The third chapter assesses the effects of the Transdniestrian constitution on the entity’s 
search for international recognition. It explores the ways in which Transdniestria has enacted 
both the traditional and contemporary criteria for recognition, as well as how external actors 
have responded to Transdniestria’s constitutional development and recognition claims. The 
research shows no evidence of the direct impact of Transdniestria’s constitution on the entity’s 
recognition process. However, this research demonstrates that the entity’s constitution has 
strengthened Transdniestrian statehood and enhanced external actors’ engagement with that 
region. 
The fourth chapter continues the examination of the contemporary criteria for recognition 
as stated and, in particular, democracy, by looking at the electoral practices of Transdniestria. 
The findings confirm the dissertation’s general argument that the Transdniestrian constitutional 
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framework has largely had no impact on the process of the region’s recognition. In other words, 
despite the theoretical relevance of a constitution to the standards for recognition and the use of 
constitutional evidence in other cases, the constitution seems to have had no effect on 
recognition for Transdniestria. The chapter does provide support, however, for the role of the 
constitution in consolidating Transdniestrian statehood, bolstering its recognition claims, and 
increasing the region’s engagement with external actors.  
The fifth and concluding chapter summarizes key findings, discusses their implications, 
and identifies possible directions for future research. In particular, this chapter offers some 
preliminary thoughts on why constitutional elements have played no role in Transdniestria, as 
opposed, for example, to Kosovo. It also raises the possibility that Transdniestria’s experience 
may be similar to those of other unrecognized entities. Finally, it outlines possibilities for further 
research on the question of whether constitutional development has had other impacts on the 
process of conflict resolution aside from recognition.  
As one of the first analyses of the role of unrecognized foundational legal tools for the 
viability of a de facto state and for the negotiation process, this research provides insight into the 
internal dynamics of an unrecognized state. It contributes to the literature on state recognition by 
analyzing the traditional and contemporary criteria for recognition in the context of an 
unrecognized state. It shows that an unrecognized state takes seriously the official recognition 
requirements and strives to meet them, although the final decision in granting recognition 
remains at the discretion of already-recognized states. The research also expands scholarly 
knowledge of functions that a constitution has in a state beyond those recognized as sovereign. It 
suggests that, apart from its usual functions such as the organization and regulation of a polity, 
limitation of a government, and the protection of human rights, a constitution also serves as a 
5 
mechanism to seek international recognition. The dissertation concludes that the effects of a 
constitution on the international recognition and political status of an unrecognized state, which 
had until now been largely unexplored topics, in fact yield valuable avenues for further 
interdisciplinary research.  
6 
CHAPTER ONE. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK: THE ROLE OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE STATE RECOGNITION 
PROCESS 
Introduction 
The existing literature widely discusses the meaning and importance of a constitution in a 
sovereign state and debates the nature and criteria of a state’s official recognition. The 
scholarship on constitutional and international law, however, are silent on the role of a 
constitution in the recognition process. This first chapter, therefore, draws on the existing 
literature on state recognition in international law and on constitutionalism in order to develop a 
doctrinal framework that evidences the importance of a constitution for the recognition of a state. 
This framework contextualizes the research question on the effects of the constitution in an 
unrecognized state and lays the groundwork for answering it in the third and fourth chapters.  
In particular, this chapter argues that the theory and practice of recognition include 
criteria that reflect constitutional principles of governance and involve a constitution – a 
fundamental mechanism that embodies and realizes those principles – thereby making a 
constitution an important element of the recognition process. On this basis, there is a theoretical 
expectation that the constitutional development of an entity seeking recognition would have an 
effect on other states’ decision to grant recognition. 
To develop this argument, section one defines the concepts of recognition, a constitution, 
and constitutionalism. Section two analyzes in chronological order the existing political and legal 
doctrines on the recognition of sovereign states and governments, and these states’ potential to 
become members in international organizations. In so doing, this analysis reveals the close 
relationship between the process of recognition and a constitution. The doctrines examined here 
include the Tobar Doctrine, the Montevideo Convention, membership criteria for the United 
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Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern 
Europe and in the Soviet Union, and the Copenhagen criteria on European Union membership. 
Section two also explores Croatian and Kosovar practices to show that they demonstrate some 
consistency with the pattern the doctrinal framework predicts. 
1. Defining the Recognition of a State, a Constitution, and Constitutionalism 
The analysis of the key features of the concepts of recognition and constitutionalism 
suggests that a constitution matters for the recognition process. It both represents a mechanism 
that asserts an entity’s statehood and projects the commitment of the aspiring state to be a 
member of the international community. 
1.1 The Recognition of States  
 Defining the recognition of states. In international relations, recognition generally refers 
to the acknowledgment of “certain changes in the world community”1 and usually concerns 
recognition of a new state or government. Formal recognition of a state implies the acceptance of 
its “legitimated authority over peoples and territories”2 and its admission to the arena of 
international relations as one of the members of the system of sovereign states. Recognition of a 
new government suggests the acknowledgement of a person’s or group of persons’ authority to 
act as an official organ of the state and to represent it in international relations.3 Taken in a 
broader context, recognition also refers to the admission of a state to official international 
organizations that have been established as communities of states either on an international (e.g. 
                                                 
1 Thomas D. Grant, The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution (Westport: Praeger, 
1999), ix 
2 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1964). 213  
3 Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in 
Exile (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, 1998). The notion of the recognition of government is further discussed 
below, in Section 2. 
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the United Nations) or regional (e.g. the European Union) level. By applying to such an 
organization and attempting to meet its membership criteria, a state seeks its recognition as a 
member. To explore the relevance of a constitution for the recognition of a state as a potential 
participant in international relations, this chapter draws on international legal theory and practice 
regarding the recognition of states, as well as governments and international organizations. 
 While the state has been the foundation of international order since the Treaty of 
Westphalia (1648),4 the very meaning of statehood and the function of recognition remain 
controversial and ambiguous. The literature on this subject is characterized by a range of debates 
on the criteria for statehood and the concept of recognition.5 One set of debates on recognition in 
international legal theory concerns its constitutive and declarative models. Constitutive theory 
suggests that the state emerges after meeting the criteria for statehood and gaining recognition 
from other states,6 whereas declarative theory claims that the act of recognition simply asserts 
the existence of the state and serves as an instrument for acknowledgement of the state’s political 
existence.7 Related to this traditional debate, but distinct from it, is the tension concerning 
whether recognition is a legal or political act.8 Finally, discussions also focus on the changing 
international practices of recognition from a unilateral and discretionary process to a collective 
                                                 
4 The Treaty of Westphalia is generally seen as the basis of the system of independent states. See Antonio Cassese, 
International Law in a Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 34-37. 
5 For the scholarship addressing the issues of recognition of a state, see Richard Caplan, Europe and the Recognition 
of New States in Yugoslavia (Cambridge University Press, 2005); James Crawford, The Creation of States in 
International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); John Dugard and David Raic, “The Role of Recognition in the 
Law and Practice of Secession,” in Secession: International Law Perspectives, ed. Marcelo G. Kohen (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment 
of New States Since 1776  (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Grant, 1999; Hans Kelsen, 
“Recognition in International Law,” American Journal of International Law 35, no. 4 (1941); Stephen D. Krasner, 
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Hersch Lauterpacht, 
Recognition in International Law (Cambridge: University Press, 1947); Michael W. Reisman and Eisuke Suzuki, 
“Recognition and Social Change in International Law: A Prologue for Decisionmaking,” in Toward World Order 
and Human Dignity, ed. Michael W. Reisman and Burns H. Weston (London: Collier Macmillan Publisher, 1976). 
6 Lauterpacht, 1947; Kelsen, 1941.  
7 Crawford, 1979. 
8 Grant, 1999. 
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and more coordinated approach.9 This chapter takes into consideration these debates but mainly 
addresses a different aspect of the recognition process, namely its interrelation with the 
constitutional development of a state-like entity. 
 On the whole, formal recognition represents the acceptance of a new entity as a state by 
an authoritative body of another, sovereign state, if the entity meets the criteria for statehood 
defined below.10 Through this process, authorized decision-makers signal the willingness of their 
state to respond to and accept certain changes in the world community and to consider a new 
state as a part of that community.11 
 The criteria for statehood. The concept of statehood, which is defined as “a claim of right 
based on a certain factual and legal situation,”12 has evolved throughout both legal thought and 
the historical practice of the recognition process. First, it includes traditional criteria for 
recognition of states found in 1933 Convention on Rights and Duties of States, also known as the 
Montevideo Convention. The Montevideo Convention asserts that a state should possess the 
following qualifications to satisfy the requirements for statehood: “(a) a permanent population; 
(b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other 
states.”13 Second, the criteria for recognition have also come to include additional contemporary 
requirements, such as an emergent state’s non-violation of international law, in particular its jus 
                                                 
9 John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (Cambridge: Grotious Publications, 1987). Since there is no 
international authority responsible for determining whether an entity claiming to be a state meets the above 
requirements, each state or international organization makes the determination through its own assessment and 
decides whether the new entity should enter the community of nations, thereby showing whether the accepting state 
is willing to deal with a new-admitted entity. See Dugard and Raic, 2006. Formal recognition is also characterized 
by both a quantitative aspect – how many of the other states recognize the entity or not – as well as a qualitative one 
– recognition by a great power is of more utility than recognition by a less powerful state. See Francis Owtram, “The 
Foreign Policies of Unrecognized States,” in Unrecognized States in the International System, ed. Nina Caspersen 
and Gareth Stansfield (NY: Routledge, 2011). 
10 Lori F. Damrosch et al., eds., International Law: Cases and Materials, 5th ed. (West Publishing, 2009), 300. 
11 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 87-88. 
12 Crawford, 1979, 31, 119. 
13 Article 1, Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933. The provisions on government and 
capacity to enter into relations with other states are discussed in detail in Section 2. 
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cogens norms (the prohibitions against genocide, maritime piracy, slavery, torture, and 
aggression),14 as well as the entity’s adherence to democratic principles, the rule of law, and the 
protection of human and minority rights.15  
The focus of the international community on democracy, the rule of law and 
human/minority rights reveals a revised approach to the character of its membership. This 
approach suggests that the internal structure of a state has gradually become more important for 
states as it influences the international system’s functioning. Previously regarded as a purely 
domestic issue, the constitutional nature of a country has increasingly become a significant 
concern for international society, especially in the twentieth century.16 Organizing a state around 
constitutional principles serves as confirmation of the state’s willingness and capacity to fulfill 
its international obligations, thereby ensuring the peaceful and stable co-existence of states in the 
eyes of international community.17 
In the context of the recognition process and Western constitutionalism, the conventional 
usage of terms “democracy,” “the rule of law,” and “human rights” mainly refer to the following 
definitions.  
 Democracy represents a form of governance that ensures the participation of all 
citizens of the state on an equal basis in political decision-making at every level of governance. It 
                                                 
14 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “International Crimes: ‘Jus Cogens’ and ‘Obligatio Erga Omnes’,” Law and Contemporary 
Problems 59, no. 4 (1996), 68. Jus cogens norms represent the peremptory norms of international law, which are 
accepted and recognized by the community of states as norms, and derogation from which is not permitted. Article 
53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. For the debates on the content of jus cogens, see also Dugard, 
1987. 
15 Damrosch et al., 2009, 312; Caplan, 2005; Grant, 1999, 84. 
16 Daniel Thurer, a Swiss scholar of public international law, has explored international influence on national 
processes of constitution-making and showed that involvement in the constitutional affairs of a country range from 
initiating (by accompanying and steering), to the instatement of such processes. Daniel Thurer, cited in Ulrich K. 
Preuss, “Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime Change through External 
Constitutionalization,” New York Law School Law Review 51, no. 3 (2006-2007), 493. 
17 Christian Hillgruber, “The Admission of New States to the International Community,” European Journal of 
International Law 9, no. 3 (1998), 501. 
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includes free and fair elections, political pluralism, freedom of press and speech, legal 
restrictions of executive powers, and an independent judiciary.18 
 The rule of law19 implies that government authority may only be exercised in 
accordance with the law, which itself has been adopted through an established procedure. It 
prioritizes the supremacy of the law instead of arbitrary rulings.20 
 Human rights are commonly understood as the universal, inalienable, and egalitarian 
entitlements of human beings. These include a set of civil, political, economic, and social rights 
(e.g. right to life, right to freedom of movement, and equality before the law). The term minority 
rights mainly refers to special guarantees for members of racial, ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
minority groups (e.g. language rights and the establishment of social and religious institutions).21 
These notions have come to constitute important principles for the international 
community, including in its activity related to the recognition process of states, for three key 
reasons. First, leading state actors, who often define the nature of the development of 
international law and relations, widely share and value the concepts of democracy, the rule of 
law, and the protection of human rights. Second, the absence of democracy and arbitrary power 
in a state might result in domestic oppression and cause instability in the international system.22 
Third, many states share a position that democracies do not go to war against one another, and, 
                                                 
18 David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). 
19 The concept of the rule of law is legally employed in the Anglo-American context; in German context, it is 
Rechtsstaat and in French it is état de droit. 
20 Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 91-101. 
21 Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, and Ryan Goodman, eds., International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, 
Morals, 3d ed. (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
22 Grant, 1999, 102. In his work, Grand refers to the shared belief of some theorists that nondemocratic states tend 
toward international aggression as well as domestic oppression and brings examples of North Korea and Iraq. See, 
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 203. For further discussion on the reasons of limiting government 
sovereignty through human rights regimes See Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: 
Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,” International Organization 54, no. 02 (2000), 217-252. 
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therefore, the establishment of more democratic regimes represents one way to achieve 
international peace.23 
In addition, the protection of human rights as a criterion for state recognition ensures the 
limitation of governments’ power domestically and constitutes a cross-state understanding of the 
“‘standard threats’ to human dignity.”24 Due to increased awareness of an individual’s 
significance and dignity, the prevention of these threats becomes an issue of international 
concern and obligation.25 Therefore, only states that are committed to the protection of human 
rights are seen as potential members of international society and guarantors of international 
peace and security. Minority rights guarantees, more specifically, hush minorities’ fears of 
oppression and quiet domestic opposition, which helps to avoid tensions and prevent the 
spillover of conflicts into the inter-state arena.26  
Historical support for the importance of human rights for the recognition process goes 
back to nineteenth century when, similar to the EU’s approach in the 1990s,27 the parties to the 
1878 Treaty of Berlin28 linked the recognition of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania to 
respect for minority rights in those newly established states.29 The Entente Powers also 
established minority rights provisions as a condition for their recognition of Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes created after World War I. In 
this way, the Great Powers sought to respond to threats to “European stability posed by 
                                                 
23 On Liberal Peace Theory, see Miriam Fendius Elman, ed. Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997).  
24 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2d ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 
57 (citing Shue, 1980, at 29-34). 
25 Ibid., 57. 
26 Grant, 1999, 103. 
27 European Community. Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and 
in the Soviet Union” and “Declaration on Yugoslavia,” December 16, 1991, discussed in detail in the next section. 
28 Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and Turkey. 
29 The Treaty of Berlin, 1878, cited in Caplan, 2005, 62. 
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unalleviated minority grievances.”30 As a result, international society establishes specific 
eligibility criteria for membership, i.e. protection of minorities, in order to ensure that the goals 
of the community are achieved.  In addition, an effective democratic system, coupled with the 
rule of law and protection of human rights, enables each individual to maintain and practice an 
identity, a freedom that reduces, if not eliminates, minorities’ claims for separation and secures 
peace within the state and stability in a region.  
Consequently, the norms governing recognition have tended toward the inclusion of 
elements “with substantial bearing on relations among states,”31 in other words, norms with 
cross-border effects that would help to achieve the aims of international law. Therefore, these 
additional contemporary criteria for recognition are seen as good practice in international 
affairs32 to consolidate and protect common values, in particular democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights.33 
Thus, the criteria for state recognition include population, territory, government, 
capacity to enter into relations with other states, respect for jus cogens norms, and adherence to 
democratic principles, the rule of law, and human rights. The evolution of these criteria reflects 
not only the factual conditions of the state (its population, territory), but also the international 
community’s expectations of the qualitative features of the internal organization of a state and 
the principles of the membership in the community of states. These elements are realized through 
a constitutional state – an increasingly prevalent political state organization throughout the 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 62. 
31 Grant, 1999, 102. 
32 Although the concept of human rights is not an inherent structural element in international affairs, but rather is a 
political preference, it has played an increasingly important role in international obligations, and therefore 
strengthens the relationship between human rights and international affairs. Even though human rights differ from 
other international obligations in their lack of reciprocity, they are constantly present in the discourse about the aims 
of international coexistence. See Damrosch et al., 2009, 956-973, 285-293. 
33 Roland Bieber, “European Community Recognition of Eastern European States: A New Perspective for 
International Law?,” American Society of International Law Proceedings 86 (1992), 377. 
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world, which ensures compliance with international legal requirements on the protection of 
minorities and human rights through the establishment of constitutional mechanisms on 
democracy, the separation of powers, and guarantees of basic rights.34 As a result, making 
internal constitutional provisions (e.g. those guaranteeing minority rights) a part of the 
recognition process helps to ensure the fulfillment of international obligations through the 
admission process of new entities into the international community35 and to strengthen the role of 
a constitutional state itself, a development that is discussed in the next sub-section. 
1.2 Constitutions and Constitutionalism 
Constitution. Widely explored by social scientists36 and legal positivists,37 the notion of a 
constitution lacks a clear and decisive list of inherent characteristics.38 However, regardless of 
the differences in national traditions,39 many constitutions share basic principles originally 
                                                 
34 Hillgruber, 1998, 501. 
35 Caplan, 2005. 
36 For example, sociologists and anthropologists have identified certain “starting mechanisms” that are necessary for 
creating norm-based social systems, one of which is the basic rule of reciprocity, which helps to sustain a 
community over time. See generally, Alec Stone Sweet, “Judicialization and the Construction of Governance,” 
Contemporary Political Studies 32 (1999). 
37 For example, legal positivists distinguish modern legal systems from other normative systems. H.L.A. Hart, for 
instance, claims that “pre-law” societies, or communities governed by “unofficial” norms and authority structures, 
were “inefficient” insofar as their regimes lacked “secondary rules,” which are the means of adapting norms to 
changing circumstances. Such “secondary rules are typically developed as constitutional law, enabling a community 
to overcome the common governance problems.” H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, ed. Joseph Raz and Penelope  
Bullock, 2 ed., Clarendon Law Series (USA: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
38 The debates regarding the concept of a constitution concern its emergence (political revolution versus continuous 
evolution); form (written versus unwritten constitutions); amendment process (flexible versus rigid constitutions); 
division of powers; checks and balances; the rule of law; containment; the incorporated governmental structure; the 
hierarchy of law; and certain basic rights. Absent from the debate is a clear and comprehensive conceptualization of 
a constitution and its inherent elements. See generally, Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms 
and Performance in Thirty-six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Ruth Gavison, “What Belongs 
in a Constitution?,” Constitutional Political Economy 13 (2002). 
39 Ulrich K. Preuss, “Constitutionalism,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Craig E. (1998); Gavison, 
2002. 
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established by “Western templates” in that they organize and institutionalize a polity40 and fulfill 
a set of functions that are conventionally divided into the internal and external.41  
The internal functions of a constitution have been widely explored in the literature and 
are directly linked to the contemporary criteria for state recognition. These functions address a 
set of issues related to basic governmental structures and functions of government; fundamental 
values and commitments; and human rights.42 They seek to create or contribute to the stability 
and legitimacy of governance. A constitution represents: 
a body of meta-norms, those higher-order legal rules and principles that specify how 
all other lower-order legal norms are to be produced, applied, enforced, and 
interpreted. […W]ritten constitutions are the ultimate, formal source of state 
authority. They establish governmental institutions, such as legislatures, executives, 
and courts, and grant them the power to make, apply, enforce, and interpret laws,[…] 
and determine how legislative authority is constituted through … elections.43 
In this context, the concept of the rule of law also captures the relationship between a 
constitution and political institutions as it implies “that the state’s bodies act according to the 
prescriptions of law, and law is structured according to principles restricting arbitrariness.”44 
There is also a relationship between a constitution and democracy,45 in that constitutions sustain, 
                                                 
40 Karolina Milewicz, “Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization: Toward a Conceptual Framework,” 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 16, no. 2 (2009), 417. 
41 For example, in referring to internal functions of a constitution, Raz describes them as the mechanism that, inter 
alia, “defines the … powers of the main organs of the different branches of government.” Joseph Raz, “On the 
Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,” in Constitutionalism: Philosophical 
Foundations, ed. Larry Alexander (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 152-153. 
42 Gavison, 2002, 89. 
43 Alec Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes,” Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 16, no. 2 (2009), 626. 
44 See András Sajó, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (Budapest, New York: Central 
European University Press, 1999), 205. 
45 Scholars point out the complex nature of the constitution-democracy paradigm. A number of them agree that, 
despite the tensions for democracy that arise from limitations on majority decision-making enshrined in a basic 
document, a constitution and democracy tend to reinforce each other. For example, a state’s commitment to 
democracy affects the structure of the regime, but whether a democratic regime is parliamentary, presidential or 
mixed, it includes regular elections and an effective multi-party system. Democracy also requires some civil and 
political rights (e.g. the rights to vote and to be elected, and some freedom of speech and association), but 
affirmation of these rights requires effective mechanisms for their enforcement, which place some limits on 
democracy. See Gavison, 2002, 90. 
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promote46 or limit democracy47 through a number of mechanisms, for example, elections, a 
multi-party system, or human rights.48  
Overall, the internal functions of a constitution aim to establish rules that can influence 
human behavior and keep government in order and efficient through the separation of powers.49 
They also seeks to foster security and predictability in society;50 establish politics “where the 
rules serve the common good;”51 create a system that enables people to be part of political life 
through their citizenship;52 and protect individual rights, placing limits on majority decision-
making to avoid political changes that could weaken the minority.53 As a result, the main 
purposes of a constitution in a liberal, rule-of-law state54 within the liberal international order55 
are to protect the freedoms and basic rights of individuals against the power of the state and, 
additionally, to limit state power through the domestic separation of powers. It is a mechanism 
                                                 
46 Cass Sunstein, “Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue,” in Constitutionalism and Democracy, ed. Jon 
Elster and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1988). 
47 Among the constitutional mechanisms that limit democracy, scholars discuss judicial supremacy, see Rogers 
Smith, “Judicial Power and Democracy: A Machiavellian View,” in The Supreme Court and the Idea of 
Constitutionalism, ed. Steven et al. Krautz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 199-217; and 
rights, including their judicial interpretation, see Jeremy Waldron, “Precommitment and Disagreement,” in 
Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, ed. Larry Alexander (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 271-99, 290-92. Democracy can also limit or pose a threat to constitutionalism because the centrality 
of democracy to liberal constitutionalism is itself a contested question. See Steven Krautz, “On Liberal 
Constitutionalism,” in The Supreme Court and the Idea of Constitutionalism, ed. Steven et al. Krautz (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 30-49; Larry Alexander, “Constitutionalism and Democracy: 
Understanding the Relation,” Ibid., 161-169. 
48  Gavison, 2002, 90. 
49 Richard Kay, “American Constitutionalism,” in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations, 1998; Stephen 
Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,” in Constitutionalism and Democracy, 1988. 
50  Kay, 1998. 
51  Krautz, 2009, 2. 
52  Bruce A. Ackerman, “Neo-federalism?,” in Constitutionalism and Democracy, 1988, 187. 
53 Minorities get veto power over political decision. See generally, John Ester and Rune Slagstad, eds., 1988; 
Holmes, 1988; Jennifer Nedelsky, “American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private Property,” Ibid.; Rune 
Slagstad, “Liberal Constitutionalism and Its Critics: Carl Schmitt and Max Weber,” in Constitutionalism and 
Democracy, 1988; Waldron, 1998.  
54 The dominant model of a state since the mid-twentieth century. 
55 Liberal values constitute the basis of formal democratic institutions and are promoted in the international arena.  
Anne-Marie Gardner, “Beyond Standards Before Status: Democratic Governance and Non-state Actors,” Review of 
International Studies 34, no. 03 (2008), 536. 
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for the citizens to organize governance and to check the power of the state.56 In this context, the 
idea of internal constitutional functions refers to the realization of the fundamental tasks related 
to the internal political organization of a state.  
Some of these functions are also characteristic of authoritarian constitutions. The rules 
established by the constitutions in authoritarian regimes restrain authoritarians’ actions, define 
the limits of acceptable and legitimate political discourse, and ensure intra-elite coordination.57  
This suggests that a constitution matters and can make a difference regardless of the political 
regime in a state-like entity.  
Along with its internal functions, a constitution also has external functions. This feature 
has been largely overlooked by scholars of western constitutions, but has received some attention 
through the study of non-Western constitutional experiences. The practices of Arab and African 
constitutions suggest that, in addition to the establishment of the structure for the exercise of 
government power, constitutions also serve “constitutive” external functions.58 The purpose of 
these external functions is to establish a convincing sovereign presence for other nations in the 
international arena. By having a constitution, a polity asserts its legitimate and sovereign 
                                                 
56 As some scholars put it, the aims of a constitution are “[1] to authorize, and to create limits on, the powers of 
political authorities, [2] to enhance the legitimacy and the stability of the political order, [and 3] to institutionalize a 
distinction between ‘regular politics’ and ‘the rules of the game’ and other constraints (such as human rights) within 
which ordinary politics must be played.” Gavison, 2002, 90. See also Sweet, 2009, 627; Michel Rosenfeld, 
“Introduction: Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and Diversity,” in Constitutionalism, 
Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Michel Rosenfeld (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1994), 3. On the basis of constitutional authority, see Larry Alexander, ed. Constitutionalism: Philosophical 
Foundations, 1998); Frank Michelman, “Constitutional Authorship,” in Constitutionalism: Philosophical 
Foundations, 1998; Michael Perry, “What is ‘the Constitution’? (and Other Fundamental Questions),” Ibid.; Joseph 
Raz, “On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,” Ibid.; Jed Rubenfeld, “Legitimacy 
and Interpretation,” Ibid. 
57 Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, “Introduction,” in Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, ed. Ginsburg 
Tom; Simpser Alberto (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 14. 
58 Nathan Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World. Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable 
Government (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, “Constitutions Without 
Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political Paradox,” in Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions 
in the Contemporary World, ed. Douglas Greenberg, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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existence, a condition that is reflected in the declaration of sovereignty in many constitutional 
provisions.59  
The division between internal and external functions seen in the constitutional practices 
of recognized states is arbitrary, since each category reinforces the other and becomes internal or 
external depending on the context. At the same time, this delimitation can be a useful analytical 
tool for examining the role of a constitution in the cases of state-like entities seeking recognition, 
a topic that is discussed further in Section Two. 
Constitutionalism. Since the end of World War II, there has been a tendency to 
distinguish between constitutionalism and a constitution to emphasize the importance of values 
laid down in constitutions and not simply their formal character.60 Constitutionalism is regarded 
as “a systematization of thinking about constitutions grounded in the development since the mid-
twentieth century of supranational normative systems against which constitutions are 
legitimated.”61 As a result, communities of nations refer to that systematization to “legitimate 
[…] their actions against non-legitimate governments under principles of international law, or 
against which the populace can legitimately rebel.”62 Thus, constitutionalism differs from a 
                                                 
59 In the Arab World, this function is secondary to domestic concerns of the organization or increase of a state’s 
authority and the embodiment of a certain ideological appeal. See Brown, 2001. For African states, the idea of the 
constitutive value of a constitution, which demonstrates a state’s sovereignty, remains preeminent. See Okoth-
Ogendo, 1993. 
60 See Larry Gata Backer, “God(s) Over Constitutions: International and Religious Transnational  Constitutionalism 
in the 21st Century,” Mississippi College Law Review 27 (2008), 34-37. 
61 Larry Gata Backer, “From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power 
Systems,” Penn State Law Review 113, no. 3 (2009), 106. 
62 Ibid., 106. Backer clarifies the idea of nations’ reliance on the systematization of thinking about constitutions in 
the following citation: “In the discourse on international relations, we routinely differentiate between various 
categories of states and label them according to certain criteria that we consider relevant for our understanding of the 
dynamics of international politics. Sometimes these criteria are purely factual, but mostly they have an evaluative, 
even moralizing, overtone.” See also Ulrich K. Preuss, “Equality of States - Its Meaning in a Globalized Legal 
Order,” Chicago Journal of International Law 9, no. 1 (2008-2009). 
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constitution in that the former serves “as a means of evaluating the form, substance and 
legitimacy of the [latter].”63 
Scholarly literature does not subscribe to a particular way of understanding the notion of 
constitutionalism. Rather, the meaning varies depending on the foundational notions of how, in a 
given political system, the citizens and their representatives organize the state, constitute the 
government, provide for representation and participation, protect minorities, promote equality, 
and so on.64 Some scholars define constitutionalism as the commitment of a given political 
community to be governed by constitutional rules and principles in conformity with meta-
norms.65 In contrast, others use constitutionalism to refer either to those practices of government 
that derive from a particular constitutional order66 or to “the basic ideas, principles, and values of 
a polity [that] aspire to give its members a share in the government.”67 The extant literature also 
includes cultural views of constitutionalism, which conceptualize it as an overarching ideology 
of politics, community, and the state. To such scholars, constitutions express the collective 
identity of a specific people through their aspirations, values, and idealized essence. In this view, 
constitutionalism, then, is a legitimizing resource for the political body.68  
Overall, constitutionalism is a complex group of ideas about constituting and limiting the 
government’s authority that are derived from a body of foundational laws. A political 
organization is constitutional to the extent that it “contain[s] institutionalized mechanisms of 
                                                 
63 Backer, 2009, 106-107. 
64 Raz, 1998, 154. 
65 Sweet, 2009, 626, 628. 
66 Neil Walker, “European Constitutionalism and European Integration,” Public Law 2 (1996), 266, 267, cited in 
Sweet, 2009, 627. 
67 Ulrich K. Preuss, “The Political Meaning of Constitutionalism,” in Constitutionalism, Democracy and 
Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives, ed. Richard Bellamy (Aldershot: Avebury Publishing, 1996), 
11, 12. 
68 See, e.g., Jo Shaw, “Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union,” Journal of European Public Policy 6 
(1999); Robert Post, “Democratic Constitutionalism and Cultural Heterogeneity” (Berkeley: University of 
California, Institute of Governamental Studies, 2000). 
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power control for the protection of the interests and liberties of the citizenry, including those that 
may be in the minority.”69  
The current dissertation employs the notions of both a constitution and constitutionalism. 
It implies that a constitution is a mechanism used to assert the sovereign existence of an entity 
to other states in the international arena, and to establish fundamental norms for internal 
governance and external interactions. It refers to constitutionalism as a set of ideas on political 
organization with limited government authority and functions that helps to ensure the 
establishment and implementation of constitutional provisions, and provides for popular 
participation in governance, the separation of powers, and respect for human rights.   
2. Constitutions as a Part of the Recognition Process  
2.1. Doctrinal Framework for the Relevance of a Constitution for the 
Prospects of Recognition  
International law establishes a set of rules to organize the interactions of states in order to 
maintain their peaceful and secure co-existence in the international arena.70 Some of these rules 
concern the formal recognition process – for example, admission to the system of states based on 
the criteria for statehood – which themselves also aim to maintain international order and 
stability. In this process, constitutions as mechanisms for constituting and limiting internal power 
(for creating internal democratic governance) generally serve as the basis to realize the criteria 
for recognition or the standards of the international community for the would-be state; to signal 
the state’s eligibility to participate in international relations; and to affirm a potential state’s 
commitment to fulfilling the international community’s aims of peace and stability.  
                                                 
69 Gordon Scott, Controlling the State: Constitutionalism from Ancient Athens to Today (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999). 
70 Peace and security are among the key goals of the international community. See, e.g. Damrosch et al., 2009, 6. 
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Although some criteria for recognition, for instance, the protection of human rights, could 
also be accomplished through ordinary laws or statutes, the distinctive characteristics of a 
constitution (or other fundamental law) make it more effective for the purposes of meeting the 
criteria for state recognition for several reasons. First, a constitution is the supreme document in 
a state with foundational characteristics. Several notable features ensures its supremacy over 
ordinary laws and statutes: 1) “it is, and is meant to be, of long duration;” 2) “it has a canonical 
formulation” (that is, it is codified and purports to be comprehensive); 3) it constitutes a 
fundamental law that is “justiciable”; and 4) amendments to it are “legally more difficult to 
secure than ordinary legislation,”71 a practice that safeguards a constitution against modification 
through legislation or judicial review.72 Although the degree of rigidity may vary by state, the 
additional approval mechanisms for amendments, together with the fundamental provisions 
contained within a constitution (organization of government, basic values, and human rights) 
ensure its superiority over ordinary legislation.    
Furthermore, a constitution creates a foundation “as document (law, covenant), as deed 
(action, event), and [sometimes] as performance” (when the institution of a constitution is 
performed through referendum), thus establishing the key institutions of the state.73 As a result, 
introducing a set of provisions related to the recognition criteria into a constitution indicates an 
entity’s serious commitment to be bound by the international recognition requirements and to 
follow those criteria. 
                                                 
71 Raz, 1998, 152, 153. 
72 Milewicz, 2009, 418. 
73 Irina Culic, “State Building and Constitution Writing in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989,” Regio-
Minorities, Politics, Society (English Edition), no. 1 (2003), 39. 
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Second, the adoption of a constitution as a way to organize a polity and limit 
governmental power has become almost a universal practice.74 As a result, the international 
community expects that an entity seeking recognition would reflect its commitments through a 
constitution as a generally recognized fundamental tool of societal organization. In this sense, a 
constitution solidly demonstrates the entity’s intention to assert its sovereignty, to respect the 
commitments required by the recognition criteria, and to follow commonly accepted practices. 
In addition, the constitutionality of a state becomes an important element in fulfilling 
international obligations, thus influencing the recognition process. In general, a constitutional 
state is a system that ensures the state’s capacity to respect international responsibilities, namely 
by establishing a political organization based on public participation in governance, separation of 
powers, and guarantees of human rights. Furthermore, a constitution provides the necessary 
conditions for a state to abide by international obligations, such as the maintenance of peace and 
stability and respect for human and minority rights.75 Also, as mentioned above, the foundational 
and supreme nature of a constitution suggests the seriousness of the commitments to respect 
international responsibilities undertaken by a state-like entity seeking recognition and its 
potential reliability as a member of international community. 
In specific cases, for example, secession,76 the issue of constitutionality relates to the 
practices of separation from a parent state. First, compliance with the parent state’s constitutional 
provisions on secession – or their deliberate infringement by a secessionist entity – point to the 
                                                 
74 Bruce A. Ackerman, “The Rise of World Constitutionalism,” Virginia Law Review 83 (1997), 771-797. 
75 Hillgruber, 1998, 501. 
76 In international law, the right to secession is seen in the context of the broader principle of self-determination. The 
relationship of this principle to the constitution and to international law was particularly addressed by the Advisory 
Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada concerning Quebec. In its opinion, the Supreme Court examined the 
questions of whether Quebec can seceded from Canada unilaterally under the Constitution of Canada, whether the 
right to self-determination exists under international law, and what should prevail in case of conflict between 
international and domestic law. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217 (1998), in Damrosch et al., 
2009, 329-337. 
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existing relationship between constitutionality and the process of recognition. In the former case, 
a constitution contributes to the legitimacy of the secession process and favorably predisposes 
the states that consider the granting of recognition to do so.77 In the latter case, a parental 
constitution serves for the secessionist entity as a foil against which to stage its claim for the 
right to secede and its search for recognition. Second, a secessionist entity that respects the 
constitutional norms of a parent state may have a better image in the eyes of the international 
community from the perspectives of its potential to comply with the international obligations it 
would undertake if admitted.78 Therefore, constitutionality, i.e. acting in accordance with a 
constitution and the realization of constitutional functions, helps the state-like entity meet the 
international legal criteria for recognition and, thus, makes the entity a more attractive candidate 
for admission to the international community of states.  
Finally, there is a strong link between a constitution and the criteria for recognition that 
appears in a closer analysis of a particular set of international legal initiatives. These initiatives 
reflect either the procedural or substantive character of a constitution in the process of obtaining 
official recognition. They include the Tobar Doctrine (1907), the Montevideo Convention 
(1933), the UN membership criteria (1945), the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the EU Guidelines on 
the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union (1991), and the 
Copenhagen criteria on EU membership (1993). A chronological discussion of these political 
and legal ideas shows the gradual convergence on recognition standards that are more attentive 
to the constitutional behavior of a state. 
                                                 
77 Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998), 329-337. See also Akhil Amar, “Some New World Lessons for the Old 
World,” University of Chicago Law Review 58 (1991), who directly argues that the secession of an independent 
polity should not be recognized if it violated the municipal law of the parent state.  
78 As Grant puts it, “If an independent movement treats municipal constitutional norms cavalierly, what are the 
prospects that as a state it will respect international law?” Grant, 1999, 104. 
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In particular, these doctrines and documents demonstrate that the criteria for recognition 
imply the presence of a functioning constitution in a state-like entity because of the constitution’s 
potential to ensure those criteria are fulfilled. First, the constitutional affirmation of territory and 
statehood fulfills the traditional recognition criteria for the existence of a defined territory and a 
permanent population. Second, the recognition process’s requirement of the existence of 
government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states dovetails with the external 
constitutional function of asserting sovereignty. Third, the recognition process’s requirements of 
democratic government, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights correspond to the 
internal functions of the constitution that limit governmental authority: the adoption of a 
democratic constitution sets up the mechanisms for organizing governance according to 
principles of democratic participation, separation of powers, and the protection of human rights. 
Although both categories of internal and external constitutional functions are geared towards 
securing recognition of a state and are part of that final goal, it is convenient to keep this 
categorization for the purposes of comparing constitutional functions in recognized and 
unrecognized states. 
Thus, the analysis below of the interactions between international legal doctrines and 
constitutionalism suggests that, for the entity seeking recognition (as a state or of a membership), 
a constitution simultaneously represents a mechanism to assert the entity’s conformity with 
international expectations regarding the character of a participant in international relations and a 
way to claim its recognition. 
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2.1.1. The Tobar Doctrine  
In the international arena, states not only extend formal recognition to other states, but 
also grant recognition to the governments of states. Although recognition of a state and 
recognition of a government are two different notions, they are closely interconnected. First, a 
government is the essential criterion for statehood: to gain recognition, a state must have an 
effective government throughout its territory. It must also display the capacity to engage in 
international relations, including the ability to fulfill the obligations of international treaties to 
which it is party, a capacity that can be realized only through a government. Second, both 
notions are essential for the emergence and/or continuity of diplomatic relations, which lays the 
foundation for engagement with and interactions between states in international relations. 
Therefore, discussions over recognition of a government affect the discussions over recognition 
of a new state. They reveal the features that established states value in the process of recognition 
for the purposes of international co-existence. 
Recognition of a new government means that a recognizing state acknowledges a person 
or group of persons as authorized to act as the organ of the state and to represent it in its 
international relations.79 The need for this type of action usually emerges in circumstances where 
changes in government affect the continuity of diplomatic relations.80 Until the early twentieth 
century, states mainly extended recognition to those governments that were in power and 
fulfilled their international obligations.81 This approach changed with the emergence of the 
                                                 
79 Talmon, 1998. 
80 The continuity of diplomatic relations between governments may be jeopardized if a new government comes to 
power by illegal means (a coup d’état), or when an existing government refuses to allow a democratically elected 
opposition to take power. 
81 Donald Marquand Dozer, “Recognition in Contemporary Inter-American Relations,” Journal of Inter-American 
Studies 8, no. 2 (1966), 321, 320. 
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Tobar Doctrine, a theory of government recognition82 that directly linked a constitution with the 
recognition process. Despite remaining a historical rather than a contemporary doctrine, this 
theory provides an important insight into the role that a constitution plays in the recognition 
process. The Tobar Doctrine explicitly sees a constitution as integral to the process, asserts that 
recognition should only be extended to democratic and constitutional governments, and 
proscribes the recognition of any government that comes to power by extra-constitutional 
means.83  
After a period of serious political disorder in Central America, the policies of recognition 
began to take on new importance. In 1907, several Central American states84 adopted a 
document, the so-called Tobar Doctrine,85 in which they agreed not to recognize new regimes in 
Central America that came to power as a result of a coup d’état or a revolution against an 
internationally recognized government. This novel policy of recognition required an appraisal of 
the constitutional validity of a new regime before it would be recognized. This new requirement 
pointed to the development of multilateral or collective recognition – that is, of recognition based 
upon international consultation. The criteria for extending recognition to a new regime in the 
Americas now mandated the representation of the will of the people in government; no 
                                                 
82 See Talmon, 1998, 7-10 (describing four traditional models of government recognition). Talmon notes that, “the 
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The Americas 23, no. 3 (1967). 
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85 Named for Carlos R. Tobar, a former foreign minister of Ecuador. 
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considerable threat to the new regime’s power; the commitment to fulfill its international 
obligations; and the approval of the principles and system of new governance by the recognizing 
government.86  
The Tobar Doctrine provided that:  
[t]he American Republics for the sake of their good names and credit, apart from other 
humanitarian or altruistic considerations, should intervene in the internal dissensions of 
the Republic of the Continent. Such intervention might consist at least in the non-
recognition of de facto, revolutionary governments created contrary to the constitution.87 
Although officially adopted by only five Central American states, other countries 
followed the Tobar Doctrine, thus demonstrating broader international expectations for internal 
governance based on the principles of democracy and constitutionalism. In particular, the United 
States followed this policy by refusing to recognize the Tinoco regime, which came to power in 
Costa Rica by means of a coup d’état, or the Huerta regime, which seized power by 
revolutionary action in Mexico.88 In its recognition policy, the US underscored that it would 
support the will of people, not the personal ambitions of those who seize power, and insisted on 
democratic procedures for changing power.89 As a result, the early interwar period in the 
Americas was marked by the “considerable use of constitutional legitimism.”90 
In 1923, the Central American states further emphasized the political principle of 
recognition by agreeing not to recognize any government that came into power through a coup 
d’état or a revolution against a recognized government, so long as the freely elected 
representatives of the people thereof had not constitutionally reorganized the country. More 
broadly, the states refused to recognize any new “government which arises from the election to 
                                                 
86 Dozer, 1966, 321, 324. 
87 Brown, “The Legal Effects of Recognition,” American Journal of International Law 44 (1950), 62, quoting the 
Tobar Doctrine, emphasis added. 
88 Dozer, 1966, 322. 
89 Ibid., 322. 
90 M.J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 1815-1995 (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1997), 75. 
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power of a citizen expressly and unquestionably disqualified by the Constitution of his country 
as eligible to election as President, Vice-President, or Chief of State designate.”91  
This conditional nature of recognition was partly connected to the increased international 
attention on governments’ character that occurred during and after both World Wars. The idea of 
democratic government as the ideal form of governance was also coupled with recognition 
policy during the Mexico City Conference, where Guatemala proposed that recognition should 
be denied to “anti-democratic regimes” on the grounds that they constituted “a serious danger to 
the unity, solidarity, peace and defense of the Continent.”92 Although this proposal was not 
approved, the Conference made it clear that non-recognition of a government could be used as a 
lever against non-compliant states to spur them to enact democratic policies to ensure peace and 
security.93 As a result, the Tobar Doctrine formulated in the Latin American conventions of 1907 
and 1923 “sought to protect constitutional governments against revolution by threatening 
revolutionary regimes with non-recognition.”94  
The experience of Central America demonstrates how recognition came to be used as a 
means for maintaining democratic regimes and promoting democratic or constitutional 
legitimacy. The policy contributed to some degree of constitutional stability,95 respect for 
democratic institutions,96 orderly processes of government, and the safety of the lives and 
property of foreigners,97 thereby promoting the aims of the international community on peace 
and security. 
                                                 
91 Dozer, 1966, 323. 
92 Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, February 21-March 8, 1945. “Report of 
the Delegation of the United States of America.” U.S. Government Printing Office, (1946), 7. 
93 Dozer, 1966, 325. 
94 Dugard, 1987, 26. 
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Criticism of the Tobar Doctrine. Critics of the Tobar Doctrine maintained that requiring 
one nation to arbitrate the interpretation of another’s constitution violated the principle of non-
intervention. In particular, in retaliation for the interventionist policies of the United States in 
1930, Mexican Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada proposed instead that recognition of a new 
government should be granted automatically, regardless of its origin or the means through which 
it came to power. The Mexican government argued that formal declarations of recognition are  
an insulting practice and one which, in addition to the fact that it offends the sovereignty 
of other nations, implies that judgment of some sort may be passed upon the internal 
affairs of those nations by other governments, inasmuch as the latter assume, in effect, an 
attitude of criticism, when they decide, favorably or unfavorably, as to the legal 
qualifications of foreign regimes.98  
The Estrada doctrine, as it came to be known, asserted that, when a new government took 
office, its diplomatic relations with other nations should continue unbroken. Based on the 
assumption that recognition was the right of a new government,99 Latin American governments 
promoted the Estrada doctrine “as a means of preventing recognition from being used for the 
purpose of applying pressure on a new government” and from violating the principle of non-
intervention.100 
Several years later, in 1948, the XXXV Resolution adopted at the Ninth International 
Conference of American States in Bogota reaffirmed the idea of continuity in diplomatic 
relations regardless of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a new regime. In particular, the 
Resolution declared: 
(1) That continuity of diplomatic relations among the American States is desirable, 
(2) That the right of maintaining, suspending or renewing diplomatic relations with 
another government shall not be exercised as a means of individually obtaining 
unjustified advantages under international law, and 
                                                 
98 “Statement of Secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico Estrada, 27 September 1930.” 1963, 85. 
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100 Ibid., 326. 
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(3) That the establishment or maintenance of diplomatic relations with a government does 
not imply any judgment upon the domestic policy of that government.101 
 Thus, these American states emphasized the historical principle of non-intervention, 
while at the same time distinguishing between the recognition of a government and approval of 
its new regime.102 This move from the Tobar to the Estrada Doctrine demonstrated a 
countervailing trend in recognition law and practice, highlighting the predominance of the 
principles of non-intervention and sovereignty (i.e. the discretion of a state to grant or deny 
recognition) in international relations.  
To summarize, the recognition practices of the governments of the Americas and 
elsewhere greatly varied during the twentieth century, fluctuating between the Tobar and Estrada 
Doctrines. At the same time, democratic values and institutions constantly remained under states’ 
close attention. For example, the spread of fascism during World War II strengthened efforts to 
use democratic legitimacy as a criterion for governments’ recognition, pushing some states, 
including Estrada’s Mexico, to deny recognition to the Franco government of Spain because of 
its fascism. Additionally, the growing importance of democracy for the international community 
influenced the decision of some states to delay “recognizing the [People’s Republic of China] for 
long periods,”103 or to condemn “the unconstitutional overthrow of the democratically elected 
Government in Pakistan…in 1999.”104  
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In addition, the increasing significance of democratic values and human rights 
proclaimed after World War II influenced the periodic usage of non-recognition as “a weapon in 
the global effort to promote democracy […] resting on a belief that one form of government is 
better than all others and deserves to be promoted through concerted international action.”105 As 
a result, although the policy of recognition based upon a test of the constitutionality of a new 
regime was not applied to the recognition of any non-American government, the Tobar Doctrine 
represented an important development in the general principles of international relations among 
states. It also contributed to later efforts to link membership in the international community with 
the concepts of democracy, protection of human rights, and the rule of law.  
2.1.2. The Montevideo Convention  
The concept of state’s recognition is closely related to the Montevideo Convention, 
which is the most widely accepted formulation of the key criteria for statehood in international 
law. The Convention establishes the traditional criteria for recognition,106 which are strongly 
connected to a constitution, its meaning, and its functions. The Montevideo requirements for 
recognition of a state include a permanent population, defined territory, government, and the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states. Despite their wide criticism,107 the factual and 
broad character of these criteria helped to create consensus among different territorial entities on 
the general approach towards recognition. This, in turn, has contributed to the maintenance of the 
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international order108 and the accommodation of the wide range of possibilities that exist in 
practice.109 Although these requirements do not explicitly refer to a constitution, there are several 
points of intersection between the traditional criteria for recognition and constitutional 
provisions.110 
First, a constitution usually defines a state’s territory and either reflects the entity’s 
existing borders or creates new ones. Thus, a constitution frequently satisfies the Montevideo 
Convention criteria on territory and population. The preambles of constitutions (and declarations 
of independence) are informative in this respect because they often assert the basis for a new 
state’s existence and sovereignty, which may include elements of its historical existence or show 
the continuity of nationhood by referring to its traditions, language, heroic history, cultural 
inheritance, and territory111 As a part of state building, a constitution establishes a demarcated 
territory112 and references the people living on this territory and the development of their 
statehood.113 As a foundational document, a constitution exercises its key external functions of 
legitimizing and asserting the existence, sovereignty, independence, and perspectives of the 
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state.114  It also helps abjure other’s claims to the new entity’s territory – an important feature for 
the international system’s functioning.115 Although the mere existence of a constitution is 
insufficient cause to consider a state independent and eligible for recognition, it nonetheless 
represents an instrument to signal an entity’s aspirations to assert its sovereignty and to 
participate in international relations: 
A territorial entity must have a constitution which is independent of other constitutions to 
be termed, in the specified sense, sovereign, and hence able to look forward to 
membership in the collectivity of states.116 
Second, the criteria on government and the capacity to enter into relations with other 
states imply the existence of a constitution (or other fundamental law) in a state as a 
contemporary mechanism to organize government and to establish sovereignty. The requirement 
of government, or other effective authority, presumes a certain degree of internal stability that is 
expressed through a functioning government, the loyalty of the majority of population,117 and 
legal order.118 The other criterion, the capacity to enter into relations with other states, depends 
on the power of a government to carry out its international obligations effectively.119 Although 
these claims can vary in how stringently they are interpreted with respect to assessing 
statehood,120 the existence of a system of government in a specific territory is, in general, a pre-
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condition for statehood and the normal conduct of international relations,121 the lack of which 
may cause the denial of recognition. As a result, the criterion of government is partly realized 
through internal constitutional functions. The practice of recognition suggests that there must 
exist  
some known and defined form of government, acknowledged by those subject thereto, in 
which the functions of government are administered by usual methods, competent to 
mete out justice to citizens and strangers, to afford remedies for public and for private 
wrongs, and able to assume the correlative international obligations and capable of 
performing the corresponding international duties resulting from its acquisition of the 
right of sovereignty.122  
Thus, a constitution becomes one of the tools used to define the form and the functions of a 
government and make them known to the subjects of a state. In addition, in the modern state,123 
legal order (or the existence of basic rules) allows the international community to determine the 
power exercised by a government.124 A constitution or other fundamental domestic law reveals 
the scope of a government’s power and the legal conditions in which it operates within the 
modern state.  
As a result, the constitution becomes a mechanism for establishing a defined form of 
government, its functions, and legal order. Along with government, to take root, to flourish, and 
to function as an instrument of a democratic political life, a constitution needs statehood – the 
political organization of the society. In this way, modern constitutionalism, an important tool of 
rationalizing state power,125 is strongly connected to the development of the modern state and its 
diplomatic capabilities126 and helps to meet the criteria for recognition.    
                                                 
121 Ibid., 47. 
122 President Ulysses Grant explaining the denial of recognition to Cuba in 1875. Moore J.B., cited in Lauterpacht, 
1947, 28-29. 
123 The modern state is defined as the territorial basis for a centralized legal order. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of 
Law, trans. Max Knight, 2d ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 284-7. 
124 Ibid., 284-7. 
125 Preuss, 2006-2007, 482, 485. 
126 Ibid., 485. 
35 
  To summarize, the provisions of the Montevideo Convention imply a constitution as an 
important mechanism in the modern liberal democratic order for establishing sovereignty and 
organizing government. In this way, a constitution serves the interests of the international system 
in fostering stable and peaceful relations among the members of the international community and 
in ensuring each country’s fulfillment of its international obligations.  
2.1.3. United Nations Membership 
Taken in a broader context, recognition also refers to the acceptance of states as members 
in an official international community (e.g. the United Nations) or in regional organizations (e.g. 
the European Union) based on certain criteria. The development of these criteria takes into 
consideration not only formal and factual criteria, but also commitments to substantive values, 
for example, the protection of human rights. The idea of “civilized states” has long implied the 
physical control of a defined territory and population with its own history, progress, and 
development.127 In the aftermath of World War II, however, this concept also gradually came to 
encompass such elements as human rights and constitutionalism. The promotion of human rights 
and the liberal political model around the globe helped to universalize these concepts128 and 
became “a civilizing crusade,”129 expanding the list of the features “civilized states” must 
possess. As a result, after World War II, the rhetoric on the character of international relations 
within the “club of civilized nations” and the membership requirements to belong to 
organizations such as the United Nations or the European Union increasingly demanded respect 
for the principles of the peaceful settlement of disputes, democracy, the rule of law, and human 
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rights.130 In these circumstances, states in search not only of diplomatic recognition but also of 
membership in certain organizations have had to meet various types of entrance requirements 
linked to constitutionalism. As a result, a domestic constitution has become one of the key 
instruments used in meeting the requirements for admission to the international or a regional 
community.  
The United Nations is the world’s most important international organization. As such, 
membership in it has come to be viewed as affirmation of independence and statehood (as 
happened for the new countries that emerged during decolonization),131 or as guarantee of 
protection under the UN Charter (in the case of Eastern European states after the Cold War).132 
The admission of a new member state to the UN does not imply its recognition by all UN 
member countries, or convey the recognition of its government. For example, Israel was 
admitted to the UN in 1949133 but to the present day continues to be unrecognized by a group of 
the UN members.134 Similarly, the absence of a state’s membership in the UN does not mean that 
it lacks statehood and may not be recognized by other states.135 However, in most cases, 
acceptance in the United Nations indicates that “a new state has come into being, and that the 
international system will treat the new entity as a state”136 with legal rights and under protection 
of international law.  
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The general UN practice embraces some of the basic principles of constitutionalism and 
suggests the importance of democratic governance and the protection of human rights for 
membership in international society. Although silent on the constitutional form of an acceding 
(or a member) state, the overall structure of the UN articulates certain fundamental values of the 
international community and pushes states toward accepting some elements of constitutionalism. 
This can be seen in several examples: the character of the UN Charter provisions; the practice of 
Rhodesia’s non-recognition; the employment of recognition as a tool for protecting human rights 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina; UN officials’ promotion of democratic governance; and the UN practice 
in defining the notion of statehood.  
First, the UN Charter explicitly sets standards for admission to the United Nations in 
order to hold emerging states to the ideals upon which the UN was founded. The Charter states: 
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept 
the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, 
are able and willing to carry out these obligations.137 
According to the International Court of Justice’s interpretation, the Charter implies five 
conditions for membership: “an applicant must (1) be a state; (2) be peace-loving; (3) accept the 
obligations of the Charter; (4) be able to carry out those obligations; and (5) be willing to do 
so.”138 These conditions must be met “in the judgment of the Organization,” and admission to the 
UN is granted by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendations of the Security 
Council.139  
Although the exact meaning of these criteria has historically been the subject of much 
debate, there is wide consensus that a newly emerging state must abide by these standards if it 
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wants to be a member of the United Nations.140 Since the last four criteria are strongly 
interrelated, they could be summarized as two criteria for UN membership: a prospective 
member must be a state and must abide by the UN Charter.   
As discussed earlier, the Montevideo Convention provides the most common definition 
of this first criterion, that a prospective member be a state. Although the international community 
has often recognized entities that do not meet the Montevideo criteria,141 this definition is still 
widely accepted142 and is used in UN admission practices.143   
The second criterion, willingness to abide by the UN Charter, refers to a general principle 
in international law that a newly independent state cannot accede to a treaty if its accession 
would be incompatible with the object and purposes of the treaty.144 By joining the UN, states 
assume a number of obligations and commitments, for example, the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and the readiness to cooperate in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.145 The requirements the UN Charter 
imposes on prospective UN members to meet these goals suggest domestic changes may be 
necessary in some states. These changes must ensure that a state refrains from threatening 
international peace and security and from using force against other states;146 respects the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;147 and accepts the principles of 
international humanitarianism and human rights.148 The special attention the UN Charter pays, 
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for instance, to the protection of human rights, equality, and peace shape the behavior of 
prospective members and may require them to enact some domestic constitutional changes to 
meet those obligations.  
Second, although UN practices during the Cold War demonstrate that many states were 
admitted to the organization in violation of the Charter’s principles, these and subsequent UN 
actions also show that some of the fundamental features of a constitutional state, such as human 
rights protections, and democratic governance (to a lesser degree),149 are nonetheless present in 
the UN’s admission process and in the UN’s acceptance of a state-like entity as a state and as a 
participant in international relations. Then and now, aspirant states that lack these features risk 
the UN’s non-recognition. The development of international relations and the system of 
sovereign states during the decolonization process shaped UN perspectives on the recognition of 
a state.150 Some cases, such as Rhodesia and South Africa’s “Homeland-States,” directly address 
the importance of democratic governance and human rights’ protections in formal recognition.  
The non-recognition of Rhodesia from 1965 to 1980 provides an example of collective 
non-recognition, led by UN, of the undemocratic and racist regime controlling Rhodesia upon 
independence. Grounding its approach in the supplemental criteria for recognition, the General 
Assembly rebuffed the minority white regime that took power in Rhodesia during 
decolonization. The Assembly appealed “to all States…not to recognize any government in 
Southern Rhodesia which is not representative of the majority of the people.”151 In addition, the 
General Assembly’s resolutions referenced the 1960 “Declaration of the Granting of 
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Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” to emphasize the UN’s fundamental goals and 
condemned Rhodesian independence under minority rule, stressing the need for governance 
under majority rule152 without policies of racial discrimination and segregation.153 
After the minority white government declared independence, the Security Council made 
several similar pronouncements. First, it called upon all UN member states “not to recognize 
[the] illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia.”154 Shortly thereafter, the Security 
Council declared that the “continuance [of the Declaration of Independence] in time constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security” and called upon “all States not to recognize this illegal 
authority and not to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with it.”155 Subsequent 
declarations likewise emphasized the threat of the situation in Rhodesia to international peace 
and security, and urged the UN member states to refrain from recognizing the state.156 
The case of Rhodesia thus demonstrates the existence of other criteria for recognition of a 
state. Although there is no scholarly consensus on what exactly these criteria encompass, they 
center on the principles of democracy and human rights. Some scholars, for example, assert that 
Rhodesia was not recognized due to absence of majority rule in the country, a prerequisite for 
recognition in such a situation.157 Others point to “apartheid type” racial laws and policies,158 
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while still others argue that an entity that systematically violates human rights simply cannot be 
recognized as a state.159 
Despite this lack of consensus, there is general support for the idea that: 
[there] must be added the requirement that [a regime of a new state] shall not be based 
upon a systematic denial in its territory of certain civil and political rights, including in 
particular the right of every citizen to participate in the government of this country, 
directly or through representatives elected by regular equal and secret suffrage.160 
Thus, while Rhodesia met the Montevideo Convention’s requirements for statehood, the 
precedent established by its lack of international recognition illustrates the power of the world 
community’s expectations of the internal political organization of aspiring members. As 
additional criteria for recognition, democratic governance and the protection of human rights are 
directly related to the capacity of a state to meet its international obligations and pursue the aims 
of peace and security. Therefore, a democratic constitution, or other foundational law, becomes 
one way to establish a democratic government and enshrine the protection of human rights. 
Since 1960, the Rhodesian precedent has been applied to other claims of statehood. One 
such notable example is South Africa’s territorial units, which South Africa granted 
“independence” in order to segregate various African ethnic groups from the white minority.161 
The General Assembly called for the non-recognition of these units, which were created as an 
integral part of South Africa’s policy of apartheid.162 Among the principal reasons for non-
recognition of those territorial units, then, was South Africa’s apartheid policy, which was 
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unlawful, contrary to the UN Charter and basic norms of international law,163 and a violation of 
fundamental human rights.164 The international community’s response in these situations thus 
suggests that additional criteria, such as jus cogens norms (prohibition of apartheid), democratic 
governance, and the protection of human rights, are essential for recognition in international 
society because these demonstrate the capacity of a state-like entity to respect international 
obligations and ensure international peace and security.   
Returning to the broader discussion of UN practice, it is important to consider how the 
use of international recognition helps to protect human rights as well as how the promotion of 
democratic governance and definition of statehood reinforces the founding principles of the 
organization. For example, the UN’s decision to grant membership to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
face of serious human rights violations and military aggression by Serb and Croat troops during 
the Yugoslav crisis was seen by many as the best way to protect the rights of people in that 
entity.165 But, recognition of Bosnian independence and its admission to the UN also adhered to 
the principles of the UN Charter on human rights protection and non-aggression. On the one 
hand, Bosnia had promised to respect the principles of human rights protection and non-
aggression to gain recognition,166 yet, on the other hand, needed protection from the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which had carried out a sustained campaign of 
human rights violations.167 Thus, considerations of statehood and, more importantly, the 
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principles of the UN Charter, influenced the UN’s decision to extend recognition to Bosnia-
Herzegovina.168 
The practices of UN high officials provide further evidence that domestic democratic 
practices are related to the international community’s aims of peace and security. For example, 
Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary-General of the UN, expressly mentioned in one of his 
influential reports that: 
[there is an] obvious connection between […] the rule of law and transparency in 
decision-making… and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable 
political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of 
international and national political communities.169 
This document, which emphasizes the significance of the constitution in state-building, laid the 
foundation for the various UN activities that followed in the coming years.170   
Finally, by “certifying the existence of some states through its admission procedure and 
by denying the existence of others by means of non-recognition,”171 the UN actively shapes 
understanding of (and limitations to) the notion of statehood. For example, before applying for 
full membership in the UN in 2011 and receiving a “non-member observer state” status in 
2012,172 Palestine submitted a declaration to the International Criminal Court in 2009 unilaterally 
recognizing the court's jurisdiction. However, the prosecutor of the Court rejected the Palestinian 
Authority’s declaration on the grounds that, at the time, it had been only a “non-member entity” 
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in the UN. In its statement, the Court said that it could not act because Palestine was an 
“observer” at the UN and not a “state” as required by the Rome Statute.173 It continued that, in 
cases where it was controversial or unclear whether an applicant constituted a “state,” the 
decision fell to the Secretary General, which had to follow or seek the General Assembly’s 
directives on the matter when applicable. For this practice, the Court referenced the General 
Assembly’s resolutions that discuss whether an applicant is a “State.”174 Since the Security 
Council was unable to “make a unanimous recommendation,”175 Palestine submitted a 
downgraded request to the General Assembly for admission to the UN as a non-member observer 
state, a status that it achieved in 2012.176 As a result, UN bodies play a significant role in 
determining whether an applicant is considered a “state” and whether it belongs to the 
community of states by shaping policies on its defining attributes. 
To summarize, in the course of admitting a state to membership in the world body, the 
UN largely exercises recognition as described earlier by jurists, namely as the act by which states  
acknowledge the existence on a definite territory of a human society politically 
organized, independent of any other existing State, and capable of observing the 
obligations of international law, and by which they manifest therefore their intention to 
consider it a member of the international community.177 
Importantly, the UN process for admission adds the elements of human rights and democracy to 
the recognition criteria and promotes their establishment through domestic constitutional means. 
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UN practice reflects new developments in international society and the expectations of 
international public order. Since much of international law exists for the purpose of “helping 
states achieve mutually beneficial outcomes by clarifying what counts as cooperation or 
coordination,” in such situations, international law amounts to a set of codified expectations that 
countries observe for their mutual benefit.178 As a result, the system-wide interest in international 
peace and security implies that the criteria for recognition internalize democracy and the 
protection of human rights in order to achieve these international goals. Consequently, these 
features of constitutionalism find their place domestically in constitutional design and externally 
in the criteria for recognition.  
2.1.4. The Helsinki Final Act  
The process of recognizing states and membership in an intergovernmental organization 
also speak to the nature of relations between states in the international community. The Helsinki 
Final Act is one of key documents of the Cold War era that emphasizes the importance of 
constitutional principles for the development of peaceful and mutually secure international 
relations. The Act lays for the foundation for countries of differing ideologies to cooperate for 
the protection of human and minority rights and, more broadly, prioritizes the mutual co-
existence and peaceful interaction of the states in the international arena. It also reveals states’ 
expectations that the promotion of fundamental rights and freedoms would, in part, help to 
achieve international peace and security. For this reason, the Helsinki Final Act has become part 
one of the texts referenced in debates over the recognition of new states.   
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Adopted in 1975 by the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
Helsinki Final Act politically bound 35 states to the principle of détente.179 The agreement 
comprises three main sections (also referred as baskets): the first covers issues related to security 
in Europe; the second concerns cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology, and 
the environment; and the third involves cooperation in the humanitarian sector and in other fields 
such as culture and education. All three sections aim to frame the guiding principles of 
international relations among states to ensure international peace and stability. 
More specifically, the Helsinki Final Act contains provisions that call for sovereign 
equality and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; restraint from the threat or use of 
force; the territorial integrity of states and inviolability of their frontiers; the peaceful settlement 
of disputes; non-intervention in countries’ internal affairs; respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; equal 
rights; the self-determination of peoples; cooperation among member states; and the fulfillment 
in good faith of members’ obligations under international law. The Principle “Respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or 
belief”, in particular, is worth quoting at length here. It states that: 
The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language or religion. 
They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, 
social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development. 
[…] 
The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right 
of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the 
full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere. 
                                                 
179 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Helsinki Final Act. (1975). 
47 
The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and 
wellbeing necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation 
among themselves as among all States.180 
As this excerpt reveals, the Helsinki Final Act and, specifically, its Principles,181 created “a 
framework for progress”182 based on constitutional norms that have had a noticeable impact on 
the process of recognition. 
First, although this text does not explicitly reference a constitution, the principles it 
outlines clearly relate to many internal functions of a constitution, the very purpose of which is 
to limit state power. The obligation a state bears to protect the people within its borders 
necessitates mechanisms to implement the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and to limit the 
state’s activity in order to protect basic human rights. As “a codification of interstate relations 
and commitments that is grounded in long-established principles of international law and in such 
basic documents as the UN Charter,”183 these Principles must be implemented “by legal acts,"184 
one of which is a constitution. 
Second, as the example of many Central and Eastern European states after the end of the 
Cold War show, acceptance of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act has become a condition 
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for regional and international recognition. For instance, the EU Guidelines on Recognition, 
explicitly stipulated that:  
[T]he process of recognition of these new States, [] requires: 
- respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments 
subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with 
regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights 
- guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance 
with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE.185 
For their part, requests for recognition by the states of the Central and Eastern Europe provided 
explicit assurances of their commitment to the goals and principles of the Final Act.186  
The importance of democratic governance and the protection of human rights received 
additional emphasis in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. This Charter was adopted by 
participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which, in 
1990, included most European countries, Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The 
Charter of Paris explicitly states that: 
We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of 
government of our nations. In this endeavour, we will abide by the following: 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, are 
inalienable and are guaranteed by law. Their protection and promotion is the first 
responsibility of government. Respect for them is an essential safeguard against an 
overmighty State. Their observance and full exercise are the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace. 
Democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly through 
free and fair elections. Democracy has as its foundation respect for the human person and 
the rule of law. Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of expression, tolerance of 
all groups of society, and equality of opportunity for each person. 
Democracy, with its representative and pluralist character, entails accountability to the 
electorate, the obligation of public authorities to comply with the law and justice 
administered impartially. No one will be above the law. 
[…] 
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We affirm that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities 
will be protected and that persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to 
express, preserve and develop that identity without any discrimination and in full equality 
before the law.187 
The Charter of Paris further strengthened the document’s grounding in the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act by including the new “Guidelines for the Future,” which stressed signatories’ 
commitment to human and minority rights, democracy, and the rule of law. 
As is evident, both the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris clearly communicate 
the international community’s vision for a system of democratic states with strong state 
protection of human and minority rights. They also specify the requirements with which a new 
state must comply if it wishes to become a member of world community or to have relations with 
other countries. Finally, the two documents both implicitly link the admission to the inter-state 
community and the co-existence and cooperation of the states with an internal governance 
structure based on constitutional principles. 
2.1.5. The EU Guidelines on Recognition 
 The process of recognizing states further evolved with the political transformations in the 
beginning of the 1990s and included the adoption of the Guidelines on the Recognition of New 
States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union and the Declaration on Yugoslavia (the EU 
Guidelines on Recognition) in 1991.188 Together, these two documents demonstrate perhaps 
most decisively the role a constitution plays in the process of granting recognition. The EU 
Guidelines on Recognition explicitly broaden the criteria for recognition beyond the 
requirements of the Montevideo Convention and the non-violation of jus cogens norms to 
include respect for democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. That these principles were 
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applied at such a crucial juncture in recent history evidences both the international community’s 
clear expectations on the constitutional character of its future members, as well as the acceptance 
of these principles by new states in search of recognition through their domestic constitutional 
development. 
 The break-up of two multinational federations, Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the Soviet Union, 
in the beginning of the 1990s revived debates over the concept of state recognition in the context 
of political change.189 While the dissolution of the Soviet Union was mostly peaceful,190 the 
violent breakup of the SFRY required additional political responses from the international 
community, many of which centered on the question of the criteria for statehood. The adoption 
of additional criteria for the recognition of a state illustrated the European community’s reaction 
to the Yugoslav crisis and represented an attempt to end the conflict caused by the country’s 
dissolution. Though views vary on the success of the EU Guidelines on Recognition in managing 
conflicts (namely settlement of the Yugoslav crisis191) or in pursuing European political goals,192 
the majority of scholars credit this document with the introduction of supplementary criteria for 
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recognition, constitutional in nature, that existing states are to take into account when extending 
recognition.193 
The requirement that a state-like entity comply with the principles of democracy, the rule 
of law, and protection of human/minority rights, which the international community adopted as a 
standard for recognition, reveals the common belief that a constitutional state is necessary to 
ensure the fulfillment of international legal obligations and to become a member in the system of 
states. The EU Guidelines on Recognition stipulate: 
In compliance with the European Council's request, Ministers have assessed 
developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with a view to elaborating an 
approach regarding relations with new states. 
In this connection they have adopted the following guidelines on the formal recognition 
of new states in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union: 
The Community and its Member States confirm their attachment to the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, in particular the principle of self-
determination. They affirm their readiness to recognize, subject to the normal standards 
of international practice and the political realities in each case, those new States which, 
following the historic changes in the region, have constituted themselves on a democratic 
basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed 
themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations. 
Therefore, they adopt a common position on the process of recognition of these new 
States, which requires: 
- respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the commitments 
subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with 
regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights 
- guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance 
with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE. 
[…] 
The commitment to these principles opens the way to recognition by the Community and 
its Member States and to the establishment of diplomatic relations. It could be laid down 
in agreements.194 
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As the subsequent analysis of this document demonstrates, the presence of specific procedural 
and substantive features in a state-like entity’s constitution has become a key condition for 
gaining recognition. 
The relevance of constitutional functions for the criteria for recognition. The EU 
Guidelines on Recognition do not explicitly mention a constitution, except for the provision in 
the Declaration on Yugoslavia that states that the country must “adopt constitutional and 
political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims towards a neighbouring Community 
State.”195 However, following the Charter of Paris, the EU Guidelines mandate that an entity 
constitute itself on a democratic basis and strengthen the rule of law.196 As outlined in the 
Helsinki Final Act,197 they also require an aspiring state to promote the effective exercise of 
civil, political, social, and other rights. The EU Guidelines additionally call on new states to 
establish guarantees for ethnic and national minorities’ rights (as envisioned under the 
framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe198) in order to “afford 
[minorities] the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and […] protect their legitimate interests.”199 The requirement in the EU Guidelines 
that a state possess a democratic foundation and ensure the protection of human and minority 
rights suggests that the EU expects these fundamental commitments to be taken seriously. In this 
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respect, the domestic constitutional framework becomes, inter alia, one of the main ways to 
promote the principles of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights.200  
Internal constitutional functions (creating a government, grounding its decisions in legal 
principles, and protecting individuals’ rights) are expressed through various constitutional 
designs. Although specific constitutional provisions vary, the general structure includes 
provisions for free, fair, and periodic elections; balanced and checked power between the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches; self-governance within the state; and protected civil, 
political, and social rights. As a result, entities seeking recognition are expected to enact these 
constitutional provisions through domestic legislation in order to demonstrate their compliance 
with the criteria for statehood. In this way, internal constitutional functions become vital for the 
recognition process. 
The new states that emerged in the post-Soviet space in the 1990s widely employed this 
approach.201 Although the former Soviet states adopted new constitutions only after they gained 
diplomatic recognition, their provisions on respect for democracy, the rule of law, and human 
rights came partly as a response to the initial assurance these states gave to the international 
community that they would fulfill the requirements of the EU Guidelines.202 Because the 
European Union received statements from the former Soviet states declaring that, “they [were] 
prepared to fulfill the requirements [of the Guidelines],”203 the EU proceeded with their 
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recognition.204 Similarly, these assurances also served as the basis for the US and other countries 
to issue statements on recognition for the majority of former Soviet republics. The US, for 
instance, stated explicitly that its decision to recognize the former Soviet republics was based on 
the republics’ “commitments and assurances” on various issues, including democracy.205  
The international community further elaborated the constitutional expectations first laid 
down in the EU Guidelines and refined through the opinions of the Arbitration Commission, 
which the EU established within the context of Yugoslav peace negotiations. Some of these 
opinions concerned the legal aspects of the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and 
Slovenia, and specifically mentioned constitutional norms among the key measures capable of 
meeting the requirements of the EU Guidelines on Recognition. 
In assessing Bosnia-Herzegovina’s request for recognition, for example, the Arbitration 
Commission closely examined the would-be-state’s constitutional provisions, especially those 
related to human rights. The Commission noted with approval that the constitution guaranteed 
equal rights for “the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina – Muslims, Serbs and Croats – and the 
members of the other nations and ethnic groups living on its territory,” mandated respect for 
human rights, and would provide full guarantees for individual human rights and freedoms.206 
Despite the Arbitration Commission’s statement that the absence of a referendum on 
independence meant that “the will of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to constitute [the 
republic] as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established,” it 
nonetheless found that the various constitutional processes had been followed necessary for EU 
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recognition.207 Therefore, provided a referendum was conducted, Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
determined to have met the criteria for recognition in part through constitutional means.208  
In its application for recognition, Macedonia also pointed to the constitutional measures it 
had already undertaken, as well as those planned for the future, that embodied the principles of 
the EU Guidelines on Recognition, including protection for human rights. These measures 
mainly entailed constitutional provisions, such as building relationships with other states in 
accordance with international law and the establishment of a special council for inter-ethnic 
relations.209 In reviewing that application, the Arbitration Commission focused its deliberations 
on the constitutional steps Macedonia had taken to enact the democratic structures and 
guarantees for human rights.210  
The Arbitration Commission also held a dialogue with Macedonia to determine whether 
one of the paragraphs of the EU Guidelines on Recognition and its Declaration on Yugoslavia in 
particular was satisfied. The Declaration on Yugoslavia states that: 
The Community and its Member States also require a Yugoslav Republic to commit 
itself, prior to recognition, to adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that 
it has no territorial claims towards a neighbouring Community State and that it will 
conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus a neighbouring Community State...211 
In course of this dialog, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia amended its constitution on 
January 6, 1992, adding the phrase “the Republic of Macedonia has no territorial claims against 
neighbouring states.”212 The Macedonian constitution’s careful account for the protection of 
minorities and for other EU Guidelines criteria for recognition eventually led the Arbitration 
                                                 
207 Ibid., 1503. 
208 This decision was confirmed later through the formal recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
209 Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission. Opinion No. 6 on the Recognition of the Socialist Republic 
of Macedonia by the European Community and its Member States. (January 11, 1992). 31 International Legal 
Materials 1992, 1507-12, 1508. 
210 Ibid.  
211 European Community. Declaration on Yugoslavia. (December 16, 1991), final paragraph, emphasis added. 
212 Quoted in Opinion No. 6 on the Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community 
and its Member States, 1992, 1511. 
56 
Commission to conclude that Macedonia satisfied the EU Guidelines on Recognition and to 
imply the possibility of its recognition by EU member states.213 
In examining whether Slovenia met the requirements in the EU Guidelines on 
Recognition, the Arbitration Commission likewise paid close attention to the Slovenian 
constitution, especially to those parts concerning democratic principles and the protection of 
human rights. The Commission focused particularly on the presence of provisions establishing 
an electoral system based on universal, equal, and direct suffrage, as well as the secret ballot; and 
provisions protecting human rights, including those that guaranteed specific rights for Italian and 
Hungarian minorities in the country. It concluded that the constitution of Slovenia effectively 
created a framework for the rule of law, human rights, and minority groups that would enable the 
country to fulfill its commitments under the EU Guidelines on Recognition. The Commission 
thus recommended that the EU grant recognition to Slovenia.214 
On both theoretical and practical levels, the EU’s recognition of new states in Eastern and 
Central Europe after the Cold War reveals that constitutional mechanisms have remained a key 
instrument for satisfying the contemporary criteria for recognition that the states granting 
recognition expect to be in place. For their part, state-like entities seeking recognition enact 
changes to their domestic legal system and design a democratic constitution “to secure 
recognition of their statehood.”215 As a result, a constitution – “a universal yardstick for civilized 
governance”216 – and its internal constitutional functions help would-be states meet the criteria 
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for recognition and ensure their admission to the system of sovereign states with “all the tangible 
and intangible benefits that accompany such membership.”217 
The practice of recognizing new states in Central and Eastern Europe also evidences the 
importance of external constitutional functions. Some state-like entities, such as Macedonia, 
Slovakia, and Croatia, adopted constitutions218 that assert both their presence in the international 
arena and their sovereignty, the latter being required for the fulfillment of domestic and 
international obligations.219 For these countries, as well as for other recognized Central and 
Eastern European states, the constitutions have become symbolic opportunities to express 
popular aspirations for democratic, free, and sovereign statehood. Since most of them lacked a 
history of official statehood, “the adoption of constitutions with broad support was a way to 
manifest independent and mature self-rule.”220  
The adoption of those constitutions also served another vital function for these newly 
independent countries by signaling their emergence as “internally and externally legitimate, 
recognized, and functioning state[s].”221 In this way, constitutions became crucial to state-
building, since constitutions in these countries “reinforced the modern principles of statehood in 
their endeavors to obtain recognition and integration within Western […] structures.”222 As a 
result, external constitutional functions assured states’ formal sovereignty, which was an 
important consideration for the international community as it debated admittance of a new 
member. Thus, a constitution has been seen as one of the key legal mechanisms to embody the 
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principles of democratic governance and the protection of human rights, to ensure further 
development of these standards by other domestic legal tools, and to provide a secure and 
reliable basis for the fulfillment of a state’s international obligations. 
The constitutionality of a state. As mentioned above, constitutionality implies both a 
specific internal mode of governance, as well as the nature of the emergence of a state-like 
entity. These aspects address the systemic interests of the world community in having members 
who respect international rules and obligations and who pursue the aims of international order 
and its stability. In the context of the EU Guidelines on Recognition, the requirement of 
establishing democratic structures in a state-like entity seeking recognition has contributed to 
various international practices protecting the international liberal order and promoting specific 
constitutional principles, such as democratic governance, the rule of law, and human/minority 
rights protection. The dissolution of two federal states, the SFRY and the USSR, highlights these 
questions of respect for constitutionality under international law.  
First, some scholars have suggested that the recognition of a newly emerged state should 
be examined first and foremost through the constitutionality of dissolution223 – in other words, 
whether an aspiring state-like entity emerged in accordance with the constitutional law of its 
parent state.224 Firmly grounded in the belief of the supremacy of a constitution as the 
fundamental framework for governance and the defining symbol of a nation,225 this argument 
holds that a seceding entity must respect the constitutional rules of its parent state to gain 
recognition. Complying with this obligation could tip the balance “in favour of international 
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recognition,”226 whereas aspiring state-like entities that ignore it invite challenges to the very 
foundations of their existence and the unity of their nation.227 Discussions on the constitutional 
prerequisite for the process of dissolution and the legitimacy of secession228 thus are part of the 
analysis of process of and criteria for recognition. 
Another dimension of the constitutionality of dissolution concerns respect for 
international law. Existing states give much consideration to the “systemic implications of 
unconstitutional order” because disregard for the constitutional legal order of the parent state 
poses a danger to international society.229 As the thinking goes, an aspiring state-like entity that 
ignores the constitutional law of a parent state may well behave similarly in its relations with 
other existing states and act outside of international law.  
Both dimensions, however, embrace the variable complexities of secession, including the 
question of legitimate reasons to go against the constitution of a parent state, which requires a 
balanced and careful approach towards the relationship between constitutional legal order and 
international obligations. Still, constitutionality continues to matter in the analysis of a state’s 
claim to recognition. For example, in addressing the structure of its relations with the Soviet 
republics in 1991, the EU noted that it would consider options only after “developments in the 
constitutional structure of the Union” took place,230 thereby emphasizing the relevance of 
constitutionality for the process of recognition.  
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To summarize, the criteria for statehood, including contemporary elements such as 
democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights, relate directly to the political and 
legal sphere of international order by both reflecting and enforcing the international law of the 
system of sovereign states. Therefore, unrecognized state-like entities seeking recognition use 
law and constitutions as instruments to win support and acceptance from existing states and 
international organizations and to signal their fulfillment of the criteria for recognition, as well as 
their conformity to the norms, standards, and goals of the international community.231  
2.1.6. The Copenhagen Criteria 
As mentioned above, the process of recognition concerns not only states but also their 
acceptance as members into interstate organizations based on certain criteria. The European 
Union accession process and its Copenhagen criteria best demonstrate the interplay between 
recognition of a state’s membership in an organization and constitutional norms. The 
Copenhagen criteria explicitly mention democracy, the protection of human rights, and the rule 
of law as essential requirements for a state to join the European Union and to be recognized as a 
member of this community.232 These criteria imply that a democratic constitution is a necessary 
mechanism to fulfill these membership criteria: a constitution is generally regarded as the 
requisite framework for a democratic government because it ensures the protection of human 
rights and respect for the rule of law. As a result, accession is an interactive process. Aspiring 
states may gain political status within a particular organization by addressing the Copenhagen 
criteria in their constitutional design. At the same time, select members of the international 
community are able to assess the state’s readiness to become a member so as to ensure stability, 
order, and peaceful co-existence among all the members. 
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The most ambitious project of regional integration in the world, the EU played an 
important role in fostering national reconciliation, stable democracy, and economic development 
in Europe after the end of the Second World War. Although it was not until 1992 when the 
obligation to respect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law became mandatory under EU 
primary law,233 these fundamental principles had been the main benchmark for evaluating 
candidate states since the mid-1970s.234 Reviewing the candidacy of Spain, Portugal, and Greece, 
which at that time had only recently transitioned from authoritarian regimes to democracy, the 
European Council declared that respect for human rights and representative democracy were 
essential for acquiring membership.235   
The elaboration of a more complex set of rules on accession became particularly urgent 
after the end of the Cold War, when a great number of states that had belonged to the Soviet bloc 
applied to join the EU.236 The criteria adopted at the Copenhagen summit in 1993237 became the 
formal, substantive requirements for accession to ensure that future members of the Union were 
reliable and committed to pursuing EU goals.238 The Copenhagen criteria included political 
requirements, economic criteria, the acquis communautaire (the acquis),239 and the less formal 
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requirement of “good neighborliness,”240 all of which reflected the broad consensus of EU 
members in favor of liberal democracy, market capitalism, and the peaceful resolution of 
disputes.241 The Copenhagen political criteria note explicitly that, for membership, the candidate 
country must have “achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.”242 
These criteria found firmer legal grounding in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which was 
later amended by the Lisbon Treaty by inserting the provision that: 
 [t]he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail.243 
In addition, Article 49 of Amsterdam treaty affirms that: 
[any] European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed 
to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. […]. The conditions of 
admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such 
admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and 
the applicant State.244 
Although these two Articles did not find further elaboration in EU primary law, they 
“have been clarified by the detailed assessment of each candidate in light of these criteria, first in 
the Opinions of 1997 and then subsequently in the Regular Reports published on the progress of 
each of the candidates every year.”245 For example, in reviewing the applications of ten acceding 
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Central European states,246 the European Commission (the Commission) adopted an influential 
report titled “Agenda 2000 – For a Stronger and Wider Union.” This report not only summarized 
the Commission's opinions on each applicant's political qualifications, but also revealed the 
substantive meaning of these political criteria.247  
First, since key democratic institutions in the Western sense include a constitution with 
particular provisions, a democratic form of governance, electoral law that renders efficient 
majorities, and plebiscitarian instruments,248 the EU expected new applicants to do likewise. This 
meant drafting well-balanced, modern constitutions; developing political parties and responsible 
popular leadership; creating governmental structures with popularly elected and effective 
parliaments and executive branches; adopting essential legislation and administrative regulations 
appropriate for a functional democracy; and establishing an accountable judiciary.249 Second, the 
criteria calling for respect for human rights implied that the applicants needed to formulate basic 
rights in their constitutions, and to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, including the protocol on permitting their citizens to 
take cases to the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights.250 And to fulfill the third criterion, the 
protection of minority rights, the Commission pressed the applicant nations to take definitive 
legislative and administrative action. As the Commission noted, “[m]inority problems, if 
unresolved, could affect democratic stability or lead to disputes with neighboring countries.”251 
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Thus, the Commission’s review of each applicant’s political qualifications was notable 
for several reasons. To begin, it attempted to go beyond a mere formal description of political 
institutions and instead sought to assess how the letter of constitutional texts was applied in 
political practice.252 The Commission’s report also suggests that the criteria on democracy, the 
rule of law, and human rights are realized primarily through deploying internal constitutional 
mechanisms. Thus, states seeking EU membership would likely need to amend existing 
constitutional structures, provisions, and procedures, or establish new ones altogether. Lastly, the 
Commission’s reviews demonstrate that the requirement of establishing democratic procedures 
on elections, the separation of powers, self-governance, and the protection of human and 
minority rights was intended to guarantee stability and order on the regional scale. 
Another example that reveals the relevance of a constitution for the Copenhagen criteria 
and the recognition process is the EU’s position on relations with the states of the former 
Yugoslavia. In 1997, the General Affairs Council agreed that, in evaluating compliance with 
democratic principles, the following conditions would be verified: the existence of a 
representative government and of an accountable executive; the presence of a government and 
public authorities that act in accordance with the constitution and the law; the separation of 
powers (government, administration, judiciary); and the holding of free and fair elections at 
reasonable intervals and by secret ballot.253 Under the heading of human rights and the rule of 
law, the General Affairs Council included freedom of expression, including an independent 
media; the right of assembly and demonstration; the right of association; the existence of 
effective means of redress against administrative decisions; access to courts and the right to fair 
trial; and respect for the principle of equality before the law and equal protection under the law. 
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The document also recognized the right of minority groups to establish and maintain their own 
educational, cultural, and religious institutions, organizations or associations; the need to 
guarantee adequate opportunities to use their respective language before courts and public 
authorities; and adequate protection of refugees and displaced persons returning to areas where 
they represent an ethnic minority.254 
The Copenhagen criteria, however, are not without criticism, mostly with respect to a 
number of political and policy issues. First, the criteria set higher political standards for 
candidate countries255 and required signing a greater number of international documents when 
compared to existing member-states.256 Second, the lack of a clear definition and comprehensive 
clarification on how the standards of democratic values and inclusiveness should be met in 
policy and in practice lead to inconsistent, “broad[,] and disparate interpretations,” especially 
with respect to minority rights.257 The ambiguity of these terms makes them problematic 
measures of the progress made by candidate states.258 Finally, the progress and monitoring 
reports the Commission regularly issues clearly indicate that it has adopted a case-by-case 
approach for evaluating political criteria.259 
Despite these shortcomings, the monitoring reports demonstrate that the states’ 
conditions are reviewed within a general constitutional framework.260 For its part, to evaluate 
whether candidates have met the political criteria, the Commission explores their constitutional 
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guarantees; provides a description of their various institutions, such as parliament, executive, and 
judiciary; and examines how the various rights and freedoms are exercised in practice. It 
analyzes the way in which the candidate countries respect and implement the provisions of the 
major human rights conventions and devotes particular attention to minority rights and the 
protection of minorities.261 In this way, the EU has gradually shifted from its requirement to have 
in place only constitutional guarantees to a careful examination of the way democracy functions 
in practice.262 
The steps that accession countries have undertaken include institutional changes and 
passing relevant legislation for which a constitutional background or constitutional amendments 
are likewise necessary. For example, to join the EU, Bulgaria had to change its constitution in 
order to better address the magistrate’s immunity and the structure of judiciary.263 Similarly, 
Slovakia had to hold municipal elections, adopt a charter on local self-government, establish 
direct election of the president, and ensure the involvement of opposition parties in parliamentary 
appointments,264 all of which required the relevant constitutional context and strengthened the 
democratic principles in the state. Moreover, in response to the requirements of accession, all 
candidate states265 have adopted programs to tackle discrimination or promote the re-integration 
of ethnic or national minorities in order to demonstrate their willingness to comply with the 
political criteria.266 Thus, the EU made clear that it would not be “ready to start the negotiations 
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with a country if there are any doubts concerning the democratic conditions, the respect for 
human rights and the protection of minorities.”267  
To summarize, the Copenhagen criteria established a set of political conditions for the 
recognition of states as members of a regional organization. The fulfillment of these political 
criteria is grounded in the establishment and implementation of democratic principles and norms 
through a constitution and constitutional development. By influencing the foreign policy of 
aspiring members through constitutional means,268 the EU accession criteria seek to pursue the 
EU’s aims of stable democracy and economic development throughout the region. As a result, 
meeting the constitutional requirements for the rule of law, democracy, and the protection of 
human rights ensures a state’s membership in an influential regional organization.   
The nature of the EU accession process demonstrates that there is a strong interplay 
between constitutional norms and a specific kind of recognition, namely, membership in an 
organization. This membership requires compliance with the criteria on admission and the 
introduction of necessary changes into the domestic constitutional framework, changes that do 
not, however, affect the recognition status of the state seeking admittance. Thus, if a state fails to 
satisfy the accession conditions to an organization, it would lack recognition as a member within 
that organization but would continue to hold recognition as a state.   
The case of the relationship between constitutional norms and the formal recognition of 
unrecognized states is different. The above analysis of international legal doctrines and concepts 
has illustrated the strong linkages between the process of recognition and a constitution. This 
mutual interaction suggests that a constitution matters for the recognition of an unrecognized 
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state on a theoretical level. More specifically, the analysis revealed that, in theory, constitutions 
or, broadly speaking, the constitutional developments of a state, may predispose the international 
community to grant recognition of a government, a state, or membership in an organization. In 
theory, recognized sovereign states expect the fulfillment of both the traditional and 
contemporary criteria for recognition, which are partially realized through constitutional 
mechanisms. This, however, raises the question of whether a relationship between a constitution 
and recognition exists not only in theory but also in practice and, if so, what evidence 
demonstrates it. The examples of Croatia and Kosovo in the next section provide some insight on 
this potentially positive correlation between a constitution and diplomatic recognition. But, at the 
same time, they also problematize the straightforward doctrinal expectations in practice, a point 
that is addressed in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. 
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2.2. Examples of Practices Consistent with the Doctrinal Framework  
2.2.1. Croatia 
The Croatian practice of gaining recognition during the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
illustrates the positive influence of a constitution on the prospects for state recognition. As 
mentioned above, the European community debated whether to grant the former Yugoslav 
republics recognition under the criteria in the EU Guidelines on Recognition and further 
elaborated by the opinions of the Arbitration Commission. In its work, the Arbitration 
Commission reviewed the constitutional norms, along with other considerations, of the Yugoslav 
entities in relation to their compliance with the requirements of the EU Guidelines on 
Recognition. 
In analyzing the Croatian request for recognition, the Arbitration Commission 
acknowledged the constitutional measures Croatia had taken to meet the EU Guidelines but also 
pointed out some of the constitutional gaps the country still needed to address before being 
granted recognition.269 It found that the Croatian Constitutional Act of December 4, 1991, did 
not fully incorporate all the provisions stipulated in the draft Convention of the Conference on 
Yugoslavia,270 which conferred substantial autonomy to minorities with respect to local 
government, local law enforcement and the judiciary, educational systems, and other specific 
matters.271 The Arbitration Commission suggested that the Croatian government supplement its 
Constitutional Act as necessary to take into account the provisions related to the special status of 
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minorities in order to satisfy the requirements of the EU Guidelines and to gain recognition. 
Following these recommendations, the President of Croatia issued a separate statement 
confirming Croatia’s acceptance of those provisions in principle, thus securing recognition by 
EC members and other countries.272  
This case demonstrates that the incorporation of the provisions stipulated in the EU 
Guidelines on Recognition into the Croatian constitution helped the country to gain recognition, 
suggesting that the case is consistent with theoretical expectation. However, it also raises some 
concerns on the causality of the relationship between the intent of recognition and constitutional 
provisions, a topic that the following chapters discuss further.   
2.2.2. Kosovo  
Both Kosovo’s adoption of its Declaration on Independence in 2008 and the earlier 
efforts of the international community to make Kosovo’s final status conditional on its adoption 
of constitutional principles regarding democratization and the protection of human rights 
illustrate the effects that constitutional mechanisms had on the process of Kosovo’s recognition. 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the international community consistently linked Kosovo’s 
status with its democratic governance. More specifically, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) held that resolution of the situation must be based on Kosovo’s 
establishment of democratic institutions, which would then help the international community 
broker dialogue on the future status of the territory.273 The UN also supported Kosovo’s 
democracy-building efforts and demanded that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
“establish genuine democratic institutions in Kosovo, including the parliament and the 
                                                 
272 Rich, 1993, 47-48. 
273 OSCE Document no. 28-CSO/Journal no. 3 (16 September 1994), cited in Gardner, 2008, 541. 
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judiciary.”274 The UN further required that settlement of the conflict there should be based on 
“an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful 
self-administration.”275 The Council of Europe emphasized the need for the democratic reforms 
in the FRY that would include the direct participation of Kosovar representatives in federal 
institutions, as well as self-government and a new political status for Kosovo.276 Some members 
of the Council of Europe explicitly noted that, “The international community gives enormous 
support [to Kosovo]. We should continue and be patient. But we must make it clear to the leaders 
that it must be deserved support and deserved progress – every day, every week.” 277  
This international support, largely from the OSCE, was linked to the establishment of 
democratic, functioning, multi-ethnic institutions, which would “prepare[] locals to take over 
institutions built with solid, sound ideas like human rights and democracy.”278 The OSCE’s focus 
on creating a “climate of tolerance” among Kosovo’s various ethnic groups279 sent a clear 
message to the Kosovar leaders: good treatment of minorities could mean crucial OSCE support 
in terms of the entity’s final status. While Kosovo “might be in a position to claim independence 
in the eyes of the international community,” the international community needed to “be 100% 
sure that the Kosovo government is competent to govern a real multi-ethnic society” before 
backing the entity’s ultimate status as an independent sovereign state.280 
After NATO's military operation against the FRY during the Kosovo War in 1999, UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244 established the mandate for the UN Mission in Kosovo 
                                                 
274 A UN General Assembly Resolution condemned “the measures and practices of discrimination and the violations 
of human rights of ethnic Albanians of Kosovo.” UN General Assembly. Resolution A/RES/51/111 (On Situation of 
Human Rights in Kosovo), (March 5, 1997). 
275 UN Security Council. Resolution S/RES/1199, (September 23, 1998).  
276 Council of Europe. Parliamentary Assembly  Recommendations, (April 25, 2001).  
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PC.DEL/262/00 5 May 2000 (emphasis in original), cited in Gardner, 2008, 544. 
278 Interview with OSCE official 5 March 2002, Ibid., 543. 
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(UNMIK). The UNMIK was an international transitional administration based on de jure 
continued Serbian sovereignty and maximum de facto self-government for Kosovo.281 Its stated 
international goal was to construct a democratic, multi-ethnic society, and to empower the 
Kosovars, including non-Albanian minorities, to govern themselves.282 In December 2003, the 
UNMIK elaborated what came to be known as the Standards Before Status policy, a strategy on 
the steps the Kosovar leadership needed to take to prove they were capable of governing 
effectively. The strategy comprised a set of benchmarks for the democratic development of 
Kosovo, implementation of which would lead to future talks on the entity’s status. The 
benchmarks covered eight areas, including representation (functioning democratic institutions); 
tolerance (freedom of movement and property rights); the peaceful resolution of conflict (the rule 
of law and dialogue with Serbia); and economic issues.283 According to the UNMIK, these 
benchmarks “describe a multi-ethnic society where there is democracy, tolerance, freedom of 
movement and equal access to justice for all people in Kosovo, regardless of their ethnic 
background.”284 Subsequent reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council measured 
Kosovo’s progress against those benchmarks as a precondition for convening future talks on its 
status.285 Thus, the Standards Before Status policy reflects the constitutional principles of self-
governance and the limitation of power through the establishment of mechanisms to guarantee 
democracy and human rights, and links those guarantees directly to the entity’s international 
status.   
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In 2007, a new international initiative known as the Ahtisaari Plan286 linked a proposal 
for Kosovo’s independence to its respect for democracy and human rights. Among its key 
principles, the Ahtisaari Plan put forward that Kosovo’s multi-ethnic society should govern itself 
democratically and with full respect for the rule of law and human rights. The plan highlighted 
the necessity of protecting the rights of Kosovo’s non-Albanian communities, establishing a 
framework for their active participation in public life, and proposing wide-ranging local 
municipal powers.287 It also explicitly stated that Kosovo’s future constitution should:  
prescribe and guarantee the legal and institutional mechanisms necessary to ensure that 
Kosovo is governed by the highest democratic standards, and to promote the peaceful and 
prosperous existence of all its inhabitants.288  
Discussions of Kosovo’s sovereignty, therefore, hinged upon steps it took to foster representative 
institutions, a secure environment grounded in peaceful conflict resolution and tolerance for 
minorities.  
Subsequent constitutional drafting, that is, the elaboration of Kosovo’s Declaration of 
Independence in 2008, contained specific references to its future foundational law and thereby 
directly contributed to Kosovo’s recognition. The Declaration reflected Kosovo’s commitment to 
democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human and minority rights, thus satisfying the 
criteria for state recognition.289 As the document stated: 
…We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multiethnic republic, guided by the 
principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law. We shall protect 
                                                 
286 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement submitted to the UN Security Council by the UN 
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari in March 2007. See UN Security Council. S/2007/168/Add.1 (Comprehensive 
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement). (2007). The UN Security Council did not adopt this Plan due to Russia’s 
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and promote the rights of all communities in Kosovo and create the conditions necessary 
for their effective participation in political and decision-making processes. 
[…] 
We shall adopt as soon as possible a Constitution that enshrines our commitment to 
respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all our citizens, particularly as 
defined by the European Convention on Human Rights. The Constitution shall 
incorporate all relevant principles of the Ahtisaari Plan and be adopted through a 
democratic and deliberative process.290 
Thus, Kosovo’s claim for recognition both in its Declaration of Independence and later in the 
constitution itself followed the Ahtisaari Plan by incorporating its key provisions on the 
protection of human rights, democratic governance, and the rule of law. The Declaration of 
Independence served as a constitutional instrument to assert Kosovo’s sovereignty and 
independence, as well as to ensure its commitment to the international obligations required of 
members in the system of sovereign states.  
Overall, both the Standards Before Status policy and Kosovo’s Declaration of 
Independence, including its explicit mention of the Ahtisaari Plan, emphasized the link between 
democratic governance and a future status of an entity. In this way, these documents established 
a precedent for state-like entities with a yet unsettled status for two reasons. First, the potential 
influence of democratization on the process of recognition has attracted increased attention from 
unrecognized states.291 Although some in the international community have emphasized the 
uniqueness of Kosovo’s case, others contend that the Standards Before Status policy implied that 
“recognition might be awarded to entities that succeed in building effective, democratic 
institutions.”292 This precedent has demonstrated to unrecognized states that the recognition of 
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autonomous units is possible if certain institutional standards are met,293 and has therefore 
influenced their approach towards the use of law in organizing domestic governance.294   
Second, given the predominance of the international liberal order, the world community 
has sought to consolidate and protect common values, in particular democracy, the rule of law, 
and human rights. Consequently, it expects that a particular group or an aspiring state-like entity 
will internalize the norms of liberal democratic governance. The existence of norms on 
democratic participation (representation), the rule of law (mechanisms for peaceful conflict 
resolution), and equality and non-discrimination for minorities (tolerance) inclines the 
international community to look favorably upon those groups or aspiring states that adopt these 
norms. In other words: 
When a group exhibits the indicators [representation and participation, mechanisms for 
peaceful conflict resolution and toleration toward minorities], signifying that it is 
becoming socialised to international standards of democratic governance, the 
international community is more likely to respond positively to the claim. In other words, 
the higher the democratic capacity of the group, the more likely the international 
community will respond by empowering the group – acknowledging, supporting, or 
helping to create alternative structures that enable the group to exert more autonomy in 
political decision-making.295 
Although a group cannot be guaranteed to accomplish its goals by merely possessing such 
constitutional structures, the international community is nonetheless predisposed to view a group 
more favorably when it is committed to democratic governance. The favor and support of the 
international community may manifest itself, for example, by endorsing increased self-
governance for the group.296   
To summarize, the Standards Before Status policy and Kosovo’s Declaration on 
Independence reveal the importance of democratic and constitutional principles and mechanisms 
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for settling an entity’s status and, in particular, for the process of granting recognition. They 
demonstrate that, by assuming the responsibilities of the establishing democratic governance, the 
rule of law, and the protection of human rights, a state-like entity can win broad support from the 
international community, and perhaps even obtain formal recognition. At the same time, given 
that Kosovo received only partial international support for its claim to recognition, the more 
specific role of constitutional principles in the process of granting state recognition has yet to be 
seen. 
Conclusion 
In the international arena, states continue to remain the main actors in international 
relations, a situation that makes the issue of recognition of a state particularly important. 
International legal theory and practice suggest that states realize their sovereign right by granting 
or refusing recognition to other states and state-like entities at their own discretion. This 
recognition process, however, often rests on respect for the traditional and contemporary criteria 
for statehood, which are, as shown above, closely linked with constitutionalism. Existing 
international legal doctrines and recent political developments strongly suggest that a 
constitution should matter for the process of recognition for several reasons. First, a constitution 
defines the territory, population, and sovereignty of a state-like entity and asserts its presence in 
the international arena. In such a way, a constitution signals the entity’s concept of itself as a 
separate unit and expresses its intention to be recognized as a participant in international 
relations. It also suggests that, as a sovereign entity, it meets the criteria for recognition as a state 
based on the existence of its government and on its capacity to enter into international relations 
with other sovereign states. Second, in contrast to ordinary laws, the foundational character of a 
constitution, its superiority over other legal documents, and its universal acceptance all make it 
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the mechanism best suited to realize the contemporary criteria for state recognition: democratic 
governance, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. And third, a constitution is the 
instrument most appropriate to convey a state-like entity’s commitment and capacity to respect 
its international obligations and to pursue shared global goals, thereby demonstrating the entity’s 
potential to be a functioning member of the international community.  
The existing doctrinal relationship between a constitution and the process of recognition 
suggests the need to look more closely at the role of a constitution in the practices of 
unrecognized state-like entities as well. Scholars have already observed that unrecognized states 
use their laws and legal institutions to project an image of themselves as having a government, 
laws, legitimacy, and effectiveness.297 As a result, unrecognized states may strategically employ 
a constitution both to justify their claims to statehood and to establish democratic governance 
and order in society, with the aim of gaining formal recognition while also achieving domestic 
goals. The adoption of a democratic constitution is, therefore, at least partly intended for 
“international consumption.”298 A constitution allows the state-like entity to show that it 
possesses one of the components of an effective, European–oriented legal system and that it 
meets the contemporary criteria for recognition through its adherence to principles of democracy 
and legality as laid out in its constitution.299 In this way, an unrecognized state’s elaboration of a 
constitution demonstrates its desire to be seen as fully sovereign, independent, and capable of 
conducting international relations.300  
In the process of seeking recognition, a constitution thus becomes one venue though 
which a state-like entity may respond to the developments of international law and international 
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relations, both of which increasingly center on democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of 
human rights. With this in mind, the following chapters analyze whether the constitution of an 
unrecognized state-like entity improves its prospects for recognition in practice.  
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CHAPTER TWO. CASE STUDY: UNRECOGNIZED STATES IN SEARCH OF 
RECOGNITION 
Introduction 
Traditionally, recognized sovereign states have been the basic units of the international 
system governed by international law. States’ domination of the world political system and the 
importance of state recognition in international relations incentivize a political entity to formally 
organize itself into a state and to seek international acknowledgement. As the previous chapter 
has shown, the process of diplomatic state recognition includes a set of traditional and 
contemporary criteria that are interrelated with constitutionalism, and which a state-like entity 
seeking recognition as a sovereign state must satisfy. But, before looking at whether the internal 
constitutional practices of a particular state-like entity matter for gaining formal recognition in 
practice, it is first important to define the general features of an unrecognized state-like entity.  
This chapter examines what are called unrecognized, de facto, or contested states (all 
terms used interchangeably in this work), or those entities whose aspirations for recognition are 
regarded unfavorably by the majority of states in the international community. They are the 
focus of this dissertation for two reasons. First, the very nature of these state-like entities makes 
them ideally suited for examining the recognition process. They exhibit the features of a state, 
and therefore exist along with recognized states, albeit on the latter’s periphery. They lack 
international recognition due to the contested nature of their statehood, but continue to pursue it. 
Second, a close look at the internal dynamics of constitutional development in an unrecognized 
state provides better insight into the relationship between a constitution and recognition, and into 
the nature of the criteria for recognition. In an entity with contested statehood, a constitution may 
play a more prominent role than in a state with a widely supported claim for recognition. In the 
latter case, a constitution mainly functions to internally regulate a polity and externally proclaim 
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its unquestioned statehood. However, in the former case, along with its regulatory functions, a 
constitution should contribute to winning the international community’s trust and acceptance of 
its statehood, and to gaining official recognition. Thus, this chapter reviews the existing literature 
on unrecognized states to identify the key features of this group. It then suggests Transdniestria 
as a case study of a constitution’s role in an unrecognized state, describes the factors that shaped 
its emergence, and explains the relevance of Transdniestria for this research.  
1. The Concept of an Unrecognized State 
The current international system is based on interactions among sovereign and 
internationally recognized states. However, a more detailed analysis of their territorial and 
political organization reveals the existence of entities that “speak like states and act like states,”1 
but lack international recognition as such. These state-like entities display political organization 
with a centralized government, exercise supreme independent authority over a defined territory 
and its population, and seek recognition as a sovereign state. As understood in the present work, 
the term “state-like entity” excludes any entity that lacks these three main criteria, for example, 
indigenous groups, liberation movements, guerrillas, or autonomous areas that share only some 
features with sovereign states and/or seek recognition of only certain rights or claims.  
The twentieth century featured numerous efforts to create states that received limited or 
no international recognition: Manchukuo (1932-45), Croatia (1941-45), Katanga (1960-63), 
Rhodesia (1965-80), Biafra (1967-70), and Bantustans (1970-94).2 Although their individual 
definitions, purposes, and methods of formation varied, they all experienced “the internationally 
                                                 
1 Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 28. 
2 There are also cases that shared some of the features of unrecognized state, but experienced different outcomes. 
For example, East Timor was briefly independent in 1975 and received full international recognition only in 2002. 
In contrast, Bangladesh’s unilateral declaration of its independence in 1971 laid the basis for its recognition later 
that year.  
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contested nature of their purported statehood”3 that placed them on periphery of the world 
community of universally recognized states. These shared experiences signal the existence of a 
distinct class of state-like entities that today include self-declared independent entities that have 
been functioning like states for a number of years, such as Somaliland, Northern Cyprus, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, among others.4 The overview of the key features of these entities presented 
below seeks to further clarify the specific kind of state-like entities to which this case study 
refers, and suggests that their nature facilitates observation of the effects of constitutional 
development on the recognition process for a state-like entity.  
Despite the continued presence of unrecognized states in the world, there has been only 
limited comprehensive and synthetic scholarly study of this phenomenon. Similarly, little 
attention has been paid to the actual goals and internal dynamics of these entities outside the 
paradigm of “parent – de facto state.”5 There is also a significant gap in the scholarship on the 
legal development of unrecognized states, on the role of law in their emergence and viability, 
and on the relevance of the legal and constitutional systems in unrecognized states for their 
claims to recognition. This is partly due to the scholarly preoccupation with recognized members 
of international community, including sovereign states’ goal of maintaining the integrity of 
parent states in cases where this principle might be challenged.6 Notwithstanding these gaps, 
current scholarship provides a good starting point through its exploration of the conceptual 
understanding of unrecognized states and their defining criteria, as well as particular aspects of 
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unrecognized states, such as their terminology, the conditions under which they appear and are 
most viable, their aims, and the causes of their non-recognition.7  
Terminology. Conceptualization of the category of an unrecognized state varies in the 
literature, as does the terminology and designation used for this group. The literature refers to 
this category as state-like entities,8 quasi-states,9 pseudo-states,10 de facto states (often also 
termed frozen conflicts),11 phantom states,12 nominal states,13 states-within-states,14 almost-states 
                                                 
7 See generally, Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998); Tozun 
Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik, eds., De Facto States: the Quest for Sovereignty (London, New 
York: Routledge, 2004); Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto 
States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004). 
8 The term “state-like entity” refers to an entity that has a population and a government that exercise control over a 
defined territory, but lacks approval for international recognition. Charles King. “The Benefits of Ethnic War: 
Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States,” World Politics 53 (2001).  
9 The term “quasi-states” describes recognized states with deficient statehood. See Jackson, 1990. Sometimes this 
term is used in the context of unrecognized, de facto states. See, for example, Pål Kolstø. “The Sustainability and 
Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 6 (2006). In addition, “quasi-state” is 
sometimes used together with the notions of para-states and black spots when referring to “governed territories.” See 
Bartosz H. Stanislawski (ed.). “Para-States, Quasi-States, and Black Spots: Perhaps Not States, But Not 
‘Ungoverned Territories,’ Either,” International Studies Review 10, (2008), 366-396; Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nalecz, 
Strachota Krzysztof, and Maciej Falkowski. “Para-States in the Post-Soviet Area from 1991 to 2007,” Ibid. There 
are also terms such as non-state actors, and proto- and semi-states, which are either too broad or do not cover the 
idea of asserted statehood. See Geldenhuys, 2009.  
10 The term “pseudo-states” suggests that polities have “transitional” or “incomplete” statehood and differ in degree 
of recognition. See Vladimir Kolossov and John O'Loughlin. “Pseudo-states as Harbingers of a New Geopolitics: 
the Example of the Transdniestr Republic (TMR),” in Boundaries, Territory and Post-modernity, ed. D. Newman 
(London: Frank Cass, 1999). 
11 The term “de facto states” describes entities that fulfill the four criteria of the Montevideo Convention, but lack 
the international personality of a state or quasi-states. Sometimes, entities with the trappings of state but lacking 
recognition are referred as “frozen conflicts,” given the frequently conflictual relationship between the entity and its 
parent state. See Pegg, 1998; Pegg, Bahcheli et al., 2004; Lynch, 2004. 
12 The term “phantom state” refers to a political – administrative entities that meets four criteria: (1) a functioning 
state apparatus that exercises control over territory with a population, and manages resources; (2) an expressed 
interest in independence as evidenced by a formal declaration of independence or similar statements; (3) the de facto 
government seeks and receives some degree of popular legitimacy, as shown through elections or referenda; and (4) 
the cause of the entity’s contested statehood rests in rival governmental claims to sovereignty between a phantom 
state and its ‘‘base state,’’ coupled with the almost universal absence of formal recognition. Daniel Byman and 
Charles King. “The Mystery of Phantom States,” The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2012). 
13 The term “nominal state” is similar to Jackson’s “quasi-state” in that it refers to the polities with a juridical 
statehood that lack government capacities. Geldenhuys, 2009. 
14 The broad concept of “state within states” refers to sub-state units, such as non-secessionist entities, movements, 
or autonomies that “exhibit key elements of a Weberian definition of statehood” but lack international recognition. 
See Paul Kingston and Ian S. Spears, eds., States-within-states: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 17. 
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as a category of para-states,15 nations without states,16 near-states,17 and areas of special 
sovereignty.18  
Given these varied approaches, in this work, the term unrecognized states refers to a 
state-like entity that 1) has proclaimed itself independent from a recognized state; 2) asserts its 
compliance with the criteria for statehood in the Montevideo Convention; and 3) seeks 
international recognition. Unilateral attempts at state formation usually cause armed conflict 
between the breakaway region and the central authorities, which creates and maintains a tense 
atmosphere between the opposing parties and across the region that may last for years or even 
decades.19 While not required for inclusion in the category of an unrecognized state in the 
present work, armed conflict and regional tensions are nonetheless common features of these 
entities. 
One of the key scholarly approaches towards this category of states is that they are 
“anomalous features of the international system and international society.”20 This approach is 
rooted in several of the characteristics of unrecognized states. First, while they lack international 
legal sovereignty,21 state-like entities nonetheless continue to exist alongside recognized, 
                                                 
15 The term “almost-states” represents para-state entities that have gained de facto independence from their parent 
country and aspire to the status of a full-fledged state, but lack the recognition of the international community. 
Stanislawski, 2008, 366–396; Pelczynska-Nalecz et al., 2008, 370-387. 
16 The term “nations without sates” refers to cultural communities that argue for autonomy or secession and use calls 
for statehood to express self-determination. See Montserrat Guibernau, Nation without States: Political 
Communities in a Global Age  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 1-2. 
17 The term “near states” denotes entities with many of the attributes of a sovereign state but lacking one of the 
Montevideo criteria for statehood. See Jacques DeLisle, “Law’s Special Answers to the Cross-Strait Sovereignty 
Question,” Orbis 46, no. 4 (2002), 741. 
18 The term “area of special sovereignty” refers to an entity that fails to display “stateness” (e.g. Somaliland). See 
Paul Robert Magocsi, Historical Atlas of Central Europe, rev. and expand. ed. (Seattle: Universtiy of Washington 
Press, 2002).  
19 See the table of unrecognized states presented at the end of this section. 
20 Harvey and Stansfield, 2011, 11. 
21 Krasner identifies four ways in which the concept of sovereignty is used: (1) international legal sovereignty 
suggests that a state is recognized by other states based on the conventional rule that the state is a “juridically 
independent territorial entity” that “can enter into treaties that will promote [its] interests as it[] define[s] them”; (2) 
Westphalian sovereignty refers to “the absence of authoritative external influences”; (3) interdependent sovereignty 
is a control over cross-border movements of capital, goods, ideas, and people; and (4) domestic sovereignty refers to 
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sovereign states in the international arena. Second, the processes by which unrecognized states 
exercise their sovereignty domestically are anomalous in myriad ways: these entities have 
questionable legitimacy, limited resources, are dependent on patronage structures, and are in 
conflict with their parent states. Third, due to their unrecognized status, state-like entities share 
certain characteristics with one another, such as their isolation in international relations, their 
experience of multiple internal and external problems, and, sometimes, their image as criminal 
states or “puppets of external states.”22 Over time, though, scholarship has also observed the 
progress that a number of state-like entities have made in the spheres of democracy and human 
rights.23 Finally, some scholars see the abnormality of this category of states simply as the fact 
that, contrary to their compliance with the general requirements of the Westphalian model, they 
lack recognition.24 
To describe this phenomenon, scholars have sought the conceptual means to understand 
and to provide an adequate term for the emergence and existence of an entity that possesses the 
trappings of statehood and the internal capacity to function as a state,25 but also experiences 
constant uncertainty and lack of international recognition.26 Although de facto state has been 
                                                                                                                                                             
domestic authority and state’s effectiveness. Stephen D. Krasner, “Problematic Sovereignty,” in Problematic 
Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001).  
22 Lynch, 2002, 832. 
23 On the democratic development of unrecognized states, see Chapter 4 of this work. See generally, Laurence 
Broers, “The Politics of Non-Recognition and Democratization,” vol. 17, The Limits of Leadership: Elites and 
Societies in the Nagorny Karabakh Peace Process (London: Conciliation Resources, 2005); Nina Caspersen, 
“Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto States,” International Spectator 44, no. 4 (2009); 
Caspersen, 2012; Nicu Popescu, “Democracy in Secessionism: Transnistria and Abkhazia’s Domestic Policies,” 
(Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2006).  
24 Timothy William Waters, personal communication, June, 2013. 
25 Geldenhuys, 2009, 27. 
26 In this context, scholars refer to conventional features of statehood, sovereignty, and decolonization. For example, 
for both Jackson and Pegg, the notions of quasi and unrecognized states have appeared as outcomes of the 
decolonization process, which is seen only as a struggle against foreign domination. See generally, Kingston and 
Spears, 2004; R.H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Pegg, 1998. 
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widely accepted,27 the term suggests that these entities receive only de facto acknowledgment 
and are all denied formal recognition, an assumption that is not necessarily accurate.28 The key 
definitional issue of these state-like entities is their desire for internationally recognized 
statehood that they are denied because of challenges to their right to statehood. Therefore, as an 
alternative term, contested states is also appropriate for this category of entities.29  
Overall, the general definition of the category of unrecognized states includes the 
following elements: 
An unrecognized state has achieved de facto independence covering at least two-thirds of 
the territory to which it lays claim and including its main city and key regions; its 
leadership is seeking to build further state institutions and demonstrate its own 
legitimacy; the entity has declared formal independence or demonstrated clear aspirations 
for independence, for example through an independence referendum, adoption of a 
separate currency or similar act that clearly signals separate statehood. The entity has not 
gained international recognition or has, at the most, been recognized by its patron state 
and a few other sates of no great importance; it [has] existed for at least two years.30 
According to these criteria, since 1991, there have been eighteen cases of unrecognized states, 
including some that no longer have claims to formal recognition.31 The table below presents a 
simple classification of unrecognized states according to their present status: states that lack any 
recognition; states that are currently only partially recognized (by only one or few other states), 
and states that were previously unrecognized but have since renounced their claims to 
recognition. 
                                                 
27 Pegg, 1998; Bahcheli et al., 2004; Lynch, 2004; Caspersen, 2009. 
28 For example, the state-like entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (both of which are often referred to as de facto 
states) are recognized by the Russian Federation. See Geldenhuys, 2009, 26. 
29 Geldenhuys, suggests this term, which also refers to the widely recognized states of Palestine and Western Sahara. 
Geldenhuys, 2009. It seems that the designation of a term depends on many factors and criteria for its 
conceptualization. This, consequently, may cause difficulties when generalizing specific case studies. For the 
purposes of this work, the terms “unrecognized/de facto/contested state,” which have yet to find a clear and 
unanimous definition, matter less than their definition, namely an entity that seeks recognition, has control over its 
territory and population, and possesses the other trappings of statehood. Therefore, both the terms de facto and 
contested are used here along with the term unrecognized states. 
30 Caspersen, 2012, 11.  
31 Ibid., 12. 
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TABLE 1. UNRECOGNIZED STATES SINCE 1991 THAT HAVE DECLARED INDEPENDENCE AND SOUGHT EXTERNAL 
RECOGNITION 
Status Currently 
unrecognized 
Currently partially 
recognized  
Formerly unrecognized, now have 
renounced their previous claims 
Entity Nagorno-Karabakh 
(1994-) 
Somaliland (1991-) 
Transdniestria 
(1991-) 
Abkhazia (1993-) 
Kosovo (2008-)* 
South Ossetia (1992-) 
Taiwan (1971-)** 
Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus 
(1974-)   
Bougainville (1975-97) 
Chechnya (1991-, 1996-1999)  
Eritrea (1991-1993) 
Gagauzia (1991-1994) 
Kurdish Autonomous Region (1991-2004) 
Montenegro (2000-2006)  
Republika Srpska (1992-1995) 
Republika Srpska Krajina (1991-1995) 
Tamil Eelam (1986-2009) 
* Kosovo was an unrecognized entity from 1999 to 2008, when it gained international recognition. 
Although this recognition has not been universal, the majority of sovereign states in the world now acknowledge 
Kosovo’s independence. 
** Taiwan’s position is ambiguous: in 2007, it applied for full membership in the UN and was rejected. 
Since 2008, after changes in its government, Taiwan no longer claims or supports its full formal independence and 
recognition. At the same time, it continues to be recognized by a number of other states. 
As the table shows, two categories of unrecognized states have sought recognition for 
many years and continue to do so today. These categories encompass states not recognized by 
any sovereign state as well as partially recognized entities. As the table illustrates, the case of 
Transdniestria belongs to the first group of contested states, those that have declared 
independence and seek recognition but remain unrecognized.32  
 Conditions for emergence and viability. Scholars have identified several conditions that 
underlie the appearance of unrecognized states. To begin, some mention the current framework 
of the international system of sovereign states with its fixed borders and the failures of such a 
system.33 Others point to the existence of geopolitical forces promoting the state fragmentation, 
which may cause a “secessionist movement to secure territory and engage in the process of 
                                                 
32 The term recognition here refers to formal recognition by confirmed, sovereign states. At the same time, both 
Transdniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh have peer recognition. The status of Transdniestrian recognition is discussed 
in greater detail in the next sections.  
33 See Timothy W. Waters. “Contemplating Failure and Creating Alternatives in The Balkans: Bosnia’s Peoples, 
Democracy, and The Shape of Self-Determination,” Yale Journal of International Law 29 (2004), 465, who argues 
that, under the current system of sovereign states with fixed borders and the factual separation of territories, the 
failure of a parent state conditions the appearance of a de facto state, whereas the rigid state system conditions its 
non-recognition. 
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separation.”34 And still others highlight the weakness and instability of parent states and current 
configurations of sovereignty,35 or the influence of other states pursuing their interests.36  
These and other factors, such as political and economic incentives and globalization (or 
the shift in authority of the modern state), have contributed to disputes between the unrecognized 
and parent states. Myriad internal conditions, such as success in nation-building efforts and 
support from an external patron,37 the needs of the market and global resources trade,38 the 
general processes of globalization,39 and the existence of the geo-economic paradigm of natural 
resources, which suggests that “[t]he ecology of unrecognized states in the international system 
is greatly influenced by…strategic importance, and…resource importance”40 all determine the 
viability of an unrecognized state and influence its insistence on seeking recognition. At the 
same time, the use of different means to address these controversies may lead to the reabsorption 
of breakaway entities and the elimination of the conditions that necessitated their separate 
existence. Gagauzia, for example, received its autonomous status through negotiations with 
Moldova,41 whereas Tamil Eelam was reintegrated into Sri Lanka by force.42 
The goal of unrecognized states. Generally rooted in the principles of self-determination, 
a contested state’s search for recognition is perhaps its key foreign policy aim – albeit one that a 
de facto state possesses reduced capacity to implement – and the goal that distinguishes it most 
                                                 
34  Harvey and Stansfield, 2011, 18. 
35  Kolstø, 2006. 
36  Stanislawski, 2008. 
37  Kolstø, 2006, 730. 
38  King, 2001. 
39 Matan Chorev, “Complex Terrains: Unrecognized States and Globalization” in Unrecognized States in the 
International System, ed. Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield (USA: Routledge, 2011), 27-40. Chorev argues that 
the logic of emergence of unrecognized states is a consequence of globalization, which has caused the crisis of 
authority that modern states have experienced. As a result, the development of intergovernmental institutions and 
sub-domestic spaces through fragmentation create a place for unrecognized states to co-exist. 
40 Harvey and Standsfield, 2011, 23. 
41 Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Eri) [Lege Nr.344, 23.12.1994 privind Statutul Juridic 
Special al Găgăuziei (Gagauz-Yeri)], adopted by Moldovan Parliament in 1994. 
42 The Sri Lankan Army took control of the territory claimed by Tamils in 2009 after a long period of military 
clashes. 
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from the foreign policy of a recognized state. Existing research on the internal dynamics and 
features of unrecognized states suggests that they seek recognition through various channels, 
including legal ones,43 to assure political and economic survival, to obtain aid and foreign 
investment, and to demonstrate the capacity of the state and its apparatus to function.44  
Reasons for the denial of recognition. When compared against the standard requirements 
of statehood, de facto states are usually denied recognition based on reasons grounded in the 
Montevideo criteria. First is the issue of population, or, more specifically, the question of 
whether the inhabitants of an entity truly support its unilateral break from the parent state. 
Second, an issue may arise when the territorial boundaries of an entity are not accepted because 
the entity’s right to independence is contested and the borders it claims are seen as an integral 
part of the parent state. Third, the government’s potential effectiveness may be challenged due to 
widespread dispute over the right of the entity to govern, which could result if the state-like 
entity’s claim to an independent existence is rejected. Fourth, recognized states may deny state-
like entities the opportunities to engage in international relations by refusing to grant them 
recognition.45 Recognition may also be denied due to violations of international norms when 
these entities were formed (e.g. aggression towards the parent state), their dependence on a 
foreign country (compromising the issue of independence), the commitment of the international 
community to the principle of territorial integrity, or the parent state’s opposition to separation. 
Despite these circumstances, however, unrecognized states continue to seek recognition of their 
statehood and acceptance of their independent status. 
                                                 
43 Francis Owtram, “The Foreign Policies of Unrecognized States,” in Unrecognized States in the International 
System, ed. Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield (NY: Routledge, 2011); Klejda Mulaj, “International Actions and 
the Making and Unmaking of Unrecognized States,” Ibid.; Nina Caspersen. “Separatism and Democracy in the 
Caucasus,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 50, no. 4 (2008); Christopher Waters. “Law in Places that Don't 
Exist,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 34 (2006). 
44 Owtram, 2011. 
45 Geldenhuys, 2009, 23-24.  
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To summarize, considering unrecognized states as a group shows that they possess a 
number of features that are important for understanding the nature of the criteria required for 
state recognition, as well as suggests the existence of a temporal correlation between a 
constitution and recognition. First, these entities de facto exist independently from their parent 
states, control territory and the population within it through their centralized government, possess 
other attributes of a state, and seek recognition of their statehood. Second, the sheer length of 
time during which these state-like entities push for but fail to achieve independence provides 
fertile ground for examining the role that constitutions and constitutional changes play in claims 
for external recognition.  
Thus, the analysis of internal constitutional development and the responses of de facto 
states to the requirements for recognition may reveal whether doctrinal expectations on the 
effects of a constitution on recognition work in practice and, if so, in what ways. To that end, the 
following section introduces one such example of an unrecognized state, Transdniestria, 
describes the historical and political circumstances of its emergence, and identifies its key 
features as a de facto state and its relevance as a case study. 
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2. The Case of Transdniestria 
The Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic (also referred here as Transdniestria or the 
TMR)46 proclaimed its separation from the Republic of Moldova47 on September 2, 1990,48 and 
became de facto independent in 1992. An interrelated set of historical, linguistic, political, 
geopolitical, and economic factors sparked Transdniestria’s declaration of independence and 
served as the backdrop for its claim to statehood, the development of its constitutional 
framework, and its decades-long search for recognition. In order to contextualize the relationship 
between Transdniestria’s quest for recognition and its constitution, a topic analyzed in the next 
chapters, the following sections provide an overview of these crucial factors. 
2.1. Historical Background  
A historical overview of the region through the early 1990s highlights important aspects 
of Transdniestria’s emergence and sets the background for understanding the TMR’s subsequent 
independent development, including its constitutional framework.49 
                                                 
46 In English, the full official name of this state-like entity is the Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic, 
(Приднестровская Молдавская Республика [Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika] in Russian, and 
Republica Moldovenească Nistreană in Moldovan). In Russian, the shortened Приднестровье [Pridnestrovie] or 
ПМР [PMR] is often used, and Transnistria in Moldovan/Romanian. In English, the name and its spelling vary 
throughout the literature as authors use Russian or Moldovan/Romanian versions, a hybrid, or varying translations 
(e.g. Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria; Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, Dniestr Republic), and various 
abbreviations (MRT, TMR, or PM, respectively). Perhaps the most commonly used term in English, Transdniestria, 
was introduced by the first report of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1993 (formerly the 
CSCE, now the OSCE). See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report No. 13 by the CSCE 
Mission to Moldova, (1993). The present work uses the abbreviation TMR and Transdniestria interchangeably, but 
preserves the term unchanged as it appears in in citations. 
47 The Republic of Moldova declared its independence from the USSR on August 27, 1991. It was part of the USSR 
from 1940 to 1991.  
48 Declaration of the Creation of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, 1990. http://mfa-
pmr.org/index.php?newsid=230. 
49 Scholars have no unanimous approach to the history of the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria. Presentation 
of the facts and their interpretation often varies and depends on the language, time of writing, and the research 
agenda of the scholar. A selected bibliography on the history of Moldova and Transdniestria, including the origins of 
their tensions, comprises, In English: William E. Crowther, Fedor, Helen, “Moldova,” in Belarus and Moldova: 
Country Studies, ed. Helen Fedor (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1995); Pål Kolstø, Andrei Edemsky, and 
Natalya Kalashnikova. “The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism,” Europe-Asia Studies 45, no. 6 
(1993); J. Eyal, “Moldovians,” in The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union, ed. G. Smith (London: Longman, 
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Control over the territory of present-day Moldova has shifted from one state to another 
for centuries, which accounts for the great variety of ethnic groups and their “diverging 
attachments to the various states which historically have laid claim to it.”50 During these 
territorial transfers, the river Dniester51 often served as one of the main natural borders defining 
the political units that formed in what eventually became Moldova and Transdniestria. 
The Principality of Moldova, stretching from the Carpathian Mountains to the Dniester 
River, was created as an independent state under Stefan the Great in 1359.52 In 1456, it was 
conquered by the Ottoman Empire and remained under Ottoman rule for several centuries (see 
Maps A and B below).53  
                                                                                                                                                             
1990); Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Hoover Institution Press, 2000); 
Post-Soviet Moldova (Iasi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1997); Van Wilhelmus Meurs, The Bessarabian 
Question in Communist Istoriography (Ultrech University, 1994); Tony Vaux and Jan Barrett, Conflicting Interests: 
Moldova and the Impact of Transdniestria (UK: Humanitarian Initiatives, 2003). 
In Moldovan/Romanian: Oazu Nantoi, “Cu Privire la Situatia in Raioanele de Est ale Republicii Moldova,” in 
Aspecte ale Conflictului Transnistrian (1992-2000) (Chisinau: Institutul Politicilor Publice, 2001), 9-18; “Conflictul 
Transnistrian – Geneza, Evolutie, Perspective,” Destin Romanesc. Revista de Istorie si Cultura, no. 1 (2003), 47-70; 
Anton Moraru, Roman Alexandru, Mihai Cernencu, Ion Moiseev. Istoria Romanilor. Besarabia si Transnistria 
(1812-1993) (Chisinau, 1995); Ion Turcanu, Republica Moldova Independent (Chisinau: Stiinta, 2001); Iulian 
Fruntasu, O Istorie Etnopolitica a Basarabiei: 1812-2002 (Chisinau: Cartier, 2002); Ioan Silviu Nistor, Istoria 
Romanilor din Transnistria (Galati, 1995).  
In Russian: Assotsiatsia Uchenyh Moldovy im. N.Milesku-Spataru, eds. Istoria Respubliki Moldova. s drevneishih 
vremen do nashih dnei (Chisinau: 2002); Ezhegodnyi istoricheskiy al’manah Pridnestrovia. (Tiraspol: 1997); 
Fenomen Pridnestrovia. (Tirapol: RIO PGU, 2000); V.Ya. Grosul i dr., eds., Istoria Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi 
Respubliki, t. 1 (Tiraspol: 2000); N.V. Babilunga, B.G. Bomeshko, Pridnestrovskiy konflikt: istoricheskie, 
demograficheskie, politicheskie aspekty (Tiraspol: RIO PGU, 1998); Nikolai  Babilunga, “Pridnestrovskaya 
Moldavskaya Respublika: Priznannaya istoriografia nepriznannogo gosudarstva,” vol. 18, Istoriograficheskiy dialog 
vokrug nepriznannyh gosudarstv: Pridnestrovie, Nagornyi Karabakh, Armenia, Yujnaya Ossetia i Gruzia, (2007). 
50  Judy Batt. “Federalism Versus Nationalism in Post-Communist State-Building: The Case of Moldova,” Regional 
and Federal Studies 7, no. 3 (1997), 27. 
51 The river flows from the Carpathian Mountains to the Black Sea and changes names several times: it is called 
Dnister at its beginning in Ukraine, Nistru in Moldova, and Dnester as it runs into the Black Sea. See Cooperation in 
the Transboundry Dniestr River Basin, http://dniester.org. The terms “right bank” and “left bank” of the Dniestr 
River refer to their orientation with respect to an observer looking downstream (south). 
52 Prior to 1359, the present-day territory of Moldova was part of Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
53 In 1711, Prince Dmitri Kantemir of Moldova and Peter the Great that Russia signed a secret agreement that 
allowed Moldova to preserve its autonomy by becoming a protectorate of Russia. The Lutsk Treaty, 1711. Although 
the Treaty is no longer in force, it indicates the longtime ties between Moldova and Russia. 
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MAP A: THE PRINCIPALITY OF MOLDOVA (MOLDAVIA) 
UNDER STEFAN THE GREAT IN 1460  
 
 
MAP B: MOLDOVA (MOLDAVIA) UNDER OTTOMAN RULE 
BETWEEN THE 15TH AND 17TH CENTURIES 
 
 
Source: Historical Atlas of Central Europe, 2002. 
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Following the Russo-Turkish war in 1812, 
the Ottoman Empire ceded Bessarabia, part of the 
Moldovan Principality located between the Prut 
and the Dniester, to Russia,54 while the rest of the 
Principality of Moldova, to the west of the Prut 
River, remained in Turkish hands (see Map C). As 
a separate political entity west of the Prut, the 
Principality of Moldova formed an alliance with 
the Principality of Wallachia that led to the creation 
of the modern Romanian state in 1859. This new 
state then laid claim to all other Romanian lands 
that no longer remained under its rule, such as 
Bessarabia, Bukovina55 and Transylvania.56 
Romania eventually acquired these lands after the 
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian 
Empires at the end of the First World War.57  
The territory of Bessarabia itself remained part of the Russian Empire until 1918,58 when 
Romania occupied the area and secured a vote from the local assembly in favor of joining the 
                                                 
54 The Treaty of Bucharest, 1812.  
55 Bukovina was the northwestern tip of the Moldovan Principality, which was annexed in 1775 by the Hapsburg 
Empire and later became an Austrian province. 
56 Transylvania was a region with a distinct history that only later became attached to the Romanian state. The 
Hungarians conquered Transylvania in the 9th century, and the Habsburg Empire annexed the region in the 17th 
century. 
57 K. Hitchens, Romania 1866-1947  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 279-91. 
58 Having lost the Crimean War (1854-56), Russia was obliged to cede the southern part of Bessarabia, which then 
became part of the Kingdom of Romania when it was created in 1859. In 1878, however, the Treaty of Berlin 
returned that part of Bessarabia, though not the Dniestr delta, to Russia.  
MAP C: BESSARABIA AS PART OF THE RUSSIAN 
EMPIRE (1812-1918), AND THE ROMANIAN 
PRINCIPALITIES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1856-
1859) 
Source: Historical Atlas of Central Europe, 
2002. 
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Kingdom of Romania.59 From 1918 to 1940, Bessarabia was part of Romania (see Map D 
below), although the USSR considered this move illegal and saw Bessarabia as part of its own 
territory.60   
                                                 
59 The creation of the Moldovan Democratic Republic within the Russian state in 1917, its declaration of 
independence in February 1918, and its vote for unification with Romania in December 1918, receive various 
interpretations from historians. Some consider these events as evidence of the democratic will of the Bessarabian 
people to reunite with Romania and restore unity among the Romanian people, which the Russian annexation of 
Bessarabia in 1812 disrupted. See e.g. Turcanu, 2001. Other historians question whether the practices of the 
Bessarabian Parliament (Sfatul Tarii) were truly democratic, noting that only a minority of Pro-Romanian members 
voted in favor of unification and used terror and violence to sway others. See e.g., Victor Stepaniuk, 
Gosudarstvennost’ moldavskogo naroda: istroricheskie, politicheskie i pravovye momenty (Chisinau, 2006), 242; 
Serghei Nazaria, “Ob’edinenie" Bessarabii s Rumyniei v svete mejdunarodnogo prava i pozitsia bessarabtsev”, 
Moldovo-pridnestrovskii region, no. 6 (2010), 63.  
British scholar Judy Batt holds a similar position to that of Stepaniuk and Nazaria. She points out: 
In fact, the 1918 union with Romania seems from the start to have been less a product of heartfelt 
identification with Romania than a practical necessity forced on the Moldovans. The national 
movement in Bessarabia had had little contact with Romania, and when Tsarist rule collapsed, an 
independent Moldovan Republic was set up. But later it found it had to turn to Romania to 
preserve itself from the successive assaults of Ukrainian-nationalist, Bolshevik and White Guard 
forces. […] After the union, the Moldovans found themselves in the unfortunate position of, in 
Joseph Rothschild's words, Romania's “most misgoverned province.”  
As Rothschild describes, the Bessarabian province within Romania was  
a particularly backward, refractory, and incendiary region...whose problems were then 
compounded by its use as a bureaucratic exile for incompetent, corrupt, sadistic, or politically out-
of-favour administrators. 
See Batt, 1997, 36; J. Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 1974), 286. 
60 Several arguments support the Russian side:  
1) Romania did not sign a treaty with Russia on the new borders in 1917. Therefore, Romanian intervention into 
Bessarabia (which was still Russian territory) in the end of 1917 under pretext of protecting military depots was an 
illegal, unilateral act – in other words, annexation.  
2) Romania signed an agreement with Russia on the Withdrawal of Romanian Forces from Bessarabia between 
March 5 and 9, 1918. Therefore, Romania violated this agreement by keeping its military in Bessarabia.  
3) At the Paris Peace Conference in October 1920, Romania, France, Britain, Japan and Italy signed a special treaty 
on Bessarabia over Soviet protests. The Treaty stated that the region historically and ethnically belonged to Romania 
and guaranteed the protection of France, Britain, Japan and Italy of the border along the Dniester. However, because 
Japan did not ratify this treaty, it remained without legal force.  
Thus, Soviet Russia broke off diplomatic relations with Romania in 1918, and ties were not restored until 1934. 
Despite several rounds of bilateral Romanian-Soviet negotiations on the ‘Bessarabian question,’ the Soviet Union 
refused to recognized Bessarabia as part of Romania from 1918 to 1940. See Documenty vneshney politiki SSSR, 7 
noieabrea 1917-31 dekabrea 1918. T. 1 (Moskva, 1959), 210-211.  
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MAP D: BESSARABIA AS PART OF THE ROMANIAN STATE (1918-1940) 
 
Source: Livezeanu, 2000. 
Throughout this time, the territory of what is now called Transdniestria, on the left (east) 
bank of the Dniester River, followed a distinct historical path. From the ninth to the fourteenth 
centuries, the area was part of Kievan Rus’ and Galicia-Volhynia. From the fourteenth to 
eighteenth centuries, control over this borderland constantly changed between Poland, the 
Ottoman Empire, and Crimean Khanate (see Maps A and B above for general reference). After 
the Russo-Turkish war in 1791, the Ottoman Empire ceded control over the left (east) bank of 
the Dniester to Russia,61 and the area became the part of Russian districts of Podolia and 
Kherson (see Map C above). As a result, prior to the Soviet period, Transdniestria “was, at an 
                                                 
61 The Treaty of Iasi, 1791 (1792). This treaty mandated that the Ottoman Empire cede all its holdings in 
Transdniestria, where a high proportion of the population was Slavs, to the Russian Empire. 
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even deeper level than in Bessarabia, a classic borderland where ethnic identities were fluid and 
situational, and where Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian, Jewish, and German influences combined 
to create a mixed culture.”62 
In 1918, the territory of Transdniestria became part of Ukraine,63 and, in 1924, part of 
this area was transformed into the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) 
within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (see Map E below).64 The 1925 and 1938 
constitutions of the MASSR prescribed the autonomous region’s internal organization, namely 
its own central governing bodies and budget, its self-governance within Ukraine, and its right to 
secede from Ukraine or to demand greater autonomy.65 Having never been a part of the 
Romanian state – unlike Bessarabia66 – the left bank and its Moldovan settlements of internal 
migrants from the right bank was from the outset heavily exposed to Slavic culture.67 Whether 
part of the Russian Empire or the USSR, the territory’s population consistently expressed loyalty 
to Russia.68  
                                                 
62 King, 2000, 181. The numbers King cites are revealing: 48% of the population was Ukrainian, 30% Moldavian, 
9% Russian, and 8.5% Jewish. 
63 In 1919, Ukraine proclaimed its independence and became the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. In 1922, it 
became one of the founding republics of the USSR. 
64 Many scholars suggest that the establishment of MASSR was part of a long-term Soviet strategy to regain 
Bessarabia. Thus, despite the relatively small population of ethnic Moldovans (30.1%) in the area, a new 
autonomous region was designed with the intent to reclaim Bessarabia with the help of some left-wing Moldovan 
émigrés from inter-war Romania. See e.g., Mihai Bruhis, Russia, Romania si Basarabia. 1812, 1918, 1924, 1940  
(Chisinau: Universitas, 1992), 148-171; George Cioranescu, Basarabia, Pamant Romanesc (Bucuresti: Fundatia 
Culturala Romane, 2002), 177-178; 296-297; Batt, 1997, 28. 
65 Constitutions of the MASSR of 1925 and 1938. In V.M. Ivanov, Konstitutsionnoe pravo Respubliki Moldova 
(Chisinau, 2000). 
66 Some Moldovan authors dispute the significance of this fact, insisting that, even though Transdniestria was not a 
Moldovan political territory, it was unquestionably part of a Romanian ethno-cultural space. See e.g., Oleg 
Serebrian, Politosfera  (Chisinau: Cartier, 2001), 117-118. 
67 Pål Kolstø and Andrei Malgin. “The Transnistrian Republic: A Case of Politicized Regionalism,” Nationalities 
Papers 26, no. 1 (1998), 106.  
68 Bomeshko, 2000. 
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Following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,69 the USSR regained control over Bessarabia70 
and, in 1940, created the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), the predecessor state to 
today’s Moldova. The MSSR included the territories of Bessarabia, or the territories between the 
Dniestr and Prut, as well as those of the MASSR, or the territories on the left bank of Dniestr 
(see Map E below).71 
MAP E: CREATION OF THE MSSR (1940) THROUGH THE UNIFICATION OF BESSARABIA AND THE MASSR (1924-1939) 
 
Source: Historical Atlas of Central Europe, 2002. 
During the Second World War, Romania, with Axis support, occupied the territory of the 
MSSR,72 including not only the territory of former MASSR but also areas far beyond it (see Map 
F below). After Romania withdrew from these territories at the end of the war, the MSSR 
                                                 
69 Formally the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, the Pact was signed in 1939. It 
stipulated non-aggression between the two countries, but also included a secret protocol that divided the territories 
of Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland into German and Soviet “spheres of influence.” 
70 Romania protested this, but did not have German support. See Andreas Johansson. “The Transnistrian Conflict 
after the 2005 Moldovan Parliamentary Elections,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 22, no. 4 
(2006), 508. 
71 The MSSR’s borders were defined by an act of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of November 1940, 
which substantially reshaped the territory. Northern Bukovina and Southern Budjak were cut off from Bessarabia 
and transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. Thus, the MSSR consisted of the rump of Bessarabia and a strip of territory 
across the Dniester, which had been part of the former MASSR. Upon its independence in 1991, the Republic of 
Moldova inherited the borders established in 1940. 
72 Upon occupying the territories of the MSSR in 1941, Romania claimed the areas as its own.  
98 
regained its status as one of the republics of the USSR,73 which continued until 1991 (see Map G 
below). 
MAP F: THE MSSR UNDER ROMANIAN OCCUPATION 
DURING WORLD WAR II (1941-1944) 
 
MAP G: THE MSSR AS PART OF THE SOVIET UINON (1945-
1991) 
 
Source: Historical Atlas of Central Europe, 2002. 
During the Soviet period, the “Bessarabian question”74 remained alive in Romania: “the name of 
Moldova […] continued to be loosely attached to the area west of the Prut up to the Carpathian 
mountains.”75 Romanian leader Ceausescu coupled this lingering resentment with anti-Russian 
sentiment in his discourse to justify pursuing independence from Soviet control.76 
Thus, the historic and political identity of the territory of present day Moldova accounts 
for the disputed legacies and differing interpretations of its past and future. In talking about 
Transdniestria as a part of Moldova, Moldovans point to their shared Soviet experience, whereas 
                                                 
73 The 1947 Peace Treaty of Paris conferred international recognition on the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia in 
1940 and confirmed the USSR’s right to Bessarabian territory. See Peace Treaty of Paris, 1947. 
74 The question of who can rightfully claim Bessarabia. 
75 Batt, 1997, 29. 
76 Evidence of this includes the periodic internal reports the Romanian foreign ministry issued on the situation in the 
MSSR and Ceausescu’s references to Bessarabia in his speeches. See Batt, 1997, 29. 
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Transdniestrians emphasize pre-Soviet history as justification for their separation from 
Moldova.77 In addition to this, both banks adopt different views on the origins of the tensions 
between them that began in the 1980s, revealing the multiplicity of factors that have contributed 
to the creation of the de facto separate statehood of Transdniestria from Moldova today (see Map 
H below).   
MAP H: THE SEPARATE REGION OF TRANSDNIESTRIA WITHIN MOLDOVA (1991-PRESENT) 
 
                                                 
77 John Beyer. “Transnistria: In Search of a Settlement for Moldova's Breakaway Region,” St. Anthony's 
International Review 6, no. 1 (2010), 168; Oazu Nantoi, The East Zone Conflict in the Republic of Moldova: A New 
Approach (Chisinau: Institute for Public Policy, 2002), 4; Serguei Markedonov, “Transnistrie: Le Credo 
Separatiste,” Politique Internationale, no. 114 (2007), 249-70, 255, 257 (Interview by Serguei Markedonov with 
President Smirnov). 
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2.2. The Origins of Transdniestria’s Separation 
Scholars have no single approach to examining the causes of the tensions between the 
right and the left banks that eventually led to Transdniestrian separation.78 Instead, in addition to 
historical differences, they point to ethnic/linguistic, political, geopolitical, economic, and 
power-sharing factors as contributing to the hostility and armed clashes in the region. 
The ethnic/linguistic component. During the Soviet era, migration dynamics rooted in the 
region’s industrialization79 and border security policies had a profound effect on the area’s ethnic 
composition.80 What resulted was an amalgamation of different ethnic groups, with Moldovans 
as the majority. According to the 1989 census, the total population of the MSSR was 4,335,000, 
of which 64.5% were Moldovans, 14% Ukrainians, 13% Russians, 3.5% Gagauz, 2% Bulgarians, 
and 1.5% Jews.81 However, the Transdniestrian region had a noticeably different ethnic makeup.  
Never considered part of Moldova proper, the area has always had a sizeable Moldovan 
population along with Ukrainians and Russians. Of Transdniestria’s total 712,500 inhabitants in 
                                                 
78 A large body of scholarship has addressed the issue of Transdniestrian separation, particularly its causes. For a 
more detailed discussion on this topic, see: In English: Steven D. Roper, “Regionalism in Moldova-The Case of 
Transnistria and Gagauzia,” in Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict, ed. Jumes; 
Sasse Hughes, Gwendolyn (London: Frank Cass, 2002); John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Andrei 
Tchepalyga. “National Construction, Territorial Separatism, and Post-Soviet Geopolitics in the Transdniester 
Moldovan Republic,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 39, no. 6 (1998); Trevor Waters, “Security Concerns 
in Post-Soviet Moldova.” (Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2001); S. Kaufman. “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elite, 
Masses and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,” International Security 21, no. 2 (1996) (highlighting a set of reasons: 
different histories, political-geopolitical interests, ethnic tensions).  
In Moldovan/Romanian: Gheorghe Cojocaru, Separatismul in Slujba Imperiului (Chisinau: Civitas, 2000); 
“Cauzele Separatizmului Politic si Teritorial al Republicii Moldova”, Destin Romanesc. Revista de Istorie si 
Cultura, no. 2 (2001), 127-133 (pointing out the political and geopolitical character of the TMR’s behavior). 
In Russian: Babilunga, Bomeshko, 1998; Oleg Galushenko, “Pridnestrovskiy konflikt: predystoria protivostoiania,” 
Anuarul Institutului de Cercetari Interetnice 4 (2003) (pointing mainly to historical, demographic, and political 
reasons for the conflict); G.N. Perepelitsa, Konflikt v Pridnestrov’e. Prichiny, problemy i prognoz razvitija, (Kiev, 
2001) (indicating linguistic and geopolitical changes as the main reasons). 
79 During the 1960s and 1970s, over 500,000 Russian-speaking workers came to Moldova, which made Russian, for 
all intents and purposes, the de facto national language. See W. Alejandro Sanchez. “The “Frozen” Southeast: How 
the Moldova-Transnistria Question has Become a European Geo-Security Issue,” The Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies 22, no. 2 (2009), 155. 
80 The Russian 14th Army was stationed in Transdniestria to protect the USSR’s southeastern flank from NATO 
members Greece and Turkey. In 1992, the army was renamed as the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF). 
81 Vsessoiuznaya perepis' naselenia 1989 g. Natsional'nyi sostav naselenia po respublikam SSSR, 
http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php?reg=9. 
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1989, 34.1% were Moldovans, 28% Ukrainians, 30.1% Russians, and 7.8% Bulgarians, Jews, 
and others.82 
Soviet politics largely suppressed Moldavian nationalism83 and pushed the official 
Moldovan language from public to private life. However, the policies of glasnost and perestroika 
created conditions for the open expression of national feelings and reforms in the Soviet 
republics. In 1988, political self-assertion spurred the formation of the Moldovan Popular 
Front,84 which agitated for the adoption of the Latin, rather than Cyrillic, script for the official 
language of Moldovan/Romanian.85 The law on the country’s official language adopted soon 
thereafter proclaimed the Moldovan language in Latin script to be “the basic precondition for the 
existence of the Moldovan nation in its formation as a sovereign nation-state.”86  
                                                 
82 B.G. Bomeshko, “Sravnitel’nyi analyz natsional’noi struktury naselenia MASSR i PMR” in Nepriznannya 
respublika. Ocherki. Dokumenty. Khronika, ed. Gryzlov F.V. (Moskva: RAN, 1999), T.1, 37. Other data on the 
TMR’s population reveals the following: total number of inhabitants: 750,000, of which 39% were Moldovans, 26% 
- Ukrainians, 23% - Russians, and 12% - others. See e.g., O’Loughlin et al., 1998, 339. However, this data is slightly 
less accurate as it includes the population from the right bank in accordance with the administrative-territorial 
division during the census in 1989. See Bomeshko, 1999, 34-37. 
83 The issue of national and ethnic identity has and continues to be a problematic one for Moldovans. Commenting 
on Moldovan/Romanian nationalism, one scholar noted: 
By the 1990s the Moldovans were still a nation divided over their common ‘national’ identity. For 
some they were simply Romanians [. . .] for others, they were an independent historical nation, 
related to, but distinct, from the Romanians to the west. Still, for others, they were something in-
between, part of a general Romanian cultural space, yet existing as a discrete and sovereign people 
with individual traditions.  
Andrei Panici. “Romanian Nationalism in the Republic of Moldova” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2, 
no. 2 (2003), 40. 
84 The Moldovan Popular Front comprised an association of independent cultural and political groups.  
85 In the MSSR, the language was Moldovan and the script Cyrillic. According to the Law on Moldovan as the State 
Language, adopted on August 31, 1989 [Lege Nr. 3464 din 31.08.1989 cu privire la Statutul Limbii de Stat a RSS 
Moldoveneşti]; the Law on the Languages in the Territory of Moldovan SSR, from September 1, 1989 [Lege Nr. 
3465 din 01.09.1989 cu privire la Functionarea Limbilor Vorbite pe Teritoriul RSS Moldovenesti]; and the Article 
13 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova from July 29, 1994 [Constituţia Republicii Moldova din 
29.07.94), the state or official language of Moldova remains Moldovan, but is now written using the Latin alphabet. 
Linguistically, it is considered a dialect of Romanian. Mirroring the divisions on ethnic and national identity 
mentioned above, some people prefer to call the language Moldovan, whereas others refer to it as Romanian. There 
is no uniform position on the language’s title among the population. 
86 Preamble, Law on Moldovan as the State Language, 1989. 
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Concurrently, another law adopted at the same time required everyone whose work 
involved communication with public to speak both Moldovan and Russian.87 Such a provision 
was problematic for the overwhelming majority of non-Moldovans since few of them actually 
spoke Moldovan. Of the total non-titular population of 1,541,000, only 190,000 had a command 
of Moldovan.88 Those that did displayed wide differences in proficiency: 6.5% professed a full 
command of Moldovan; 23.5% could understand and read it; and 52.5% could only pick out 
certain phrases. Fifteen and a half percent of the non-titular population admitted to total 
ignorance of the language.89 Although the law contained a number of provisions on the rights of 
other linguistic groups,90 it also had a number of gaps that invited arbitrary interpretations.91 For 
example, Russian speakers often raised concerns that native Moldovan-speaking applicants or 
those with a very good command of the state language received priority in admission to higher 
education and in employment. For the left bank Moldovans in particular, a “return” to the Latin 
script was a far-fetched idea, since they could trace their usage of the Cyrillic alphabet from the 
fourteenth century, with the brief exception during the interwar period.92 
These abrupt changes in the linguistic environment led to the exclusion of the majority of 
Russian speakers from the cultural and informational environment of Moldova, significantly 
contributed to the hostility between the populations on the two banks, and led to protests and 
                                                 
87 Article 7, Law on the Languages Spoken in the Territory of Moldovan SSR, 1989 (Law on the Languages). 
88 Natsional’nyi sostav naselenia SSSR, (Moscow, 1991).  
89 Pål Kolstø, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics (London: C.Hurst and Co, 1995), 145-6, citing a survey 
conducted in 1992. 
90 For example, the republic undertook to safeguard the development of the Gagauz language, and recognized 
Russian as “the language of interethnic communication” (Article 3, the Law on the Languages). The law stated 
explicitly that citizens were entitled to use the language of their choice at all public and private gatherings and in 
local administration (Articles 6-7, the Law on the Languages). Moldovan was mandated as the working language for 
government, state administrative bodies, and public organizations, but documents were to be translated into Russian 
whenever necessary (Article 9, the Law on the Languages). However, Russian speakers in Moldova regularly 
complained that these provisions were not respected. See Kolstø et al., 1993, 981. 
91 Kolstø et al, 1993. Both laws on languages led to strikes in all major cities in August 1989 and to demands to put 
a draft of the law to a popular referendum. These demands, however, were ignored. 
92 Ibid., 981. More on the language issue in Moldova, see Kolstø, 1995; Jeff Chin and Steven D. Roper. “Ethnic 
Mobilization and Reactive Nationalism: The Case of Moldova,” Nationalities Papers 23, no. 2 (1995), 294-300. 
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mass strikes by the Transdniestrian population.93 As the language policies of the central 
authorities in Chisinau remained unchanged, the Transdniestrian population continued to 
mobilize in order to protect their linguistic and cultural rights.  
Overall, however, given the multiethnic composition on both banks, neither ethnic nor 
linguistic differences became a determining factor in driving the push for separation. Instead, it is 
more accurate to suggest that ethnic or linguistic divisions, which have played a large role in 
conflicts elsewhere in the former Soviet Union,94 are not and have not been especially salient for 
the conflict over Transdniestrian claims to independence.95 Rather, it was a combination of 
factors, including conflict over language, that exacerbated tensions between the banks and 
resulted in the TMR’s separation. 
The political and geopolitical component. In March 1990, the newly elected Moldovan 
Supreme Soviet consolidated the nationalist coalition that implemented a series of radical 
political and economic reforms to “renationalize” Moldova.96 The adoption of the Declaration of 
Sovereignty97 and a new citizenship law98 challenged the position of non-Moldovans and forced 
                                                 
93 Workers of the industrial enterprises on the left bank of the Dniester elected strike committees in August 1989 that 
coalesced under the auspices of the United Council of Work Collectives (UCWC) to oppose the policies emanating 
from Chisinau and later to organize the referenda. For details, see O’Loughlin et al., 1998, 345. 
94 A number of ethnic conflicts occurred in the 1990s between Abkhaz and Georgians, South Ossetians and 
Georgians, and between Armenians and Azeris, leading to creation of the currently unrecognized states of Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia (except for Russia’s recognition of these entities in 2008), and Nagorno-Karabakh.  
95 The majority of the scholars share the positions discussed under footnote 78. One of the few authors who argues 
that the Moldovan-Transnistrian war was essentially an ethnic war is Kaufman, 1996, 108–138. 
96 These measures included, inter alia, the abolition of the leading role of the Communist Party; the acceleration of 
the implementation of the 1989 Language Law, the replacement of Russified and Soviet place names and Russified 
personal names with Moldovan ones; the introduction of national literature and “the history of the Romanians” into 
the core school curriculum; and the adoption of a new national flag, the Romanian red, yellow and blue tricolor that 
for Transdniestrians symbolized the Moldovan desire for unity with Romania. Further steps included the exclusion 
of the Russian language in Romanian-Russian mixed schools and of courses on Russian language and literature; the 
nationalization of the curriculums of all schools; and the decreased number of spots for the Russian speakers in 
universities.  
97 Declaraţia de Suveranitate a Republicii Sovietice Socialiste Moldova, Nr.148-XII, 23.06.1990 [Declaration of 
Sovereignty of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova, June 23, 1990]. 
98 Lege cu privire la Cetăţenia Republicii Moldova, Nr. 596, 05.06.1991 [Law on Citizenship of the Republic of 
Moldova]. Unlike in the Baltic Republics, Moldovan citizenship was open to any resident on the territory as of June 
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them to decide their opinion on Moldovan statehood. Ethnic Russians in the republic faced a 
particular quandary: 
…the Russians had to stake their future on the continued existence of the Soviet Union, 
or else renounce Soviet citizenship and thus by their own actions contribute to the 
downfall of the Soviet state.99 
In addition, of all of the republics, Moldova adopted the most radical position towards the 
new Union Treaty Gorbachev proposed for referendum in an effort to preserve the USSR. 
Deputies of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet favored a loose, confederal “association of sovereign 
states” with no central institutions.100 But, before holding a referendum, the deputies denounced 
the referendum101 and voted to boycott it.102 This move effectively denied the Transdniestrian 
population the right to express its opinion and enhanced their feelings of exclusion from the 
decision-making process on this and other important issues.103 As a result, Transdniestria held its 
own referendum on the Union Treaty separately, and announced that more than 93% of voters 
supported the preservation of the USSR.104 Although both Chisinau and Moscow ignored the 
                                                                                                                                                             
23, 1990. However, applications for citizenship had to be made within one year of that date, and dual nationality was 
not permitted. 
99 Kolstø, 1995, 152. These developments also affected the Trandniestrian nomenclature (people who occupied the 
key administrative, industrial, agricultural positions) who, given Moldovan sovereignty, were deprived of support 
from Moscow, and risked losing power in Moldova and even in their own region. See Perepelitsa, 2001. 
100 Vladimir Socor, “Moldavian Parliament Endorses Confederation,” in Radio Liberty Report on the USSR (1991), 
18-20. 
101 Moldovan deputies denounced the referendum as “our own death warrant, which we are being invited to sign,” 
and “a legalization of the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.” Ibid., 19. 
102 Ibid., 20. 
103 Firstly, the population of Transdniestria represented a society of “Soviet people” where the politics of Soviet de-
nationalization had been successful. Therefore, the ethnopolitical processes in Moldova were seen as a threat to their 
lifestyle. The majority wanted to preserve the Soviet Union as guarantor of their protection and stability in the way 
of life. In addition, the Transdniestrian nomenclature were faithful to Communist ideology and believed in the 
integrity of the Soviet state. Secondly, the draft Union Treaty provided for an increase in the number of Union 
members (consisting of not only republics, but also of their autonomous regions), a provision that would have 
allowed Transdniestria a chance to gain a new political status. See Perepelitsa, 2001. 
104 Bomeshko, Babilunga, 1998, 30-31. 
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results,105 the referendum in Transdniestria demonstrated Moldova’s division on its external 
policy and further heightened the tensions between the banks. 
Another set of controversial developments concerned the increased promotion of the 
nationalist agenda,106 the drive for the “Moldovanization” or “de-Russification” of state 
structures,107 and the competing calls for Moldova’s independence and its unification with 
Romania. The idea of uniting with Romania, which the Moldovan Popular Front consistently 
championed, strongly disturbed Transdniestria as it included the unification not only of Romania 
and Bessarabia, which was based on historical and legal arguments,108 but also the inclusion of 
the Transdniestrian region into Romania on the basis of demography.109 Although the potential 
for unification was in practice quite limited,110 the rhetoric of the Moldovan Popular Front, the 
                                                 
105 The Soviet government in Moscow limited itself to issuing a parliamentary act, “On the Ways to Achieve 
Agreement on Normalizing the Situation in the Moldovan SSR,” in April 1991. The Act called for consensus 
between the left and right banks based on Transdniestria as an integral part of Moldova. Council of Nationalities of 
the Supreme Soviet of USSR, adopted on April 26, 1991. [Soviet natsional’nostei Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR “O 
putiah dostijenia soglasia po normalizatsii obstanovki v SSR Moldove”]. 
106 Batt, 1997, 34. 
107 Claus Neukirch, “Transnistria and Moldova: Cold Peace at the Dniestr” Helsinki Monitor, no. 2 (2001), 123. 
108 The historical grounds for the unification of Romanian and Bessarabia are briefly discussed above. The legal 
arguments for this idea are discussed in the next session. 
109 Leaders of the Moldovan Popular Front pointed to the fact that Moldovans constituted a plurality, although not a 
majority, of the population in Transdniestria and should therefore be included into a united Romania. See Kolstø et 
al., 1993, 980, referring to the conversations with leaders of the Moldovan Popular Front in Chisinau, September 
1992. 
110 In Moldova, this idea did not garner wide support. And in Romania, the new government remained very cautious, 
given its poor economic conditions, the significant differences between the political cultures of two states, and its 
fears of the possible Hungarian counter-claims towards Transylvania. As a result, Romania was reluctant to broach 
the topic of unification with Moldova. For more details on Moldovan and Romanian perceptions of unification. See 
Eyal, 1990; Hitchens, 1994, 277; Batt, 1997, 36; Tuomas Forsberg. “Explaining Territorial Disputes: From Power 
Politics to Normative Reasons,” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 4 (1996), 441. 
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Romanian intelligentsia111 and mass rallies in Moldova112 aggravated fear of this possibility 
among the Transdniestrian population.113 
The economic and power-sharing components. Given the MSSR’s position on the border 
and longstanding disagreements between the USSR and Romania over Bessarabia’s history, the 
leadership of the Soviet Union considered the Transdniestrian part of the MSSR more 
trustworthy than the rest of the republic.114 Consequently, the MSSR’s political leadership came 
mainly from Transdniestria and the bulk of heavy industry, which was under Moscow’s direct 
control, 115 was based on the left bank.116 At the end of 1980s, the Moldovan government tried to 
bring left bank enterprises under its own control,117 threatening the positions of their technocrats 
and factory directors118 and going against the interests of the local administration and influential 
persons from Russia and Ukraine.119 As a result, Transdniestrian leaders sought to preserve their 
                                                 
111 See the eyewitness account of the response of a group of Romanian liberals to this issue in K. Verdery, “Civil 
Society or Nation? ‘Europe’ in the Symbolism of Post-socialist Politics,” in What was Socialism, and What Comes 
Next? , ed. K. Verdery (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
112 During mass rallies and meetings, the issue of unification often appeared together with the exclusion of the 
Russian language from public life. The scale of the rallies was often massive. For example, one of them, held in 
Chisinau in August 1989 attracted about 500,000 people. See Istoria Republicii Moldova, 2002, 329; Panici, 2003, 
39. 
113 The prospect of Romanian unification did not appeal to the majority of Transdniestria’s population given the 
interwar period of Romanian occupation. One particularly unpopular legacy of Romanian occupation was the 
memory of ghettos and death camps on the Transdniestrian territory, where hundreds of thousands died. Therefore, 
any (even indirect) reference to Moldovan potential unity with Romania provoked fear in much of the TMR’s 
population. See Alexandr Burian, “Pridnestrovskiy konflikt i perspectivy ego razreshenia: vzglead iz Kishineva,” 
AVA Portal, July 19, 2011. See also Nikolai Babilunga, “Istoria Pridnestrovskoi Moldovskoi Respubliki,” in 
Pridnestrov’e v makroregional’nom kontexte chernomorskogo poberej’y, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato (Hokkaido 
University, 2008), 54. 
114 Johansson, 2006, 509. 
115 In 1990, such enterprises accounted for about 95% of all heavy industry in Moldova. Argumenty i fakty, 24, 
1992. 
116 Examples of the heavy industry in the TMR include the metallurgical plant in Rybnitsa and the hydroelectric 
plant in Dubasari, the latter of which provides 90% of the energy used on the right bank. See Johansson, 2006, 509. 
117 The Transdniestrian region produced 33% of all industrial goods and 56% of all consumer goods in the entire 
republic. Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 19, 1992. 
118 The left-bank nomenclature depended strongly on maintaining links to Moscow. Therefore, Moldovan 
sovereignty threatened the power and authority of those leaders. See Perepelitsa, 2001. 
119 Nantoi, 2003, 59, 64. 
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access to power first by requesting from Moldova special status as a free economic zone,120 and 
later by pursuing the area’s sovereignty. 
In addition, the struggle for the control over these enterprises was related to the problem 
of center-periphery interactions within the USSR. The Soviet center in Moscow strove to 
preserve effective power over all republics,121 sometimes provoking and using for its own 
purposes conflicts in certain “rebellious” territories and working against their aspirations toward 
sovereignty and national revival.122 
Hostility and the involvement of the 14th Army. The complex interrelation of the above-
mentioned factors and the inability of leaders on both banks to adequately address them brought 
mounting tensions from 1990 to 1992, including acts of provocation and armed conflict. 
Transdniestria’s refusal to accept Chisinau’s authority and Moldovan attempts to restore control 
over the territory led to a number of violent clashes between the newly formed Transdniestrian 
armed forces and Moldovan police, leading to a war in June 1992 that also involved Russian 
troops.123  
                                                 
120 Moldova regarded this request simply as a pretext for the Transdniestrian nomenklatura to preserve its power and 
denied Transdniestria status of free economic zone. See Ion Stavila, “Evolutia Reglementarii Conflictului 
Transnistrean,” in Evoluţia Politicii Externe a Republicii Moldova (1998-2008), ed. Igor Sarov (Chisinau: 
Cartdidact, 2009), 155. 
121 In part, this dominance was pursued through the military and industrial complexes located in the republics. See 
Nicolae Tau, Politica externa a Republicii Moldova  (Bucuresti2000), 158; Nanoi, 2002. 
122 Stavila, 2009, 155. 
123 There is a vast literature dedicated to the details of the armed conflict as viewed from historical and geopolitical 
perspectives, and written in different languages. One detail that has been the source of great contention is the 
number of casualties caused by the conflict. The data vary among different sources, with figures ranging from a few 
hundred upwards to almost a thousand, and more than 100,000 internally displaced persons. See e.g., T. Waters, 
2001, 5, and the CSCE Mission Moldova’s Report No. 13, 1993, 2. Some of the literature that focuses on the details 
of the armed conflict include: Kieran O'Reilly and Noelle Higgins. “The Role of the Russian Federation in the 
Pridnestrovian Conflict: An International Humanitarian Law Perspective,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 19 
(2008), 57-72; Kaufman, 1996, 108–138 (one of the few works arguing that the Moldovan-Transnistrian war was 
essentially an ethnic war; others mainly support the political character of the conflict); Nikolai Babilunga, B.G. 
Bomeshko, Kniga pamjati zaschitnikov Pridnestrov’a (Tiraspol, 1995); Kolstø et al, 1993; Anatolie Ciubotaru, 
Nicolae Muntean, Romanii de la Est: Razboiul de pe Nistru (1990-1992) (Bucuresti, 2004); T. Waters, 1998, Ivan 
Dnestryanskii, “Pravda i lozh o voine v Pridnestrov’e”  http://artofwar.ru/i/iwan_d/. 
108 
After World War II, the Soviet 14th Army was stationed in the MSSR on the left bank 
(Transdniestria). Eventually, due to withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and the 
redistribution of military personnel, a large number of 14th Army soldiers and officers were local 
inhabitants.124 When provocations began on both sides in 1990, the Army remained neutral and 
intervened only in June 1992,125 when Moldovan President Mircea Snegur issued the order to 
regain control over Transdniestria by force. The now Russian Army saw the order as a threat to 
the ordinary Transdniestrian population, which included the families of many of the military 
personnel. As a result, the Russian 14th Army intervened on behalf of the TMR to repel 
Moldovan forces over the Dniestr and to stop the civil war.126  
A cease-fire agreement signed between the Russian and Moldovan presidents in 1992127 
ended the war and stipulated the presence of Russian peace-keeping forces in the region with the 
goal of separating the two sides using a Security Zone. The subsequent agreement between 
Moldova and Russia additionally provided for the synchronization of troop withdrawals once 
final resolution of the Transdniestrian conflict was achieved.128 The ongoing presence of the 14th 
Army129 in Transdniestria, however, has proved controversial. On the one hand, the Russian 
troops have helped to keep Transdniestria separated from the right bank and continue to stay on 
Moldovan territory in violation of the neutrality principle established by Article 11 of the 
                                                 
124 According to General Lebed’s data, 50% of officers and 90% of warrant officers and soldiers came from 
Transdniestrian region. Cited in Andrei Devyatkov, Pered vyzovom evropeizatsii: Politika Rossii v Pridnestrovskom 
uregulirovanii (Tyumeni: Tyumeni State University, 2012), 20. 
125 Williams, 1999, 74. 
126 See the press-conference of the general of 14th army, Alexandr Lebed, in Tiraspol, in 1992, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOyjEzMd15s 
127 Agreement on Principles of the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict of July 21, 1992, signed in Moscow. 
128 Agreement concerning the Legal Status of the Military Formations of the Russian Federation Temporarily 
Present in the Territory of the Republic of Moldova and the Arrangements and Time-limits for Their Withdrawal of 
October 21, 1994. 
129 The former 14th Soviet Army was transformed into the Operative Group of Russian Forces in 1992. Its size was 
reduced from about 9,600 troops in mid-1992 to 2,600 by 1999, including peacekeepers. William H. Hill. “Making 
Istanbul a Reality: Moldova, Russia and Withdrawal from Transdniestria,” Helskinki Monitor 13, no. 2 (2002), 133, 
135. 
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Moldovan Constitution of 1994. On the other hand, the Russian troops have provided a sense of 
security for the de facto state.130 In addition, the majority of Transdniestrians see the Russian 
presence as a source of stability and as a protection of their rights.131 
To summarize, the conflicting interpretations of history, disregard for linguistic 
differences, controversial internal policies, the Moldovan government’s attempt to use force 
against Transdniestria to maintain the republic’s integrity, and the ongoing polar positions on 
joint coexistence even after the end of armed conflict have all contributed to Transdniestria’s 
assertion of its own interests, to the emergence of its de facto statehood, and to its continued de 
facto independence.132 
2.3. Transdniestria as a De Facto State and as a Case Study 
Transdniestria represents an example of an unrecognized state and serves as a valuable 
case study on the role of a constitution in the search of recognition. The entity illustrates the 
characteristics inherent to the class of de facto states described above as well as the features of a 
case study. 
2.3.1. Transdniestria as a De Facto State 
Transdniestria proclaimed its independence from Moldova in 1990 and has remained 
beyond that country’s control for two decades. The TMR has demonstrated its aspirations for 
statehood through its adoption of a set of self-constituting acts and has ensured its functioning as 
a state through a number of mechanisms.  
In response to the changes in the political and linguistic conditions in the MSSR between 
1989 and 1990, the representatives of Transdniestrian trade unions organized referenda across 
                                                 
130 King, 2001, 540. 
131 A March 1995 referendum the Transdniestrian administration organized indicated that 93% of voters favored a 
permanent Russian base in the region and were against withdrawal of the troops. This referendum is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4. 
132 See Grosul, 2001; Babilunga, Bomeshko, 1998. 
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localities in the TMR on the issue of the region’s autonomous status.133 The results of the 
referenda showed the overwhelming support of the population for the creation of an autonomous 
Transdniestrian republic.134 Although Moldova recognized neither the legitimacy of the 
referenda nor their results and adopted a strong stance on putting “an end to separatist activities 
of the leaders of the so-called … Dniestr Republics,"135 the referenda’s outcome nonetheless had 
particular significance for Transdniestria. Most importantly, the results formed the basis for 
promotion of the TMR’s aspiration for statehood and its commitment to protect the interests of 
the region. First, based on the results of these referenda, in 1990 the TMR adopted a number of 
documents that asserted its statehood. These included the Decision on the Creation of the 
                                                 
133 The referenda concerned the creation of an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Moldovan Soviet 
Socialist Republic. This idea was based on the existence of the MASSR from 1924 to 1939 within the Ukrainian 
SSR and intended mainly to protect the political, economic, and linguistic rights of Transdniestria’s population. 
After the Moldovan SSR adopted its Declaration of Sovereignty that did not mention Moldovan membership in the 
USSR, and the Parliamentary Approval of the Committee’ Conclusions on Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (see details in 
Chapter 3), the issue put to referenda shifted to the creation of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic within the 
USSR.  
134 As Table A suggests, Transdniestria’s population largely supported the creation of a Transdniestrian republic (the 
TMSSR).  
Table A. Voter Turnout and Referenda Results in Transdniestria, 1989-1990 
City/Rayon Total number of 
voters (pers.) 
% of 
participation 
% of votes for 
TMSSR 
% of votes against 
TMSSR 
Bendery 86,210 80 97.3 2.2 
Tiraspol 136,004 93 95.9 2.3 
Dubossary 21,334 77 97.0 1.3 
Dubossar rayon 20,637 30 95.0 1.6 
Rybnitsa 39,260 82 91.0 5.5 
Rybnitsa rayon 24,877 94 95.7 3.0 
Grigoriopol rayon 35,480 57.6 94.0 3.4 
Kamenskiy rayon 25,187 88 98.0 1.4 
Slobodzeiskiy rayon 80,871 70 96.0 1.4 
  In total   471,907   79   95.8   2.4 
See “Rezyl’taty uchastia i golosovania Pridnestrovtsev v referendumah v period 1989-1990 g.,” Dnestrovskaya 
Pravda, #299, December 12, 1990; A.Z. Volkova, “Referendumy v kontexte istorii stanovlenia i razvitia 
demokraticheskih institutov v Pridnestrov’e (konetz XX-nachalo XXI vv.),” Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik Pridnestrov’a 
5 (2011). 
135 “Moldova’s President Demands Criminal Prosecution of the Leaders of Dniestr and Gagauz Republics,” Official 
Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, September 19, 1990. During the meeting of the Presidential Council of the Moldovan 
SSR, Moldovan President Mircea Snegur demanded that the heads of the public prosecutor's office and the 
Republic's Ministry of the Interior use every available tool against separatists. The President also demanded that 
criminal proceedings be opened against the leaders of the self-proclaimed republic in the Dniestr Region as well as 
against anyone who abided by the decisions of “the unconstitutional authorities.” Snegur categorically ruled out 
“any talks with the separatists.” Ibid. 
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Transdniestrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (TMSSR) as an autonomous republic within 
the USSR, the Declaration of the TMSSR’s Creation, the Decree of State Power, and the 
Declaration of TMSSR’s Sovereignty. That same year, the TMR held its first parliamentary 
elections.136 One year later, with the break-up of the Soviet Union, Transdniestria adopted its 
Declaration of Independence and held its first referendum on independence.137 Second, the 
popular support for Transdniestria’s autonomous status became the foundation for 
Transdniestrian leaders’ claim to pursue separation from Moldova and to seek recognition of the 
TMR’s statehood unceasingly during the following two decades. It became the main factor for 
both justifying and legitimizing the TMR’s claims in the official discourse and the process of 
negotiation. 
After proclaiming its separation from Moldova, Transdniestria sought to ensure its 
successful functioning as a state. Since the early 1990s, Transdniestria has controlled more than 
two-thirds of the territory it claims.138 Its leadership has continued to highlight residents’ support 
and allegiance and to strengthen state institutions through the establishment of several key state 
features: its constitution; its functional legislative body (the Supreme Council); its executive, 
                                                 
136 The turnout of the parliamentary elections was 81%. Although the Supreme Council of Moldova declared invalid 
the elections in “so-called PMSSR due to violation of the Constitutions of the SSRM [Soviet Social Republic of 
Moldova] and the USSR,” the elections have strengthened the legitimacy of the TMR authorities and their 
independence policies. B.G. Bomeshko, Verhovnyi Soviet Pridenstrovskoi Moldavskoi Respubliki, 1990-2010 
(Bendery: Poligrafist, 2010), 26-27. For more details on these documents, see Chapter 3. 
137 Transdniestria adopted its Declaration of Independence on August 25, 1991. The referendum on independence 
was held on December 1, 1991, with a turnout of 78%. In answer to the question: “Do you support the independence 
of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic within the political and economic union of sovereign states?” 97.7% of 
voters cast their votes for the TMR’s independence. Note, though, that the Moldovan authorities have dismissed the 
referendum and the elections as illegal and without any legal force, describing Moldovan territory as indivisible. See 
A.Z. Volkova, Referendumy v Pridnestrovskoy Moldavskoi Respublike (1989-2006 g.) (Tiraspol, 2006); E. 
Kondratov, “V Moldove mnozhatsea presidenty,” Izvestia, #286, December 3, 1991; “Minorities in Moldova Opt for 
Independence,” Agence France Presse - English, December 2, 1991; “Tuesday Moldavia's Minorities Vote to Quit,” 
The Independent,  December 3, 1991. 
138 The TMR initially established control over its territory between 1990 and 1992, and, since winning the war in 
1992, has maintained its control over the area. According to the Law on the Administrative-Territorial Division of 
the TMR of 2002, which further specified the TMR’s Constitution, this territory comprises 8 cities, 143 villages, 8 
settlements and 4 railway stations. Out of them, 7 villages on the left bank and 1 village on the right bank are 
administrated by Moldova. Zakon ob administrativno-territorial’nom ustroistve PMR, 2002, http://zakon-pmr.com/  
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including a popularly elected president and a full set of ministries; and its judicial branches with 
a Supreme Court, an Arbitration Court, and a Constitutional Court. While possessing its own 
military, Transdniestria has relied on the presence of Russian forces as an important pillar of its 
sovereignty139 and “as a shield and de facto guarantee of [its] independence.”140 The republic has 
its own currency, flag, anthem, citizenship, and passport. Overall, the entity has the political, 
legal, financial, educational, and welfare systems that clearly signal separate statehood.141  
While the entity de jure continues to be part of Moldova and has not been recognized by 
any other states142 except for a few peer entities,143 the TMR has continually sought recognition 
of its statehood over the last two decades. This claim, however, is distinct from the 
Transdniestrian claim to independence, which has undergone an important shift since the TMR’s 
de facto separation from Moldova. In its argument for separation and statehood recognition, the 
TMR has used the word “gosudarstvennost,” loosely translated in English as “statehoodness.”144 
The TMR believes that, due to the historical and political background discussed above and its 
right to self-determination (described below in Chapter 3), Transdniestria has a right to its own 
statehood as a separate republic that best ensures the interests of the TMR’s population.  
                                                 
139 Andrei Devyatkov, “Russian Relations with Moldova under a Paradigm of Ambiguity,” in Moldova: Arena of 
International Influences, ed. Marcin Kosienkowski, William Schreiber (UK: Lexington Books, 2012), 192. 
140 William H. Hill, Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lessons from the Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict  
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 71. 
141 The relevant details on Transdniestrian state-building and constitutional framework are provided in the next 
chapter. 
142 The reasons for this lack of international recognition are discussed in the next chapter. 
143 The TMR is recognized by Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, who are themselves also 
unrecognized states (Abkhazia and South Ossetia are, however, officially recognized by Russia.) Abkhazia, 
Iuzhnaya Osetia i Pridnestrov’e priznali nezavisimost’ drug druga i prizvali vseh k etomu je. NewsRu.com Portal, 
November 17, 2006. 
144 The term “gosudarstvennost” in Russian may denote either a political system (one that has the features of the 
state) or the state of development of a nation or of another social group that has succeeded in creating its own state. 
In contrast, the term “gosudarstvo” explicitly means “a state” or “statehood” in English, both terms that imply 
independence and sovereignty from other states. See Tolkovyi slovar’ russkogo yazyka, pod red. S. Ozhegova, N. 
Shvekovoi (Moskva, Azi), 1992 [The Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language]. 
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While consistently insisting on recognition of its statehood, the TMR has been 
negotiating its particular political status. Its claim to independence and independent statehood 
only gradually became an explicit part of the TMR’s discourse. First, while initially seeking 
recognition of its statehood between 1989 and 1992, the TMR was willing to accept autonomy 
within Moldova. After Moldova rejected this idea, the TMR continued to insist on recognition of 
its statehood, but from 1992 to 2003, it argued for autonomy in a larger sense. It believed that 
only a federal or, better, confederal relationship within Moldova could meet the TMR’s 
expectations for its development. Finally, from 2003 onwards, the TMR has hardened its position 
even further and insisted on the recognition of its statehood outside of Moldova’s borders. For 
the past ten years, Transdniestria has sought the status of a fully independent state that would 
bring the TMR closer to possible integration with Russia.145  
Overall, the de facto separation of Transdniestria from Moldova for the last 20 years, its 
establishment of distinct state institutions, and its search for formal recognition as one of its key 
foreign policy goals make Transdniestria precisely one of the de facto states as suggested in the 
literature.  
2.3.2. Transdniestria as a Case Study 
When analyzing the features of unrecognized states, scholars usually examine a group of 
Eurasian entities that include the republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (in Azerbaijan), the republics of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (in Georgia), and Transdniestria. These cases are often explored 
together because of their similarities. Having all emerged during the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, these unrecognized states have all since created strong independent state structures that 
                                                 
145 Chapter 4 contextualizes the Transdniestrian claims within the process of negotiation and provides details on the 
Transdniestrian approach towards its political status. 
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have posed serious challenges to potential reintegration with their parent states.146 As a result, the 
characteristics Transdniestria shared with respect to its survival and subsequent development 
with the other post-Soviet de facto states makes the Transdniestrian case illustrative of other 
frozen conflicts147 throughout post-Soviet territory and may be informative for de facto states 
outside of the Eurasian region.   
At the same time, when compared to other de facto states, Transdniestria has a number of 
specific features that make the case particularly relevant to the study of the relationship between 
a constitution and recognition. First, Transdniestria stands out from other de facto states on 
various historical, politico-administrative and cultural grounds. The nature of its conflict, too, 
which is predominantly political/geo-political with cultural, rather than ethnic or religious, 
divisions, sets it apart.148 Importantly, the non-ethnic basis of its conflict may influence 
Transdniestria’s approach to seeking recognition. The TMR may pay less attention to the 
traditional criteria for statehood, a strategy characteristic of other de facto states.149 Instead, the 
TMR may focus on the contemporary criteria for recognition and argue for the involvement of 
the entire population in state-building efforts, regardless of their ethnic differences, thereby 
respecting the principles of democracy and human rights.  
Second, the conflict between Transdniestria and Moldova is the most “internationalized” 
of all de facto states, in large part because a higher number of outside parties are involved in its 
                                                 
146 See e.g., Caspersen, 2009; Lynch, 2002; King, 2001; Kolossov and O’Loughlin, 1999; Kolstø, 2006; Kimitaka 
Matsuzato. “From Belligerent to Multi-Ethnic Democracy,” Eurasian Review 1 (2008). 
147  Although the term “frozen conflict” is often employed in the context of Eurasian entities, not everyone agrees 
that the term accurately describes the situation, and some parties suggest avoiding it altogether. Personal 
communication with the Moldovan representative in negotiations, August 2013. 
148 For example, Beyer, 2010, King, 2001, Kolstø, 2006; and Kolossov, 1998, point to the non-ethnic character of 
the Transdniestrian issue and the creation of its separate identity without ethnic cleansing.   
149 Abkhazia, for example, refers its long, almost uninterrupted history, of statehood with a particular ethnicity and 
language, thus meeting the criteria for people’ self-determination. Vyacheslav Chirikba, “Gruzia i Abkhazia: 
Predlozhenia k konstitutsionnoi modeli,” in Praktika federalizma: Poiski al'ternativ dlea Gruzii i Abkhazii, ed. 
Kopiters Bruno, David Darchiashvili, Natella Akaba (Moskva: Ves' Mir, 1999), 394-403. 
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settlement in comparison to other conflicts.150 This is particularly important because the act of 
recognition is fundamentally an external act, and assessment of the effects of the constitution on 
the process of recognition are most clearly seen through international involvement.  
Finally, Transdniestria was one of the first de facto states to emerge after 1991. Since that 
time, it has acquired, to the author’s knowledge, more of its own state features (border control, 
currency, etc.) than any other state-like entity in Eurasia. The emergence of Transdniestria also 
coincided with the adoption of the EU Guidelines on Recognition. Therefore, the Transdniestrian 
case is well positioned to examine whether the formal acknowledgment of democracy, the rule of 
law, and human rights as criteria for recognition have influenced the de facto state’s existence 
and constitutional development in its search for recognition.  
3. Case Study Methodology 
To understand the relationship between the constitutional provisions and practices of 
Transdniestria and the process of its recognition, this study analyzes Transdniestrian 
constitutional acts, reviews official public statements made by Transdniestrian and foreign 
officials, and presents the results of a survey in the form of a questionnaire and semi-structured 
interviews of high-ranking officials involved in the negotiation process. 
3.1. Review of Constitutional Acts 
This legal review aims to establish whether the doctrinal link between a constitution and 
the criteria for recognition described earlier exists in this case study. It explores the occurrence of 
the criteria for recognition in the Transdniestrian constitutional documents that have conditioned 
                                                 
150 Kolossov, 1998, 20. The current format of Moldovan-Transdniestrian negotiations comprises seven participants: 
Moldova, and the TMR; the OSCE (mediator); Russia and Ukraine (mediators and guarantors); and the EU and 
USA (observers). For more details on the actors within the negotiation process, see the section below. 
116 
its creation and set up the basis for its independent existence and functioning. Table 2 lists the 
key Transdniestrian constitutional documents reviewed in this research.  
TABLE 2. TRANSDNIESTRIAN KEY CONSTITUTIONAL ACTS 
Act Date; Issued by 
Decision to create the Transdniestrian Moldavian 
Soviet Socialist Republic (TMSSR) as part of the 
USSR 
September 2, 1990; adopted by the Second 
Congress of People’s Deputies of All Levels  
Declaration of the Creation of the TMSSR September 2, 1990 
Decree of State Power of the TMSSR September 2, 1990 
Statement on the Political and Legal Grounds for 
the Creation of the TMSSR 
September 2, 1990  
Declaration of Sovereignty of the TMSSR  December 8, 1990, adopted at the first convocation 
of the Supreme Council of TMSSR 
Decree of State Power of the TMSSR December 8, 1990  
Declaration of Independence of the TMSSR August 25, 1991 
Constitution of the TMSSR September 2, 1991, adopted by the Fourth 
Congress of People’s Deputies of all levels of 
TMSSR 
Constitution of the TMR December 24, 1995; adopted at referendum, signed 
by a president in January 17, 1996 
Except for the decrees of state power and the constitution of 1991, which both lost their effect 
when they were superseded by new legal acts, the rest of the constitutional documents are still in 
full force only in Transdniestria and are unrecognized beyond its borders.  
3.2. Study of Official Public Statements 
Negotiations. Both Transdniestria and foreign actors have made official public 
statements, mostly within the context of the negotiation process between Moldova and 
Transdniestria that started in 1992. Over two decades, the process has moved in fits and starts, 
but has nonetheless included a number of initiatives and key documents that frame the 
relationship between the sides, reflect its general development, and identify the actors 
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involved.151 Table 3 lists the main stages of the negotiations between 1992 and 2012 that serve as 
the background and contextual basis for the research. 
 TABLE 3. KEY NEGOTIATIONS INITIATIVES 
Date Initiative 
 1992 (July 21) Agreement on the Principles of the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in 
the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova 
1993 (November 13) CSCE Report No. 13, which outlines a proposal for a special status for the left-
bank Dniester areas within the Republic of Moldova as a basis for talks between 
both parties to the conflict 
1997 (May 8) Memorandum on the Principles of Normalizations of the Relations between the 
Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria (also called the Moscow or Primakov 
Memorandum) 
1998 (March 20) Agreement on Confidence Measures and the Development of Contacts between 
the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria (Odessa Agreement) 
1999 (July 16) Joint Statement of the Participants in the Kiev Meeting on Issues of 
Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria 
(Kiev Statement) 
2002 (February 20) Initiative “On the Organization of the Negotiation Process Regarding 
Transdniestrian Conflict Settlement” and the creation of the Permanent 
Conference on Political Issues in the Framework of the Negotiation Process for 
the Transdniestrian Settlement (Bratislava format) 
2003 (November) Russian Draft Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of a 
United State (Kozak Memorandum) 
2004 (February 13) Proposals and Recommendations of the Mediators from the OSCE, the Russian 
Federation, and Ukraine with regards to the Transdniestrian Settlement 
2005 (May 20) Ukrainian Initiative for the Transdniestrian Peaceful Settlement Plan 
(Yushchenko Plan) 
2011 (September 22) Statement of the Participants of the '5+2' Consultations on the Resumption of the 
Work of the "Permanent Conference on Political Issues in the Framework of the 
Negotiation Process for the Transdniestrian Settlement" 
2012 (July 13) Principles and Procedures of the Conduct of Negotiations within the “Permanent 
Conference on Political Issues in the Framework of the Negotiation Process for 
the Transdniestrian Settlement”; Agenda of the Official Negotiation Process 
(Vienna agreements)  
Actors. This research looks at seven key participants in the Transdniestrian negotiations. 
As Table 4 illustrates below, since 1992 the format of the negotiations has undergone a number 
                                                 
151 On the negotiation process, see generally: In English: International Crisis Group, “Moldova: No Quick Fix,” 
(2003); “Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria,” (2004); “Moldova’s Uncertain Future,” (2006); Graeme 
P. Herd, Moldova and the Dniestr Region: Contested Past, Frozen Present, Speculative Futures? (Conflict Studies 
Research Center, 2005); Denis Matveev et al., eds., Moldova–Transdniestria: Working Together for a Prosperous 
Future. Negotiation Process. [Also in Romanian and Russian] (Chishinau: 2009). 
In Moldovan/Romanian: Igor Boţan, Reglementarea Transnistreană: O Soluţie Europeană  (Chisinau: Arc, 2009). 
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of changes and currently includes representatives of six actors, seen as outside or external actors 
for Transdniestria.  
TABLE 4. LIST OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
Date of 
joining 
1992,  
July 
1993,  
April 
1996,  
January 
2005,  
September  
 
Current “5+2” format152 
since 2005 
Actors 
 
Moldova  
Russia153 
Moldova  
Russia 
OSCE154  
Moldova  
Russia 
OSCE 
Ukraine155 
Moldova  
Russia 
OSCE 
Ukraine 
EU 
USA156 
 
- Transdniestria,  
Moldova (parties); 
- Russia (guarantor, 
mediator); 
- OSCE (mediator); 
- Ukraine (guarantor, 
mediator) 
- EU, USA (observers) 
Being directly involved in conflict resolution as parties, mediators, guarantors, or 
observers, these states or organizations have a more detailed picture of Transdniestrian local 
developments, are aware of the internal negotiation processes, and, by virtue of their roles, react 
to any steps on the Transdniestrian side that are related to and/or might affect the negotiations on 
its status.157 The good position of these actors for observing and responding to the constitutional 
development of Transdniestria when compared to other states that are less interested in the 
Transdniestrian issue explains the focus of this research on the reactions of these six actors 
external to Transdniestria. Henceforth, this group of six external actors (Moldova, Russia, 
Ukraine, the OSCE, the EU, and the US) is referred to as “the external actors.” 
                                                 
152 After the EU and USA joined the negotiation process as observers, the new format for the negotiations became 
known as the “5+2” format. 
153 Moldova and Russia became official actors in the negotiations in 1992, with the signing of the Agreement on 
Principles of the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict, see Table 2. 
154 The OSCE joined the process after the establishment of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in 1993. 
155 Ukraine officially joined the negotiation process in 1996, when it signed the Joint Statement of the Russian 
Federation, Moldovan and Ukrainian Presidents on Political Settlement of the Transdniestrian Conflict. 
156 The EU and the US joined the process according to the Annex “Rights and Obligations of Observers in 
Negotiation Process” to the Memorandum adopted at a Mediators’ Meeting of Ukraine, Russian Federation and 
OSCE with Representatives of the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria. (September 27, 2005).  
157 See more on the general description of the negotiation process and its participants in Boţan, The Negotiation 
Process, 2009. 
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The present work views the collective membership of the OSCE and the EU158 as single 
entities and looks at their responses as single institutions. This does not mean, however, that this 
research does not take into consideration the heterogeneous and complex nature of these 
organizations. On the contrary, it acknowledges that the foreign policy position of some 
members of those organizations regarding Transdniestria might be more influential than the 
institution’s approach to general foreign policy. As a result, this work pays close attention to the 
internal dynamics of the foreign policies of the OSCE and EU where appropriate, and looks into 
the reactions of those international actors who are not directly involved in the negotiation process 
but who have a particular interest in the Transdniestrian settlement. For example, given its 
historical and geopolitical ties to Moldova, Romania has taken a keen interest in the early 
resolution of the Transdniestrian conflict that, in many ways, has contributed to the EU’s 
approach towards Transdniestria.   
Issues. The study of the official public statements, defined below, aims to explore the 
constitutional provisions and practices of Transdniestria in meeting the traditional and 
contemporary criteria for recognition, and the influence they have had on the external actors. As 
Table 5 shows below, the present research focuses only on the specific constitutional steps that 
Transdniestria has undertaken that enable the researcher to observe and assess the reaction of the 
external actors, and to draw conclusions on the effects of the constitutional development in an 
unrecognized state.  
                                                 
158 Fifty-seven states are currently members of the OSCE, compared to 28 in the EU today. See www.osce.org; 
www.europa.eu. 
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TABLE 5. SELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES OF TRANSDNIESTRIA FROM 1990 TO 2013 
TMR constitutional developments Analysis of the outside reactions to the events 
Adoption of acts proclaiming 
independence and constitutions 
Declarations of the TMR’s Creation, Sovereignty, and 
Independence: 1990-1991 
 Adoption of the Constitutions: 1991, 1995 
Holding elections and referenda Presidential elections: 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 
 Parliamentary elections: 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
 Referenda: 1989, 1990, 1991, 1995, 2003, 2006 
Adoption of constitutional amendments  Amendments expanding presidential powers: 2000  
 Amendments balancing executive and legislative powers: 
2010 
Protecting human rights Setting up the Constitutional Court: 2002; establishing the 
Ombudsman office: 2006; cooperation with international 
monitoring missions: 2012 
This research explores the relationship between the criteria for recognition and the 
constitutional provisions or practices in Transdniestria’s official public discourse by addressing 
the following questions: Do any constitutional provisions contain references to the criteria for 
recognition? Do public officials mention the adoption of the acts of independence, the 
constitution, and the provisions of the constitution in relation to the recognition process in their 
official public statements? Do public officials link other constitutional practices, such as holding 
elections and referenda, adopting constitutional amendments, and protecting human rights, to the 
process of recognition in their public discourse?  
The present research also analyzes the reactions of the external actors to the existence of 
specific Transdniestrian constitutional provisions and practices by exploring the following 
questions: Do the external actors make any references to the Transdniestrian constitution and its 
provisions in their official public statements or during the negotiations? Do they mention 
Transdniestrian elections, referenda, constitutional changes, or adherence to human rights 
documents in their public statements or during the negotiation process? If so, what is the attitude 
of the external actors toward Transdniestrian developments?  
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Documents (official public statements/discourse). The review of official public 
statements includes documents available on official websites, in printed or online media, and 
issued by key public Transdniestrian and external officials, namely presidents, ministers or heads 
of foreign affairs, heads or members of the legislative body, as well as the heads or key 
representatives of the organizations involved in the settlement of the Transdniestrian issue. 
Time period. The overall period of the documents reviewed ranged from August 1990 to 
May 2013. The time period of documents issued by the external actors depends on the time at 
which the actor joined the negotiation process. For example, the OSCE entered the process in 
1993 so its documents are analyzed from that period, whereas the US entered the process in 
2005, so its documents are analyzed starting from 2005. 
3.3. Questionnaire Study 
The questionnaire study looks at similar, although more succinct, versions of the issues 
analyzed in official public statements and aims to understand the positions of the external actors 
regarding Transdniestria’s constitutional development and the prospects for its recognition 
beyond public discourse. Such an approach provides a more comprehensive picture for the 
analysis of the effects of the constitution on the recognition of Transdniestria.  
This study of officials’ opinions was conducted between January and September 2013 
and comprises both the written and/or oral responses from the questionnaire on Transdniestria’s 
constitutional development and its status. In total, the questionnaire was sent to forty-three 
relevant public officials and experts in the negotiation process in the “5+2” format. 
Correspondence was maintained with twenty-seven of them. In the end, responses to the 
questionnaire were obtained from seventeen people, some of whom provided their answers on 
the condition of remaining anonymous. As a result, the present study included the views of 
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representatives from the TMR, Moldova, the OSCE, Ukraine, and the EU. Representatives from 
the Russian Federation as well as the United States did not provide their views for the study. 
Thus, this research analyzes the insights of five actors in the negotiation process obtained from 
public sources, the questionnaire, and semi-structured interviews, as well as two additional 
positions obtained only from the publicly available sources (See Table 6).  
TABLE 6. PARTICIPANTS IN THE STUDY 
Actor Number of pers. Position Period covered 
TMR 3 High-ranking public officials 1990-2013 
Moldova 3 High- and low-ranking public 
officials 
1994-2013 
OSCE 6 High-ranking public officials 1993-2013 
Ukraine 1 High-ranking public official 2007-2013 
EU 2* High- and low-ranking public 
officials 
2007-2013 
Experts  2 Independent scholars 2002-2013 
*Note: One respondent, a representative of the EU, is an independent expert whose knowledge on the issue is used 
in the work of the EU public officials. 
To summarize, by examining Transdniestria’s constitutional acts, this research explores 
whether they demonstrate the criteria for recognition, and, if so, which criteria are used and how 
they are asserted. Additionally, by looking at the official statements of Transdniestrian political 
leaders, this study analyzes whether the entity’s claim to recognition is related to its 
constitutional acts or to specific stages in the TMR’s constitutional development. Finally, this 
research seeks to explore the reactions of the outside actors to the existence of Transdniestrian 
constitutional acts and/or to the steps of Transdniestria’s constitutional development, as well as 
to see whether such reactions have had any impact on Transdniestria’s status. 
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Conclusion  
The doctrinal framework on the international recognition of states suggests that 
constitutionalism is part of the recognition process and that a constitution matters for the 
purposes of an entity’s recognition. Observing these doctrinal expectations in practice requires 
close examination of the experience of an unrecognized state in search of recognition. This 
chapter suggests focusing on a special category of state-like entities – unrecognized states – that 
possess all the attributes of statehood but lack international recognition due to the contested 
nature of their statehood. The lengthy efforts of these states in searching for recognition allows 
us to analyze the constitutional tools they use for the purposes of recognition and the reactions of 
outside actors toward these tools. Along with sharing similar features with other de facto states, 
Transdniestria stands out as a case study that facilitates observation of the doctrinal expectations 
in practice due to its highly internationalized, non-ethnic conflict and well-developed 
constitutional structures. Thus, analysis of the interactions between elements of Transdniestrian 
constitutional development and the positions of the external actors will demonstrate whether the 
existence of a constitution and constitutional mechanisms in an unrecognized state has any 
effects on its recognition.  
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CHAPTER THREE. THE EFFECTS OF ASSERTING THE TRADITIONAL 
AND CONTEMPORARY CRITERIA FOR 
RECOGNITION IN THE TRANSDNIESTRIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ON THE PROCESS 
OF TRASDNIESTRIA’S RECOGNITION  
Introduction  
Unrecognized states experience and create a viable sense of statehood despite their lack 
of international recognition. One of the features that assists unrecognized states in consolidating 
their statehood is their constitutional framework: it provides the basis for their internal political 
development and establishes a sovereign presence for the purposes of external relations. As 
Chapter 1 has shown, the process of state recognition and a state’s constitutional development 
are interrelated in several ways. First, a constitution asserts the traditional criteria for recognition 
such as a defined territory, population, and government, as well as the capacity of a state to 
conduct international relations. Second, a constitution enables the state to implement the 
contemporary criteria for recognition on democratic governance, the rule of law, and the 
protection of human rights. Third, a constitution ensures the state’s commitment and capacity to 
respect its international obligations and to pursue international aims that demonstrate its potential 
to be a member of the world community. 
In order to observe whether similar relations characterize the Transdniestrian case study 
and to assess the effects of the Transdniestrian constitution on the TMR’s recognition, this 
research explores the ways in which Transdniestria has constitutionally embedded the criteria for 
international recognition and publicly linked its constitutional provisions and practices to its 
claim for recognition. It also analyzes the official responses of the key external actors on 
Transdniestrian constitutional development as observed through their public statements and 
personal communications. Here and in the next chapters, the term the external actors refers to a 
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specific group of actors in the Transdniestrian negotiation process, namely Moldova, Ukraine, 
Russia, the OSCE, the EU, and the US. 
This framework for analysis suggests a variety of possible outcomes concerning the 
effects of the TMR’s constitutional framework: 
 the Transdniestrian constitution has an effect only on the recognition of this 
entity; 
 the Transdniestrian constitution affects the recognition of this entity, and has other 
effects as well; 
 the Transdniestrian constitution does not affect the recognition of this entity or 
anything else; 
 the Transdniestrian constitution does not have an impact on the recognition of this 
entity, but does have other effects. 
The case study shows that the Transdniestrian constitution did not impact the process of 
recognition of this de facto state, but that it did have other effects. On the one hand, the adoption 
of the TMR’s constitution has not led the external actors to view the issue of Transdniestria’s 
recognition more favorably or predisposed them to granting it recognition. This lack of 
recognition stands in contrast to the fact that the TMR’s constitution asserts both the traditional 
and contemporary criteria for recognition and establishes a framework for the entity’s democratic 
development.  
On the other hand, the overall development of the Transdniestrian constitutional system 
has had an impact on Transdniestria itself and on the external actors. First, in Transdniestria, the 
constitutional framework has aided the consolidation of the TMR’s statehood. The constitutional 
incorporation of both the traditional and contemporary criteria for recognition has ensured its 
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internal organization, the regulation of the TMR’s polity, and the internal legitimation of the 
TMR’s authority. Although the constitutional function of asserting the criteria for international 
recognition is applicable in the context of both recognized and unrecognized states, it has a 
particular relevance for unrecognized states that are seeking their independence. In the case of 
Transdniestria, its constitutional assertion that it meets the criteria for recognition and its 
constitutional practices have served as a basis for state building and for the entrenchment of its 
claims to statehood. Second, the existence of the Transdniestrian constitution has influenced the 
TMR’s political path by keeping its focus on achieving its independence as a state. Domestically 
and internationally, Transdniestrian authorities have promoted policies that have reflected the 
will of the people as enshrined in the constitution. In particular, authorities in the TMR have 
made sure that the constitutional provisions stipulating the state’s sovereign and independent 
character are followed and implemented.  
Furthermore, the TMR’s constitutional framework has influenced the entity’ interactions 
with the external actors. First, during the negotiation process, the external actors have officially 
worked with Transdniestrian representatives who were elected or appointed in accordance with 
the TMR’s constitution. As this shows, the external actors are willing to engage with the 
constitutionally elected (although officially unrecognized) leaders of Transdniestria for the 
purposes of negotiations.  
Second, the TMR’s long existence as a de facto state has prolonged and increasingly 
deepened its engagement with the external actors over the years. Gradually, these interactions 
have included a growing number of parties to the Transdniestrian issue and have covered an 
increasing number of issues connected to the process of conflict resolution. The causal link 
between the TMR’s constitutional framework and its increased engagement with the external 
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actors, however, remains unclear. Although the constitutional organization and regulation of the 
TMR has contributed to its longevity, the available evidence suggests that the Transdniestrian 
constitution has not been the only or even primary factor in sustaining the entity’s existence. 
Therefore, while the constitution has likely influenced the TMR’s endurance, which, in turn, has 
enabled more meaningful interactions with the external actors, the constitution alone is not solely 
responsible for this international engagement. 
Third, while the TMR’s constitution has had no impact on its recognition, the very idea 
of constitutional, democratic development in the entity has shaped how the external actors 
approach negotiations with and over Transdniestria. The external actors have further injected the 
general principles of democratic development into the negotiation process by suggesting that the 
democratic development of Transdniestria in practice is an important factor for possible 
settlement of the conflict. Therefore, the external actors have paid close attention to the internal 
constitutional practices of Transdniestria in order to observe whether those practices favor or 
jeopardize resolution of the entity’s status. 
The analysis of the case study’s findings is divided into two chapters. This chapter looks 
at the effects of the TMR’s constitutional incorporation of the traditional and contemporary 
criteria for recognition on the decision-making processes of the external actors regarding 
possible recognition of the entity. The next chapter examines the specific example of democratic 
development as one contemporary criterion for recognition and explores the effects that the 
TMR’s electoral practices have had on Transdniestria’s quest for recognition.  
This chapter demonstrates that, while the TMR’s constitutional framework has not had 
any effect on the international recognition of Transdniestria, it has influenced the consolidation 
of Transdniestrian statehood. This chapter also explores the ways in which the external actors 
128 
have emphasized the idea of Transdniestrian democratic development for the purposes of the 
negotiation process. Section 1 analyzes the use of the traditional criteria for recognition in 
constitutional documents and public discourse in Transdniestria and examines the responses of 
the external actors. The section demonstrates that the assertion of the traditional criteria in 
constitutional documents has created a strong basis for Transdniestrian state-building and the 
consolidation of its statehood. However, the lack of response from the external actors to 
Transdniestria’s constitutional statehood implies its potentially negative effects on the entity’s 
prospects for recognition. Section 2 explores how both the Transdniestrian constitution and 
official public discourse reflect the contemporary criteria for recognition. It also reviews the 
reactions of the external actors to the TMR’s constitutional provisions as they stand in text, and, 
most importantly, to their realization in specific practices that illustrate general aspects of its 
constitutional development. While the existence of TMR’s democratic constitutional provisions 
and their implementation have not affected international recognition of the entity, they have 
consolidated and legitimized Transdniestrian state institutions. Also, despite the exclusion of 
recognition from possible solutions to the conflict, the external actors have taken the TMR’s 
democratic development into account when approaching the broader process of conflict 
resolution.  
1. The Traditional Criteria for Recognition 
One of the ways in which Transdniestria has framed its claim for recognition is through 
its assertion of the traditional criteria for recognition in its constitutional documents. Such 
framing has helped Transdniestria lay the groundwork for future state building and for projecting 
an image of the TMR as a state to the key external actors. Although in its official public 
discourse, Transdniestria largely bases its claim for recognition on the principle of self-
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determination and does not mention the incorporation of the traditional criteria in its constitution, 
leaders still refer to the constitution as a characteristic of independence and the foundation for 
the state’s internal organization. Thus, the constitution’s assertion of the traditional criteria for 
recognition and their general public presence have influenced the internal development of 
Transdniestrian statehood, which, in turn, has consolidated the Transdniestrian claim to 
recognition. 
For their part, the external actors make no mention of the existence of the Transdniestrian 
constitution in their official public discourse and disregard the incorporation of the traditional 
criteria for recognition in the TMR’s constitutional documents. Based on the premise that 
Transdniestria is ineligible for statehood, outside actors avoid framing their discourse in any way 
that references the TMR’s constitutional provisions, including those asserting the traditional 
criteria for recognition. Instead, they refer to a set of issues related specifically to negotiation and 
conflict resolution. 
As a result, neither Transdniestrian nor foreign official public discourses serve as 
evidence that the traditional criteria asserted in the TMR’s constitution has affected the prospects 
for the TMR’s recognition. Yet the constitutional incorporation of the traditional criteria for 
recognition has strengthened Transdniestrian state-building because the provisions on 
population, territory, government, and interstate capacities create the background for the 
organization of the Transdniestrian state and its internal and external practices, which, in turn 
further entrench the TMR’s claim to independent statehood. 
For a better understanding of the Transdniestrian claim and the role of the TMR’s 
constitution in pursuing that claim, this section looks at the traditional criteria for recognition as 
they are embodied in the TMR’s constitutional acts, and how the external actors have reacted to 
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this embodiment. It then examines the traditional criteria for recognition in the Transdniestrian 
official discourse, and how the external actors have responded to this rhetoric. Although it is 
hard to separate the discourse of the external actors on these topics, such a division helps to 
clarify what exactly, if anything, the external actors have discussed, and how they have 
responded to the Transdniestrian arguments. 
1.1. The Traditional Criteria for Recognition in the TMR’s Constitutional 
Documents and the Responses of the External Actors  
In its adjustment to the break-up of the Soviet Union1 and search for sovereignty, 
Transdniestria has adopted a number of foundational constitutional acts asserting its existence as 
a state. The constitution’s endorsement of the traditional criteria for recognition, rather than their 
endorsement merely as statutes, suggests a greater degree of commitment to pursuing the 
independence and assertion of a common Transdniestrian identity. As Chapter 2 has shown, the 
political and linguistic changes in Moldova led Transdniestrians to mobilize to protect their 
rights through a number of initiatives. At its Second Congress of People’s Deputies of All Levels 
held on September 2, 1990, the Deputies of Transdniestria adopted:   
 The Decision on the Creation of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic (TMSSR), which would be part of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR);  
 The Declaration of the Creation of the TMSSR; 
                                                 
1 The break-up of the USSR contributed to creation of Transdniestrian statehood. As the ex-President of TMR, Igor 
Smirnov, underscored in his public statement on the 8th anniversary of the TMR’s establishment, “The creation of 
our state became the legitimate consequence of the processes that began as the result of the break-up of the USSR.” 
Transdniestrians considered the multi-ethnic state of the Soviet Union as a protector of their rights, in contrast to the 
newly sovereign Moldovan state, with a single dominant ethnic group. See “Doklad Presidenta Smirnova na 
torzhestvennom zasedanii Vehovnogo Soveta, Pravitel’stva i obschestvennyh organizatsii, posvyaschennom vos’moi 
godovschine PMR” [Report of the President Smirnov I.N. at the Special Session of the Supreme Council, 
Government and Public Organizations, in honor of the 8th year of PMR existence], Pridnestrovi’e, #171, September 
8, 1998; Perepelitsa, 2009. 
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 The Decree of State Power; and 
 The Statement on the Political and Legal Grounds for the Creation of the TMSSR. 
Between December 1990 and August 1991, the first convocation of the TMSSR’s Supreme 
Council (parliament) adopted even more documents supporting its sovereignty: 
 The Declaration of Sovereignty of the TMSSR (December 1990); 
 The Decree of State Power of the TMSSR (December 1990); and 
 The Declaration of Independence of the TMSSR (August 1991).  
Subsequently, Transdniestria adopted: 
 The Constitution of the TMSSR (September 1991), at the meeting of the Fourth 
Congress of the People’s Deputies of All Levels of the TMSSR; and 
 The Constitution of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (December 1995), 
which was approved by a popular referendum.  
Through these foundational legal documents, Transdniestria has asserted the traditional 
recognition for criteria – a permanent population, a defined territory, an efficient government, 
and the capacity to enter in international relations – and additionally emphasized the leading role 
of these documents for Transdniestrian state-building. As a result, the constitutional acts’ 
embodiment of the Transdniestrian people’s desire for separate statehood provides evidence of 
the TMR’s commitment to build its own state.  
1.1.1. Population 
International law does not require minimum standards on population size, a population’s 
readiness for independence, or significant commonalities among the population in order to meet 
the criterion for population. It does, however, expect that an entity will have some number of 
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inhabitants, “some population linked to a specific piece of territory on a more or less permanent 
basis.”2 
In its Declaration of the Creation of the Transdniestrian MSSR, Transdniestria stressed 
the common will of its multinational population to be sovereign,3 as well as the state’s historical 
responsibility for the future of all peoples in Transdniestria along with their own history, culture, 
and traditions. In reaction to the suspected threats to the Moldovan nation in Moldova itself, the 
Declaration also stipulated the intention of Transdniestria to protect the existence of Moldovan 
ethnic groups within its territory as part of its multinational population.4 Furthermore, the 
Declaration reflected the idea that the TMR’s people are its only source of power, the feature that 
most added to people’s sense of belonging to a new republic through their shared governing 
functions.5 
Similarly, the Declarations of Sovereignty and Independence of the TMSSR established 
provisions on the multinational character of the Transdniestrian population and on the need to 
ensure its development. Likewise, the 1995 Constitution explicitly underscored the shared 
destiny of the multinational people living within the territory of Transdniestria.6 Such an 
                                                 
2 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 4th ed. (London: Blackstone Press, 2000), 107-8. 
3 The will of the Transdniestrian people as expressed during referenda in 1989 and 1990. 
4 By introducing this provision, Transdniestrians highlighted one of their reasons for separation from Moldova, 
which at that time (1989-1992) was seeking rapprochement with Romania, introducing state symbols that strongly 
resembled their Romanian counterparts (e.g. flag, anthem), and mandating the use of the Latin script. Transdniestria 
also responded to the problematic issue of identity in Moldova, where some people think of themselves as 
Moldovans whereas others view themselves as Romanians. Therefore, Transdniestria emphasized that the Moldovan 
nation exists separately from the Romanian and continued to use the Moldovan language based on Cyrillic. 
5 Declaration of the Creation of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, 1990 [Declaratsia o 
Sozdanii Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki], http://mfa-
pmr.org/index.php?newsid=230. 
6 Preamble, Constitution of TMR, 1995, amended and modified [Konstitutsia PMR], http://mfa-
pmr.org/index.php?newsid=644.  
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inclusive approach towards its population in its constitutional acts aimed to ensure the basis for 
the creation of the Transdniestrian civic state.7 
1.1.2. Territory 
As with the requirement for a population, in international law, there are no strict 
standards on the size of a state’s territory and the scope of its territorial control. However, an 
entity “must have some definite physical existence that marks it out clearly from its neighbors”8 
and must exercise government power over that territory. 
With the announcement of the TMSSR’s creation in the early 1990s, all of its 
constitutional acts paid special attention to the issue of Transdniestrian territory. The Decision of 
the Second Congress of Popular Deputies, the Declarations of Sovereignty and Independence, 
both the 1991 and 1995 constitutions, as well as the law on administrative-territorial divisions 
from 2002 all specify the TMR’s borders and territorial division.9 They stipulate that the main 
part of the territory lies on the left bank of the Dniestr River, with exception of the city of Bender 
and a part of the Slobodzea region, which are located on the right bank. Between 1989 and 1990, 
each region had a referendum on the question of the TMSSR’s creation and whether to join it.10 
The borders of the republic were also defined by the 1992 Special Temporary Regulation on 
Protection of the TMR State Borders11 and the 2013 Law on the TMR State Borders.12 As such, 
                                                 
7 The TMR’s Constitution does not focus on ethnic factors and attempts to build up the civic and multinational 
grounds of its state. See M.N. Guboglo, “Tyazhkoe vreamea konkuriruiuschih identichnostei. Opyt Pridnestrov’a,” 
in Nepriznannaya respublika. Ocherki. Dokumenty. Khronika, ed. V.F. Gryzlov (Moskva: Rossiiskaya academia 
nauk, 1997). 
8  Dixon, 2000, 108. 
9 The TMR’s territory includes the cities of Bender, Dubassary, Rybnitsa, and Tiraspol, and regions [rayons] of 
Grigoriopol, Dubassary, Kamenka, Slobodzea, and Rybnitsa. For general reference, see Map H in Chapter 2. 
10 Volkova, Nepriznannaya respublika. V.3, 1997; See also the details on 1990 referenda in Chapter 2. 
11 Postanovlenie Verhovnogo Soveta nr.243 Ob utverjdenii Vremennogo polojenia ob ohrane Gosydarstvennoi 
granitsy PMR, 15.10.1992. http://zakon-pmr.com/. 
12 Zakon nr. 109-З-V o Gosydarstvennoi granitse PMR, 10.06.2013. 
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Transdniestria’s constitutional acts clearly delineate the borders of its territory over which the 
TMR’s government exercises its control.  
1.1.3. Government 
Again, although international law specifies no requirements with respect to the degree or 
breadth of governmental power exercised over a territory, this criterion is nonetheless commonly 
interpreted to include “some degree of maintenance of law and order”13 through governance 
structures.  
The constitutional acts the TMR adopted were aimed at ensuring control over its territory 
and population and at establishing an efficient government. The Decision of the Creation of the 
TMSSR, the Declaration of Sovereignty and the Declaration of Independence, both Decrees of 
State Power, and both Constitutions included the following provisions: the power of the state 
belongs to the people; it is divided into legislative, executive, and judicial branches; and that 
power is realized through a range of governance structures such as local councils and the 
Supreme Council, heads of administration and the central government, the local courts and the 
Supreme Court.  
Since the adoption of the new constitution in 1995, the TMR’s system of governmental 
bodies has undergone a number of changes, yet has retained control over its territory and ensured 
the maintenance of both law and order. The details of the Transdniestrian governmental 
structure, which are described in the next section on the contemporary criteria for recognition, 
also illustrate that the entity’s constitutional provisions establish the democratic structures 
necessary to ensure sovereign governance in its own state.  
                                                 
13 Crawford, 1979, 45-46. 
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1.1.4. The Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States 
Closely connected to the presence of a functioning government, this criterion requires 
that an entity express its independence to freely determine its international relations and to 
interact with other states. The Declaration of Sovereignty and the 1991 Constitution both 
explicitly mentioned international relations, stipulating that:  
The Transdniestrian MSSR exercises its international links and relations independently as 
well as through the existing bodies of the Union of SSR. In its relations with the republics 
of the Union of SSR, the exclusive right to represent the TMSSR belongs to the Supreme 
Council of the republic and its designated bodies.14   
Additionally, the Declaration of Independence provided that: 
The relations of the Transdniestrian MSSR with other states are built on the basis of 
treaties signed on the principles of equality, mutual respect and non-interference in 
internal affairs of other states.15  
The 1995 Constitution echoed this provision by grounding its foreign policy in the principles of 
the sovereign equality of states, non-use of force, peaceful dispute resolution, and non-
interference in other states’ internal affairs.16 It stated that: 
The universal principles and norms of international law, as well as the international 
treaties of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic, are the basis for relations with other 
states and the constituent part of its legal system.17 
To summarize, the Transdniestrian constitutional acts have included provisions relating 
to all the traditional criteria for statehood. By employing fundamental constitutional documents 
such as the Declaration of Independence and two Constitutions to assert these key elements of its 
statehood, Transdniestria has demonstrated its commitment to seek sovereignty and 
independence internally and externally. Internally, the population of Transdniestria witnessed the 
realization of popular will through the provisions of these fundamental constitutional documents 
                                                 
14 Declaration of the TMR’s Sovereignty, 1990; Article 29, the TMR’s Constitution, 1991. 
15 Declaration of the TMR’s Independence, 1991.  
16 Article 10 (1), the TMR’s Constitution, 1995. 
17 Article 10 (2), Ibid. 
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after having expressed wide support for sovereignty in referenda.18 Externally, Transdniestria has 
made clear its commitment to independence so that the external actors could see its intention and 
consider it while negotiating over TMR’s status.  
Notwithstanding Transdniestria’s substantial efforts to advance its statehood and to assert 
the traditional criteria for recognition through constitutional acts, the external actors have made 
no mention of either these constitutional documents or the provisions they entail in their official 
public discourse. Instead, the external actors largely frame their public discourse around issues 
related to the negotiation and settlement processes. Major sections in the official statements of all 
of the external actors – Moldova, the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and the US – concern the 
need for conflict resolution and the importance of discussions and cooperation among all parties 
involved to achieve that goal. The external actors have emphasized Moldovan territorial integrity 
and their commitment to the conflict settlement process19 and discussed the need for a viable 
resolution that includes a guaranteed status for the TMR.20 With the goal of settling the dispute 
in sharp relief, the external actors also have paid considerable attention to the issues of 
international and regional stability and security. They have debated the peacekeeping mission, 
the withdrawal of Russian troops,21 and the ways in which a solution to the conflict will 
                                                 
18 Details on the referenda held between 1990 and 1991 may be found in Chapter 2, while the 1995 Constitution is 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
19 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Annual Reports,” (1994-2012); Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, “Testimony of Asif J. Chaudhry,” (2008); U.S. White House, “Joe Biden’s Speech at Opera House 
Square, Chisinau, Moldova,” News Release, March 11, 2011; U.S. Department of State, Interview by Virginia 
Dumitras, December 12, 2011; European Union Council. Council Conclusions on Moldova, 2004 and 2008; 
Pravitel’stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “Sovmestnaya press-konferentsia s Federal'nym kanslerom Germanii Angeloi 
Merkel po itogam rossiisko-germanskih peregovorov” News Release, June 5, 2010; Sovet Federatsii Federal'nogo 
Sobrania Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “Sergei Mironov: Rossia gotova sodeistvovat’ resheniu Pridenstrovskoi problemy,” 
News Release, May 18, 2008. 
20 Ministerstvo Inostrannyh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “Intervieu Sergheya Lavrova,” News Release,  November 10, 
2005; OSCE Annual Reports, 1994-2012; OSCE Report #13, 1993; “Interv’u Erwan Fouere,” Novyi Region, 
September 24, 2012; “Interv’u William Moser,” Novyi Region, October 8, 2012. 
21 “Iulian Chifu: V Buchareste schitaiut, chto naznachenie Rogozina zablokirovalo pryamoi dialog mejdu 
Kishinevom i Tiraspolem,” Novyi Region,  January 29, 2013; (on the need to transition from Russian peace-keeping 
troops to an international force, and to push Russia to comply with Istanbul obligations on troops withdrawing); 
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contribute both to regional stability22 and to the protection and furtherance of the basic security 
interests of all parties in the region.23 Furthermore, individually, the external actors have 
discussed particular issues of relevance to their own external policies. For example, along with 
settling the conflict, the EU often mentions its goal of further developing its neighborhood 
policy,24 while Ukraine, Russia, and the US concentrate on social and economic issues.25  
The resulting context in which Transdniestrian status is debated rules out the possibility 
of recognition altogether, thus hinting that the issue has an important geopolitical component. 
Official public discourse merges the issue of Transdniestria into a larger discussion of how to 
create a comprehensive system for security and stability in the region and cares little about the 
internal dynamics of the de facto state itself or its constitutional structure. 
Thus, the approach the external actors have adopted in their official public discourse 
frames the Transdniestrian issue in terms of conflict resolution (based on the territorial integrity 
of Moldova) and geopolitics. Their approach has not suggested that the Transdniestrian 
constitution and its provisions asserting traditional criteria for recognition have been particularly 
decisive for the prospects of Transdniestria’s status.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Moldova US Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Office of Inspector General Report of 
Inspection. Embassy Chisinau. “Report Number ISP-I-05-12A,” (2005), 5. 
22 During his visit to the TMR, the head of EU delegation on the external relations, Rene Nyberg, stated, “The aim 
of our visit is to underscore the importance of stability in this region of Europe. We support all efforts on final 
conflict resolution.” “‘Troika’ Evrosoyza v Pridnestrov’e,” Dnestrovskaya Pravda, #121, October 21, 1999.  
23 Hill, 2008. 
24 EU Council Conclusions on Moldova, 2004. 
25 “Leonid Kozhara: Seichas vremea prinimat' vernyie reshenia,” Kommersant,  January 20, 2013; Louis O'Neill. 
“Moldova’s Recent Elections: Prospects for Change in Europe’s Poorest Country,” (Commission on Security & 
Cooperation in Europe: U.S. Helsinki Commission), 2009. 
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2.1. The Presence of the TMR’s Constitutional Provisions Asserting the 
Traditional Criteria for Recognition in Official Transdniestrian Public 
Discourse, and the Approach of the External Actors towards 
Transdniestrian Claims 
In arguing for the recognition of its statehood, the TMR rarely refers to the traditional 
criteria or to the constitutional provisions that ground these criteria in its official public 
discourse. Instead, the TMR bases its claim to recognition on the restoration of its statehood and 
its right to self-determination. This suggests that the TMR largely views the issue of its 
recognition within the context of international law and consigns constitutional law to the 
domestic sphere.26 For the external actors, however, the framing of Transdniestrian claims in 
terms of the restoration of its lost statehood and right to self-determination are not important. In 
their official public discourse, the external actors reject the TMR’s claims27 and largely ignore 
discussions of this topic in favor of upholding the international legal principle of territorial 
integrity. 
Thus, along with defining the visible elements of Transdniestrian and foreign official 
public discourse, the view of and reactions to Transdniestrian claims to its statehood 
contextualize the grounds for the TMR’s search of recognition, as well as the external actors’ 
refusal to recognize the entity. In addition, review of Transdniestria’s claims to recognition 
strengthens the idea that the TMR’s constitutional documents have not played a direct role in the 
recognition process and have not affected the prospects for a change in the entity’s status. 
                                                 
26 The approach is supported by personal communications of the representatives of Transdniestrian authorities. 
August 2013. 
27 Scholars analyzing the compliance of the TMR’s claims to statehood and self-determination with the traditional 
criteria for recognition under the framework of international law widely share this position. See the discussion 
below. 
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2.1.1. Restoration of the TMR’s Statehood 
In justifying its statehood, Transdniestrians invoke arguments highlighting the area’s 
considerable experience of autonomy in the past and the Moldovan denunciation of the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact, which was signed between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939. First, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Transdniestrian territory served as the basis for the creation of 
the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) within Ukraine in 1924. In 
comparison to Bessarabia, which was a part of Romania at that time, Transdniestria experienced 
its own statehood in the form of an autonomous republic from 1924 to 1940. As a result, in 
claiming restoration of its statehood after the break-up of the USSR, Transdniestria refers to its 
pre-MSSR history28 and to the will of the Transdniestrian people who “decisively voted to return 
its statehood during the referenda [of 1990 and 1991].”29  
Second, in December 1989, the Second Soviet Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow 
declared the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, which defined the modern boundaries of Moldova, 
illegal.30 Some groups in Romania and Soviet Moldavia interpreted this pronouncement as 
annulling Bessarabia’s annexation by the USSR in 1940.31 Consequently, in 1990, the Moldovan 
republic declared its sovereignty32 and likewise adopted a document denouncing the Ribbentrop-
Molotov Pact as an act of aggression leading to the Soviet occupation of part of Romania.33 The 
                                                 
28 Statement on the Political and Legal Grounds for the Creation of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic [Politicheskie i pravovye osnovy sozdania Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki], 
1990.  
29 The Chairman of the Transdniestrian Supreme Council, Grigory Marakutsa, speaking in an interview. He also 
added that Transdniestrians need their statehood as a guarantee to prevent their absorption into another state. 
“G.Marakutsa: My budem vesti dialog…” [G.Marakutsa: We will continue a dialog…], Dnestrovskaya Pravda, 
#215, September 18, 1992. 
30 Vtoroy s’ezd narodnyh deputatov SSSR, 12-24 December, 1989: Stenographicheskiy otchet,  [Second Meeting of 
the USSR Deputees. Records of the Proceedings], t. IV  (Moskva: Verhovnyi Soviet SSSR), 1990. 
31 Kolstø et al., 1993, 982. 
32 Declaration of Moldova’s Sovereignty, adopted on 23 June 1990. 
33 Decision of the Supreme Council of Moldovan SSR on the Conclusion of the Commission of the Supreme 
Council of MSSR regarding Political and Legal Assessment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, adopted on June 23, 
1990. This act raised the question of possible unification with Romania. See Kolstø et al., 1993, 982. 
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document additionally declared illegal the decision of the USSR’s Supreme Soviet to create a 
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic and that republic’s immediate incorporation into the 
USSR.34 
In response to these statements, Transdniestria claimed that the Moldovan declaration on 
the illegality of the MSSR’s creation entitled the TMR to be free from the MSSR.35 It followed, 
then, that there would exist two successors to the MSSR: the Republic of Moldova (formerly 
Bessarabia), and the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (the direct successor of the MASSR).36 
Given the fact that Ukraine refused to reabsorb the Transdniestrian republic – which was 
formerly part of Ukraine37 – based on Ukraine’s support for Moldovan territorial integrity,38 
Transdniestria believes this entitles it to claim its own statehood and realize its right to self-
determination.39  
In their available official public statements, international actors largely disregard these 
details based on their recognition of the Republic of Moldova and their view of Moldova as the 
                                                 
34 The Declaration on Moldovan Independence, adopted in August 1991, also underscored the forceful occupation of 
the Bessarabian territory in 1940 and the illegitimate creation of the Moldovan SSR. 
35 “Obraschenie Komissii Pridenstrovskoi Moldavskoi Sovietskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki k narodam SSSR 
[The Address of the Commission of TMSSR to the peoples of the USSR],” Dnestrovskaya Pravda, #217, September 
14, 1990. 
36 “Istoriko-pravovye predposylki sozdania Pridnestrovskoi gosudarstvennosti. Rol’ i znacehnie Pridnestrovskoi 
Moldavskoi Respubliki v mirovom politicheskom protsesse,” Diplomaticheskiy vestnik 1 (2010). While not rejecting 
the existence of the TMR’s statehood between 1924 and 1940, some authors highlight its fleeting character as a 
region expressly created for establishing the Moldovan SSR. See e.g., V. Ia. Grosul, T.S. Guzenkova, 
“Pridnestrov’e,” in Moldavia: sovremennye tendentsii razvitia, ed. E.M. Kozhokin (Moskva: ROSSPEN, 2004), 
370. 
37 In 1991, the deputies of the Supreme Council adopted the Address on Entering Ukraine to which Ukraine never 
responded. See “Interv’u s Igorem Smirnovym,” Pridnestrov’e, #213-214, November 10, 2001. 
38 Joint Statement of the Russian Federation, Moldovan and Ukrainian Presidents on Political Settlement of the 
Transdniestrian Conflict, January 19, 1996. The statement emphasized the necessity of settling the question of 
Transdniestria’s status within the borders of the Republic of Moldova. Ukraine reiterated its position in documents it 
issued throughout the negotiation process (e.g. Moscow Memorandum, 1997; Russian-Ukrainian Odessa Statement, 
1998; Kiev Declaration, 1999; Mediators Proposals and Recommendations, 2004). 
39 V.N. Yakovlev, “Kontstitutsia Moldovy i diplomaticheskie aktsii - osnova nestabil’nosti v Pridnestrov’e,” in 
Nepriznannaya respublika, ed. V.F. Gryzlov (Moskva: RAN, 1997), 73. 
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only legitimate successor of the MSSR.40 In this context and with regard to the Moldovan 
denouncement of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, scholars add that:  
Simply denouncing a treaty does not revert the political system to the status quo ante; it 
merely means that the treaty will not be in force going forward. This is especially true in 
treaties that include boundary delimitation provisions.41 
In a few of its public statements, Ukraine has reiterated the inadmissibility of any territorial 
changes in the region. It has emphasized that the MASSR’s existence within Ukraine remains in 
the past and that Ukraine firmly respects the recognized borders of the former states of the Soviet 
Union.42 Moldovan public officials additionally reject the TMR’s position as unjustified. They 
argue that the current territory of the TMR includes only a part of the MASSR, whereas the rest 
of that territory is now part of Ukraine.43 In this view, then, Transdniestria cannot appeal for 
restoration of its statehood. 
Thus, Transdniestrian historical and legal arguments based on the restoration of its 
statehood and the external actors’ rejection of these claims after their recognition of Moldova in 
1991 suggest two points. First, these developments indicate that the constitution has not played a 
role in this process. And second, they confirm the external actors’ strong stance on viewing 
                                                 
40 The EU, or the European Community at that time, recognized Moldova on December 31, 1991. In its Statement, 
the European Community announced, “The Community and its Member States welcome the assurances received 
from Armenia. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan that they are 
prepared to fulfill the requirements contained in the ‘Guidelines on the recognition of new States in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union’. Consequently, they are ready to proceed with the recognition of these Republics.” European 
Political Cooperation. “EPC 91/472. Statement Concerning the Recognition of Former Soviet Republics,” V.7 
European Political Cooperation Documentation Bulletin, 773 (1991), emphasis added. The US extended its 
recognition on December 25, 1991. See U.S. State Department. “President Bush Welcomes Commonwealth of 
Independent States, December 25, 1992,” 2 Foreign Policy Bulletin 12 (Jan-Apr.1992). 
41 Special Committee on European Affairs of the New York City Bar, “Executive Summary: Thawing a Frozen 
Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova,” ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 
14, no. 2 (2007-2008), 383. 
42 Interview of Yevgeny Levitsky, a representative of the Ukrainian president at the negotiations. He emphasized 
that, “Kyiv does not have territorial claims to anyone, and considers inadmissible such claims from anyone else.” 
“Yevgeny Levitsky's Interv’u,” Dnestrovskaya Pravda, #95, August 19, 1999. 
43 Private communication with Vasile Shova, former Moldovan Ministry of Reintegration (2001-2009), August 
2013. See Map E in Chapter 2. This position is widely shared by Moldovan scholars. See e.g., Boţan, 2009; A. 
Smochină. “Federalizarea Republicii Moldova: Pro et Contra,” in Ştiinţa Universitară la începutul Mileniului Trei, 
ed. Gh. Postică (Chisinau: Universitatea Liberă Internaţională din Moldova, 2002); A. Smochină. “Consideraţiuni 
Teoretice privind Statutul Special al Localităţilor din Stânga Nistrului,” Legea şi Viaţa 4 (1999).  
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Transdniestria as a part of Moldova, thereby making the idea of the TMR’s recognition as an 
independent state unfeasible. 
2.1.2. Self-determination 
International law does not specifically grant portions of a state the legal right to secede 
unilaterally, but it provides the right to self-determination as a venue for “a people” to pursue 
their own development.44 Transdniestria has framed its claim to statehood in terms of its right to 
self-determination based on a variety of provisions in international documents, and has grounded 
its search for recognition in that right. Despite the Transdniestrian position, international actors 
have largely ignored this claim in their public discourse, and the expert community, with some 
exceptions, has rejected it. 
International law contends that the arguments for external self-determination of any 
unrecognized state must, at minimum, prove that: 
a) the separatists are a “people”; 
b) the state from which they are seceding seriously violates their human rights; and 
c) there are no other effective remedies under either domestic or international law.45 
The following sections briefly evaluate each of these conditions with respect to the 
Transdniestrian case. 
a) The claim to be a “people” 
In the practice of states, the term “people” generally refers to the population of a 
state/territory, and/or to an ethnic group, or a “nation” in the ethnographic sense of the word.46 
When speaking about the people of Transdniestria, its officials stress the multinational 
                                                 
44 Damrosch et al., 2009, 330-333; Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998).  
45 Ibid. 
46 Special Committee on European Affairs of the New York City Bar, 2007.  
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composition of the TMR and their shared Transdniestrian identity. First, as mentioned earlier, in 
the beginning of the 1990s, the TMR consisted of three key ethnic groups: Moldovans (34.1%), 
Russians (30.1%), and Ukrainians (28%).47 This multi-ethnic composition has provided the basis 
for the Transdniestrian authorities to proceed in building a civic state, as opposed to the 
Moldovan national state.48 Second, Transdniestrian authorities have pursued the development of 
a separate Transdniestrian identity, briefly described below, based on the TMR’s historical 
heritage and Transdniestrian self-identification as such.49  
First, from a historical perspective, the area’s experience of statehood from 1924 to 1940, 
limited as it was by Stalin’s regime, nonetheless served to justify Transdniestrian regional 
identity.50 In addition, during the MSSR’s existence, both entities, Transdniestria and Moldova, 
“represented two largely disconnected cultures, which co-existed in a complementary way – each 
dominating in its own domain […with] the Russian-speaking industrial sector and agricultural 
Moldovan one.”51 This experience added to the common Transdniestrian identity that became 
more apparent in the course of increasing resistance to Chisinau from 1989 to 1992.52  
                                                 
47 Bomeshko, 1999, 37. Despite a decrease in population from 712,500 to 555,500 by 2004, the ethnic division of 
three groups remained approximately the same: 31.9% constituted Moldovans, 30.3% - Russians, and 28.8% - 
Ukrainians. “Itogi Pridenstrovskoi perepisi naselenia” [Report on Transdniestrian census], Olivia-Press, 07.09.2005. 
48 Both the existence of three ethnic groups and their peaceful coexistence with other ethnicities is widely mentioned 
in official documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the 1991 and 1995 Constitutions, and public 
discourse. For instance, the 1995 Constitution no less but opens with the sentence “We, the multiethnic nation of 
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic…” As for public discourse, one example can be found in ex-President 
Smirnov’s annual statement on the creation of the TMR, which proclaimed that, “the people of Transdniestria 
managed to protect the genuine equality of nations and created their own state, in which there are no “titular” 
nations, but which ensures equal rights to all citizens and that has three state languages.” “Pozdravitel’noe 
obraschenie Smirnova I.N.,” Pridnestrov’e, #165-166, September 1, 2001. 
49 A number of regional and international scholars support the idea of a separate Transdniestrian identity. See e.g., 
O’Loughlin et al., 1998; Vladimir Kolossov and Dmitriy Zayats. “Moldova i Pridnestrov’e: natsional’noe 
stroitel’stvo, territorial’nye identichenosti, perspektivy razreschenia konflikta,” Vestnik Evrazii 1 (2001); Patrick 
Bruno, Phillip Velmot, and Oleg Vernik, Mezhdnarodnoe pravo i nezavisimost' Pridenstrov'a  (Bendery: Poligrafist, 
2007); Perepelitsa, 2001; V. Solonari, “Transdniestria: Old Problems, New Developments,” in Prospects and Risks 
Beyond EU Enlargement, ed. Iris Kempe, Wim van Meurs (Vs Verlag Fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2003). 
50 Kolossov, Zayats, 2001, 94. 
51 Alexander Bogomolov et al., “Transnistria Assessment Mission Report. Transnistrian Crisis: Human Dimension. 
December 2008 – February 2009,” (2009), 7. 
52 O’Loughlin et al., 1998, 351. 
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Second, regarding the question of self-identification, two surveys conducted at the end of 
the 1990s in the TMR53 showed that about half of the residents there saw themselves as 
constituting a specific ethno-cultural entity distinct from their neighbors.54 When the population 
was asked to which neighboring states the TMR is the most similar, 43.7% of residents answered 
that the population of Transdniestria is unique,55 believing that their identity had been formed for 
centuries under Russian influence.56  
The process of self-identification has itself influenced the preferences of the TMR’s 
inhabitants concerning the place of Transdniestria in the region: 65.4% of those surveyed 
believed that Transdniestria has a right to sovereign statehood,57 and only 15% supported unity 
with Moldova, even with a special status for the TMR.58 Thus, these studies suggest evidence of 
“the visible signs of a new national construction”59 and of an identity,60 which both serve as 
grounds for Transdniestrian authorities to claim to have met the criteria of creating “a people.”61  
                                                 
53 One study was conducted in 1998 by the Tiraspol’ polling firm Strategia, under the sponsorship of the Carnegie 
Foundation. The results were reported by Nikolai Babilunga in the paper “Territorial Identity as a Factor in the 
Political Stability of Transniestria,” presented at the Conference on "National Identities and Territories," Institute of 
Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, May 14-16, 1998 (Conference paper), and cited in O’Loughlin 
et al., 1998. The second study “National processes, language relations and identity,” was conducted under the 
framework of the project “Nationalism and Violence in Two Post Soviet republics: Azerbaijan and Moldova,” 
authored by David Laitin, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, and financed by Harry Frank 
Guggenheim Foundation (1997-1999). The coordinator of survey in Transdniestria was N.Babilunga; computer 
processing of data was completed by T. Guboglo. The study was presented in an article of M.N. Guboglo, 
“Tyazhkoe vreamea konkuriruiuschih identichnostei. Opyt Pridnestrov’a.” [Heavy burden of competing identities] 
In Gryzlov, 1999, 43-96, with the Annex of the results of the project: 165-220. 
54 Babilunga, Conference paper, cited in O’Loughlin et al., 1998, 351; Guboglo, 1999, 197. 
55 The figure of 43.7% reflected the view of 39% of Moldovans, 47% of Russians, 40% of Ukrainians, and 71% of 
other ethnicities who responded that the Transdniestrian population is unique. Guboglo, 1999, at 197; Babilunga, 
conference paper, 1998, cited in O'Loughlin et al., 1998, 35. 
56 Babilunga, Conference paper, cited in O'Loughlin et al., 1998, 351. 
57 Among those 65.4% who support the statehood for the TMR were 47% of Moldovans, 77.2% of Russians, 71.4% 
of Ukrainians, and 76.2% of representatives of other ethnic groups. Guboglo, 1999, 198. 
58 Among the 15% who support this idea, were 23.1% of Moldovans, 12.3% of Russians, 11.2% of Ukrainians, and 
no representatives of other ethnic groups. Guboglo, 1999, 199; Babilunga, Conference paper, cited in O'Loughlin et 
al., 1998, 351. In addition, Babilunga in his survey reports that 83% of those interviewed desired consolidation of 
the TMR’s statehood. Babilunga, Conference paper, cited in O'Loughlin et al., 1998, 352. 
59 O’Loughlin et al., 1998, 352. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Since no ethnic group dominates the entity, the identity has a political character that has been legitimized through 
the common history of the TMR’s inhabitants. The TMR strengthens its political identity through the adoption of 
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Scholars of international law, however, believe that the criterion for “people” lacks 
applicability to the context of the TMR precisely because there are no such people as 
Transdniestrians, but rather three distinct ethnicities – Moldovans, Russians and Ukrainians62 –
whose members often, along with Transdniestrian citizenship, hold the citizenship of 
neighboring states.63 As a result, they contend that the population of this region cannot be called 
a “people” in the sense of belonging to a single ethnic group. In addition, scholars argue that, 
even if such a group were to exist, the simple declaration of its desire to secede, on its own, does 
not actually constitute a right to do so.64 
The external actors have largely been silent on the issue of Transdniestrian identity in their 
official public discourse. One exception is the OSCE Mission to Moldova, which, in 1993, 
pointed out the existence of a distinct Transdniestrian perception of identity that is shared by 
both Slavs and Moldovans and is nourished by common geography, “a keen sense of a different 
history,” and demographic development during the Soviet Union.65 At the same time, the OSCE 
                                                                                                                                                             
state symbols and holidays; the establishment of statewide TV, radio, newspapers; the elaboration of history 
textbooks; the creation of museums, etc. Kolossov, Zayats, 2001, 102. In addition, the TMR’s authorities base their 
identity construction efforts “on a fundamentalist Slavophile presentation of local history and countless 
denunciations of Moldova’s ‘Romanisers,’ [and] ‘Unificationists.’” Solonari, 2003, 4-5. 
62 Special Committee on European Affairs of the New York City Bar, 2007. 
63 Since the entity does not prohibit citizens from holding multiple passports – not least because of its unrecognized 
status – nearly half of the Transnistrian population has Moldovan citizenship; more than 170,000 residents have 
Russian citizenship; and about 90,000 Transdniestrians have Ukrainian passports. To compare, about 200,000 
Moldovans have Romanian citizenship, with approximately 700,000-800,000 more applying for Romanian 
citizenship. See Octavian Milevschi, “Romania: From Brotherly Affection with Moldova to Disillusionment and 
Pragmatism,” in Moldova: Arena of International Influences, ed. Marcin Kosienkowski and William Schreiber (UK: 
Lexington Books), 2012, 176-177. On Moldovan citizenship data, see State Register of Residents. Statistical data 
from the State Register of Residents about people residing in the Republic of Moldova, by territorial administrative 
units, as of April 1, 2011, Online resource, Registru Center for State Informational Resources. 
http://www.registru.md/stat1_ru/; Figures on Russian citizenship were provided by the Russian Ambassador in 
Moldova during the opening of a new venue for the visiting of the consular service of the Russian Embassy. See “V 
Tiraspole otkrylsia novyi korpus vyezdnogo konsul’skogo obsluzhivania Rossiiskogo posol’stva.” Novyi region 
News Portal, April 16, 2013, http://nr2.ru/pmr/434530.html; On Ukrainian citizenship data, see “Daiesh’ 
Pridnestrov’e!” Segodnya, Online resource, May 20, 2010, http://www.segodnya.ua/news/14137900.html 
64 Special Committee on European Affairs of the New York City Bar, 2007, referring to a note from the 
International Committee of Lawyers, who were commissioned by the Council of the League of Nations with the task 
of providing a consultative opinion on the legal aspects and issues around Finland’s Aland Islands. 
65 The OSCE Mission to Moldova Report No. 13, 1993, 3. 
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made it very clear that such feeling of identity is enough only for claiming autonomous status 
within Moldova – not independence. As a result, the OSCE explicitly rejected the TMR’s 
constitutionally incorporated claim for its own statehood.66 
In their private communications, Moldovan officials argue that the term 
“Transdniestrian” connotes a person belonging to that territory/locality, analogous to how one 
would claim to be from a certain city or town. Given that the dual citizenship in the TMR varies 
mainly according to a person’s ethnicity (for example, ethnic Moldovans tend to hold Moldovan 
passports), Moldovan officials have put forward that people in Transdniestria primarily have an 
ethnic identify rather than a Transdniestrian one.67 As a result of this approach, Moldova and 
international experts have rejected any of the TMR’s claims to a Transdniestrian people or 
identity as well as any of its legal provisions on the subject.  
b) the claim to have experienced serious violations of human rights  
Transdniestria frames its official discourse on human rights violations with reference to 
three primary topics: 
 violations of linguistic, cultural, and political rights;  
 the events of the 1992 civil war; and  
 the denial of economic rights.  
Regarding the first claim, the TMR argues that, due to violations of the rights of its 
people from 1989 to 1992, the TMR’s separate statehood had been and continues to remain the 
key instrument required to protect the public interest and civil liberties.68 The adoption of the 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 Private communication with Vasile Shova, former Moldovan Ministry of Reintegration (2001-2009), August 
2013. 
68 Istoriko-pravovye predposylki sozdania Pridnestrovskoi gosudarstvennosti, 2010. In one of his interviews, 
Smirnov noted, “It has been ten years that we are building and consolidating our statehood, which people see as the 
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laws on language in 1989, which required that Moldovan/Romanian to be written in Latin script 
and declared Moldovan/Romanian the only official language, ignored the ethnic realities on the 
left bank of the Dniester River. As both Moldova and the central bodies of the Soviet Union 
disregarded the TMR’s demands for a plebiscite on these issues,69 the TMR pushed for 
protection of its rights through conducting its own referenda, which proved the support of the 
people for its sovereignty and statehood.70  
Regarding the second and third claims, Transdniestrian public discourse recalls the 
violations of the rights of its population who suffered armed conflict and Moldovan brutalities 
between 1989 and 1992.71 It also points to the Moldovan denial of the Transdniestrian right to 
ownership and their rights to economic activity throughout the years. Moldova does not 
recognize Transdniestria’s privatization program and requires businesses to register with 
Moldovan agencies, a situation which, the TMR argues, significantly limits the economic rights 
of its population.  
Furthermore, in arguing for its right to self-determination, the TMR references key 
international texts. In particular, leaders point to the provisions of Article 5 of the Declaration on 
the Right to Development, which stipulate that: 
States shall take resolute steps to eliminate the massive and flagrant violations of the 
human rights of peoples and human beings affected by situations such as those resulting 
from […] [forms of illegal activity] and refusal to recognize the fundamental right of 
peoples to self-determination.72 
Transdniestrian leaders also point to Article 6 (2) of the same document, which states that: 
                                                                                                                                                             
solid guarantee of their civil rights and freedoms.” V. Murav’ev, “OGRV-Faktor sderjivania vozmojnyh 
agressorov,” Pridnestrov’e, #189, September 28, 1999. 
69 Grosul, 2000, 149. 
70 On the details of the referenda held between 1989 and 1991, see Chapter 2. 
71 In addition to the accounts of war as seen from the Transdniestrian side (which are mentioned in the sources in 
Chapter 2), see also the press conference of the General of 14th Army, Alexandr Lebed, in Tiraspol, 1992, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOyjEzMd15s. 
72 Article 5, Declaration on the Right to Development, A/RES/41/128, December 4, 1986. 
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All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal 
attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and 
protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.73 
As a result, the TMR suggests that the protection of only the cultural and linguistic rights of its 
people through specific guarantees granted within Moldova violates their right to development.74 
Instead, it insists that, by grounding its claim in the fundamental principles of international law, 
the TMR has created its own state and confirmed the legal right of its people to self-
determination.75  
The external actors are silent on this issue as well and, in their official public discourse, 
ignore Transdniestrian claims about the violation of its rights and the subsequent need for self-
determination. In private communications, Moldovan officials emphasize that, since the end of 
1992, Moldova has bolstered its respect for minority rights by meeting relevant international 
standards and point to the country’s lack of systematic human rights violations.76 The majority of 
researchers also reject the TMR’s position, suggesting that the rights of Transdniestrians are 
more often violated by the unrecognized regime itself due to the absence of internationally 
recognized justice.77 The events of a war in themselves do not automatically grant the legal right 
to secession. Finally, Transdniestrian officials’ complaint that Moldova has refused to recognize 
Transdniestria’s privatization plan and that registration of the TMR’s businesses with Moldovan 
agencies makes products more expensive and less competitive on European markets for trade 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
74 Yakovlev, 1997, 74. 
75 “Smirnov: Pridnestrovtsy-narod sil’nyi i mujestvennyi” [Smirnov: Transdniestrians are Powerful People of Sprit 
and Courage], Pridnestrov’e, #171, September 8, 1998. 
76 Private communication with the representative of the Moldovan delegation to the negotiations (1994-1999), 
August 2013. 
77 A. Bohomolov, I. Semyvolos, and D. Pushkar, "The Transnistrian Crisis: The Human Dimension," (Kyiv: Center 
for Near Eastern Studies), 2010. 
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represent economic policies of the state and thus cannot be considered a violation of human 
rights.78  
c) the claim to have no other effective remedies under either domestic or international 
law 
Transdniestria insists that its conflict with Moldova is intractable and argues that the 
TMR will achieve effective sovereignty only through independence.79 The TMR reminds the 
international community that it sought to protect the interests of its people through attempting to 
gain the status of a free economic zone, autonomous region,80 or federal republic within Moldova 
between 1989 and 1991,81 all options that the Moldovan authorities rejected. Throughout 
subsequent years, starting in 1992, discussion on the issue of granting a special legal status to the 
TMR as part of Moldova has not achieved a consensus among all the relevant actors82 and 
Transdniestria insists that its own political entity would better protect the rights and freedoms of 
the multinational people living on its territory.83   
                                                 
78 Alyona Getmanchuk et al., “Scenarios for the Development of the Transnistria Conflict. Challenges to European 
Security,” (Kiyv: Institute of World Policy, 2011), 112. 
79 Statement on the Political and Legal Grounds for the Creation of the TMSSR, September 2, 1990; The Address of 
the Committee of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic towards the Peoples of the USSR, 
Dnestrovskaya Pravda, #217, September 14, 1990. As mentioned in Chapter 2, although the TMR’s discourse often 
included the claims to independence, it was not until 2006 that it implied the search for actual independence. 
80 In 1989, the TMR’s authorities approached the Ministry Council of MSSR with the suggestion to grant the region 
political and economic autonomy. See “Obraschenie k MSSR s predlojeniem o sozdanii politicheskoi i 
ekonomicheskoi avtonomii” [The Address to MSSR Offering the Creation of the Political and Ecnomic Autonomy], 
Pridnestrovskaya Pravda,  October 3, 1989. 
81 In 1990, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the TMSSR, I. N. Smirnov, stated in an interview that, 
“Federation is the most appropriate way to overcome the conflict…Yes, we support federation within Moldova’s 
borders, and, of course, within the Union [USSR].” A. Platitsin, “Pravoe delo Pridnestrovia,” Dniestrovskaya 
Pravda, #291, December 12, 1990. 
82 In April 1992, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Moldova, Russia, Romania and Ukraine discussed the issue 
of granting special status to the TMR. After that, the format of negotiations has been changed several times, but has 
not yet yielded any results. Grosul, Guzenkova, 2004, 381. 
83 For instance, in 1999, the ex-President of the TMR, Smirnov, stated in an interview that, “It has been nine years 
that we are building up our statehood, which is seen by the people as a real guarantee of their civil rights and 
freedoms.” Muraviev, 1999. 
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In making its case, the TMR also refers to the provisions of the International Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights, as well as on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which stipulate 
that all peoples have the right of self-determination and that “[b]y virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”84 The TMR insists that, according to the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law, the mechanisms for implementing the right of self-determination are freely 
determined by a people and include the establishment of a sovereign and independent state, the 
free association or integration with an independent state, or the transformation into any other 
political status.85 Therefore, Transdniestria argues that the appropriate process to implement its 
right to self-determination should not be imposed by any outside state.86 
The external actors, however, disregard these claims. In their official public discourse, 
they emphasize the need to find a resolution that would provide the TMR with some form of 
autonomy while preserving the territorial integrity of Moldova.87 The majority of experts believe 
that the Transdniestrian position on the unsuitability of other instruments for resolving the 
conflict is insufficient, since the instruments that might bring “viable settlement” should have 
been tried first before being rejected.88  
                                                 
84 Article 1 (1), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. GA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
December 16, 1966. 
85 Article 1 (The principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples), Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations. GA Resolution 2625 (XXXV) of October 24, 1970. 
86 Yakovlev, 1997, 74. 
87 As US Vice President Joe Biden noted in his speech, “America has supported and will continue to support a 
settlement - not any settlement, but a settlement that preserves Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 
White House Press Release, March 11, 2011. Another example is the statement of Asif J. Chaudhry, Ambassador-
Designate to the Republic of Moldova (2008-2011): “The US is committed to a resolution of the Transnistria 
conflict that guarantees Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Testimony at the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, June 19, 2008. 
88 Gertmanchuk et al., 2011, 112. Also, US scholars believe that the TMR is attempting to exacerbate ethnic tensions 
in order to claim that separation is necessary to avoid ethnic conflict, whereas Moldova has sought to decrease them 
as much as possible. See Special Committee on European Affairs of the New York City Bar, 385. 
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Overall, in claiming its right to recognition, Transdniestria has framed its official public 
discourse in terms of its historical statehood and its right to self-determination, whereas the 
constitutionally incorporated traditional criteria for recognition remain invisible. Over the years, 
Transdniestrian public figures have kept their focus on these two categories and reiterated the 
reasons for tense relations with Moldova and the TMR’s right to its own statehood, relegating the 
constitution to the domestic sphere. Although the particular forms of such reiteration vary, the 
example of the official statement provided below illustrates the underlying theme of the TMR’s 
general official discourse on the issue of its statehood.  
In one of his interviews, then Chairman of the Supreme Council of Transdniestria, 
Grigory Marakutsa, provided the following explanation for the tense situation between Moldova 
and Transdniestria: 
The conflict stems from the present [1990-1991] policy of the Moldovan leadership. I am 
referring to its decision not to sign the Federal Treaty of Sovereign States, and also its 
desire to forcibly Romanize the republic, which means discrimination against a 
considerable part of the working people of the Dniestr area for their political views, 
nationality and language. We have exerted efforts for quite a time to settle these and other 
problems, have moved to form a federation within the framework of Moldova, but have 
always run up against the Moldovan leadership's refusal to understand us. All this has 
compelled the people of the [Transdniestrian] area to adopt on August 25, 1991, a 
Declaration on the Independence of the [Transdniestrian] Republic.89  
On the question of legitimacy of the Transdniestrian Republic, he noted: 
Our Republic was formed as a result of its populations' freely expressed will during the 
recent referenda in urban areas and meetings in agricultural regions. On September 2, 
1990, a Congress of People's Deputies of All Levels from the [Transdniestrian] area 
proclaimed the establishment of this republic as a part of our renovated Federation. This 
is the will expressed by the multinational population of the [Transdniestria’s] area. It was 
confirmed by elections to the Supreme Soviet of the newly-formed republic on November 
25, 1990.  
Several scientific institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences concluded that the 
foundation of our republic was in keeping with the historical, cultural and economic unity 
                                                 
89 “Interview with the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Dniestr Republic, Grigory Marakutsa,” Official 
Kremlin International News Broadcast. September 19, 1991. 
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of the population and specific character of the region's development. Practical experience 
proves the expediency of the [Transdniestria] area's statehood. 
From the legal point of view, it is important to stress that the USSR Constitution 
recognizes the right of nations to self-determination, and we have turned this provision 
into a political reality on the basis of the [Transdniestrian] population's expressed will. A 
specific feature of our republic is that Bessarabia, a former Russian province, got its 
statehood when the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed in 1940 through its 
unification with the [Transdniestrian] Autonomous Republic.90  
Thus, in claiming the TMR’s independence and seeking recognition, the leadership of 
Transdniestria has mainly relied on a set of historical and legal factors combined with the 
political realities of the time. They make those reasons central in both official public and private 
discourses and believe that such an approach better accommodates the international legal 
requirements for achieving recognition.91  
External actors, in their turn, disregard the TMR’s claims for the restoration of its 
statehood and the right to self-determination, instead forcefully and constantly reiterating the 
need for a resolution to the conflict based on respect for the territorial integrity of Moldova with 
a special status for the TMR.92 They also ignore the TMR’s constitution as a whole, as well as its 
specific provisions asserting the traditional criteria for statehood. 
As a result, the Transdniestrian framing of its claim to recognition and the responses of 
the external actors suggest that the constitutional system in the TMR plays an important internal 
role, but has not influenced the process of the TMR’s recognition. As an internal mechanism, 
however, the Transdniestrian constitution organizes society and promotes the sovereign 
development of the TMR, which, as the next section illustrates, have grown stronger over time. 
                                                 
90 Ibid. 
91 Personal communications of the former TMR ministers of foreign affairs, Valery Litskay (period of service: 1990-
2008), Vladimir Yastrebchak (period of service: 2008-2011), and a representative of the TMR government (period 
of service: 2011-present). 
92 While visiting the TMR, the head of EU delegation on external relations, Rene Nyberg stated, “We believe that 
Transdniestria is part of Moldova and recognize [Moldovan] territorial integrity.” “‘Troika’ Evrosoyza v 
Pridnestrov’e,” Dnestrovskaya Pravda, #121, October 21, 1999. 
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2. The Contemporary Criteria for Recognition 
Along with asserting the traditional criteria of recognition, the TMR has also set up 
constitutional mechanisms to address the contemporary criteria for recognition: democracy, the 
rule of law, and the protection of human rights. Similar to traditional criteria for recognition, no 
evidence suggests a link between the TMR’s constitutional democratic framework and the 
entity’s recognition. At the same time, there are a number of ways in which this framework has 
had other important effects. 
First, the existence of the TMR’s constitutional democratic framework has consolidated 
its claim to statehood. The entity’s constitutional provisions on democracy, the rule of law, and 
the protection of human rights establish the basis for the internal organization of the TMR’s 
polity and its future development. In this way, the elaboration and further implementation of 
these provisions demonstrate both to the people of Transdniestria and to the external actors the 
TMR’s capacity for sovereign governance. Constitutional practices, such as procedures to amend 
the constitution and the protection of human rights, add to the TMR’s claims of democratic 
development. These practices also allow the TMR, particularly in the field of human rights, to 
interact more closely with the external actors and to use this interaction as an additional forum in 
which to make its case for statehood.  
Second, the external actors expect Transdniestria to embrace the principles of democracy, 
the rule of law, and human rights, not least for the purposes of becoming a more reliable partner 
in the negotiations – a partner who will contribute to resolving the conflict while respecting 
Moldova’s integrity. Although the external actors disregard the TMR’s constitutional provisions 
related to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in their official public discourse, they 
still consider the realization of the principle of democratic development in the TMR to be 
essential for settling the dispute. Consequently, the external actors often raise the issue of the 
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need for democratic development in Transdniestria in their discourse and also closely observe 
Transdniestrian constitutional practices, such as constitutional amendments and the protection of 
human rights. As private communications with the external actors suggest, its constitutional 
democratic framework has become an instrument for the external actors to prompt Transdniestria 
to finding consensus on the settlement and agreeing to reintegration with Moldova. Although a 
number of other factors may matter for the external actors in seeing the positive role of 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the settlement process, the available data 
indicates that they emphasize the TMR’s democratic development mainly for the purposes of 
advancing conflict resolution, which the external actors hope would be achieved with the support 
of more flexible and compromise-oriented leaders from the TMR.  
 To analyze the relationship between the constitutional process that includes the 
contemporary criteria and recognition, this section explores the presence of the contemporary 
criteria in the Transdniestrian constitution and their use by the Transdniestrian authorities in the 
claims for recognition. The section then looks at some Transdniestrian constitutional practices 
related to the contemporary criteria for recognition, such as constitutional amendments and the 
protection of human rights, and the discourses that Transdniestria and the external actors invoke 
around these practices. 
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2.1. Constitutional Provisions on Democracy and the Rule of Law, and 
Their Use in Transdniestrian Official Discourse 
The adoption of the Transdniestrian constitution in 1995 aimed to further develop the 
state institutions established in 1990 and 1991 and strengthen the TMR’s statehood. The 1995 
constitution followed the general path of democratization in Eastern Europe in the 1990s by 
addressing the key principles of democracy, the rule of law, and protection of human rights in its 
text. As a result, the TMR’s foundational legal act satisfied the requirements of a contemporary 
constitution and became the basis for asserting and developing Transdniestrian statehood.93 
2.1.1. Transdniestrian Constitutional Provisions on Democracy and 
the Rule of Law 
The TMR’s constitution contains general and specific provisions on the nature of the 
entity’s governance and on the structure of its government. It proclaims the establishment and 
supremacy of the rule of law in the TMR.94 The constitution declares the TMR a democratic state 
and specifies that power in this state rests solely with the people who exercise it through local 
and state institutions (indirectly) as well as through referenda and free elections (directly).95 It 
establishes three official languages: Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian, all with equal status.96 
The constitution specifically provides that “the state, its institutions, and officials act in the 
conditions of the democratic pluralism of political institutions and opinions.”97 This pluralism, 
however, is not without limitations. As the constitution explicitly stipulates, “public associations, 
                                                 
93 According to First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council, Vladimir Atamaniuk, the TMR’s constitution was 
drafted to take into considerations international norms, the requirements of the Universal Declarations of Human 
Rights, and the geopolitical, economic, and social changes wrought after the break-up of the Soviet Union. “24 
dekabrea v Pridnestrov’e otmechaiut Den’ Konstitutsii” [24th of December is the Constitution Day in Trasdniestria], 
Olvia-Press, December 24, 1999; Personal communication of the former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Valery 
Litskay (years of service: 1990-2008), and Vladimir Yastrebchak (years of service: 2008-2012), August 2013. 
94 Preamble, the TMR Constitution, 1995. 
95 Article 1. 
96 Article 12. 
97 Article 8 (1). 
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their bodies, or representatives, which act against the sovereignty of the Republic, call for violent 
changes to the constitutional order that disrupt the state’s security, create unlawful armed units, 
and incite racial, ethnic and religious hatred are prohibited.”98  
The constitution lays out the separation of powers and expressly prohibits the 
centralization of power in the hands of one person or institution.99 It establishes a presidential 
system with the president, who is elected by universal suffrage for five years, is the head of state 
and the executive branch, and acts as a guarantor of the constitution, the republic’s sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity. The president defines the main thrusts of the state’s 
internal and external policies, including on issues of defense and security, determination of the 
state’s political status, and the protection of the TMR’s borders.100  
The government also includes a parliament, the Supreme Council, which is the only 
representative and legislative body of the republic and is elected for a five-year term101 by 
majoritarian voting. Local governance includes the representative bodies at various levels (cities, 
rayons,102 and villages), which consist of people’s deputies elected by the population of the 
corresponding territorial units; and executive bodies, such as the state administrations of cities 
and rayons, who are appointed by the president.103 
The judiciary in the TMR includes the Constitutional Court, courts of civil, 
administrative, and criminal proceedings, and the Arbitration Court,104 all of which are based on 
                                                 
98 Article 8 (3). 
99 Article 55 (2). 
100 Article 55 (1); 56 (1); 59 (1-3); 60 (2,3). 
101 Article 67 (1-2). 
102 A unit of territorial division that represents a larger geographic area containing cities and villages. In English 
sources, the term “rayon” usually remains untranslated in the context of territorial divisions in Moldova or 
Transdniestria. 
103 Article 77 (1,2); 78 (1,2). 
104 Article 80 (2). 
157 
the principles of independence and non-interference.105 The president appoints judges on the 
recommendation of the Supreme and Arbitration Courts.106 Trials are based on adversarial 
principles and on the equality of the parties and, as a rule, are open to the public.107 The 
Constitutional Court exercises control through interpreting and protecting the constitution; 
assures the supremacy of the constitution; ensures the separation of powers; and guarantees the 
state’s responsibility before citizens and citizens’ responsibilities to the state.108 The judges of 
the Constitutional Court are appointed by the president, the Supreme Court and the Republican 
Assembly of Judges for a period of seven years.109 
The constitution also stipulates that several sections, “The Basis of Constitutional Order,” 
“The Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of a Human Being and a Citizen,” and “The 
Amendments to the Constitution,” can be changed only through referendum.110 
Thus, the provisions of the TMR’s constitution demonstrate their correspondence to the 
contemporary standards for democracy and the rule of law. They also show Transdniestria’s 
commitment to developing its statehood in line with the principles of self-government and 
sovereignty. As a result, Transdniestria’s state-building efforts through the establishment of state 
institutions and governing norms have strengthened the legal and institutional basis of the de 
facto state. More broadly, it has defined the legal space for existence of the Transdniestrian 
people.  
                                                 
105 Article 81 (1,2). 
106 Article 83 (1, para. 1). Justices of the Peace are elected. Article 83 (1, para. 2). 
107 Article 85 (1, 2). 
108 Article 86 (1). 
109 Article 86 (2). Each of the institutions appoints two judges to the Constitutional Court. 
110 Article 102. 
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2.1.2. The Transdniestrian Constitution in Official Transdniestrian 
Discourse 
Although the Transdniestrian leadership believes that the TMR’s constitution meets the 
requirements for democracy,111 they rarely link this fact to the entity’s claim to recognition in 
official discourse or within the context of negotiations. As shown in Section 1, Transdniestria 
instead bases its claim to recognition mainly on the restoration of its statehood and its right to 
self-determination.  
At the same time, the TMR’s constitution and the document’s democratic provisions are 
both part of the larger framework of asserting Transdniestrian statehood and claiming 
sovereignty. In official speeches and congratulatory messages celebrating Republic Day112 or 
Constitution Day,113 Transdniestrian authorities refer to the constitution as an important 
instrument for establishing and preserving a distinct Transdniestrian entity. In particular, they see 
the adoption of the TMR’s constitution as “a crucial event in the history of [the TMR as a] state 
that, to a large extent decided its future as sovereign, democratic, and [respectful of] the rule of 
law.”114 The constitution is a document that ensures the TMR’s sovereign right to self-
determination and its future as a state despite the numerous challenges that the entity has 
experienced. The mere fact that Transdniestria has had its own constitution for many years 
carries weight. It is viewed as “the result of the common struggle of the whole nation for the 
                                                 
111 In support of their belief, Transdniestrian authorities refer to the views of the representatives of unspecified 
recognized states that the Transdniestrian constitution is a balanced and a democratic foundational legal document.  
I. Letyga, “V Pridnestrov’e otmetili Den’ Konstitutsii,” Olvia-Press,  December 24, 2002. 
112 Republic Day is celebrated annually on September 2. 
113 Constitution Day occurs annually on December 24.  
114 “Smirnov: Konstitutsia-Glavnyi Zakon strany” [Smirnov: Constitution is the Fundamental Law of the Country], 
Dnestrovskaya Pravda, #150, December 24, 1998. 
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TMR’s statehood”115 and as an inherent part of all of the current trappings of the entity’s 
independence. 116  
On Republic Day or Constitution Day, Transdniestrian leaders emphasize the close 
interrelation between the constitution and the TMR’s statehood. In their view, the constitution is 
(1) the foundational document for the Transdniestrian state and its efforts to build democracy;117 
(2) a basic act that addresses economic and social problems; and (3) the key normative 
framework through which to consolidate society, protect its civil accord, peace, and stability,118 
and to ensure equality of all ethnicities.119 In this way, official statements frame the TMR’s 
development as democratic, united, and sovereign, all of which have contributed to the internal 
consolidation of Transdniestrian statehood.   
In addition, in the context of the TMR’s unrecognized status, both the very idea of 
observing a Constitution Day and the official discourse surrounding the importance of the 
                                                 
115 Letyga, 2002. 
116 “Ocherednaya godovschina Pridnestrovskoi Konstitutsii,” Olvia-Press,  December 22, 1999. 
117 Personal communications with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Transdniestria, August 2013; 
“President pozdravil pridnestrovtsev s Dnem Konstitutsii,” Olvia-Press, December 24, 2003; "President PMR: 
Nasha s vami oschaya zadacha-sberech provozglashennye tsennosti,” Olvia-Press, December 23, 2004; “V 
Tiraspole proshlo torjestvennoe sobranie, posvyaschennoe Dniu Konstitutsii,” Olvia-Press, December 23, 2005; 
“Smirnov: Stabil’nost’ Konstitutsii opredelyaet stabil’nuiu raboty institutov gosudarstvennoi vlasti,” Olvia-Press,  
December 23, 2006; “Osnovnomu Zakonu strany – Konstitutsii – 13 let,” Olvia-Press, December 24, 2008; “24 
dekabrya – Deni Konstitutsii Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respubliki,” Olvia-Press, December 24, 2010; “24 
dekabrya v Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respublike otmechaetsea kak Deni Konstitutsii,” Olvia-Press, December 
24, 2012. 
118 “Smirnov, Stabil’nost’ Konstitutsii,” 2006; “Igor Smirnov: Nasha Konstitutsia ukrepila prioritet 
demokraticheskih prav i svobod, mir i sotrudnichestvo v nashem obschestve i gosudarstve” [Igor Smirnov: Our 
Constitution Has Strengthened the Leading Role of Democratic Rights and Freedoms, Peace and Cooperation in Our 
Society and State], Olvia-Press,  December 25, 2007; “Osnovnomu Zakonu strany – Konstitutsii – 13 let,” 2008; 
Smirnov emphasized that, “For the residents of our country, the constitution has been and remains the main legal 
norm, the law for the protection of civil peace and accord.” “Smirnov: Dlea zhiteleei nashei strany Konstitutsia byla 
i ostaetsea glavnoi pravovoi normoi, Zakonom sohranenia grajdanskogo mira i solglasia,” Olvia-Press,  December 
24, 2009. The new President of the TMR, Yevgeny Shevchuk, also emphasized these ideas. He noted in his 
greetings that, “I am convinced that joint constructive efforts will allow us to […] achieve our goals of strengthening 
our statehood, developing the economy, increasing people’s well-being, and consolidating peace and stability in our 
society.” “24 dekabrya v Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respublike otmechaetsea kak Deni Konstitutsii,” Olvia-Press, 
December 24, 2012. 
119 Smirnov made the point that the TMR Constitution is a guarantee of further development and prosperity for the 
Transdniestrian republic since it provides for equality of all ethnicities and languages. “Igor Smirnov: Konstitutsia 
PMR – garant ravnopravia pridnestrovtsev,” Olvia-Press, December 24, 2003. 
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constitution for Transdniestria point to the symbolic function of this document in shaping the 
domestic perceptions of Transdniestrians of their national identity. Transdniestrians appear to 
view their constitution as a unifying concept useful for pursuing statehood; in this regard, the 
designation of a special day contributes to the performance of their statehood. At the same time, 
the extent to which Transdniestrians have internalized their constitution for the purposes of the 
development of the TMR’s identity is unclear due to the lack of data. Transdniestrians have 
continued the tradition of observing a Constitution Day from the Soviet period, during which the 
celebration of the Constitution of the USSR was an integral part of the Soviet life.120 Constitution 
Day is also one of several official holidays in the TMR, along with Defenders’ Day, International 
Women’s Day, Victory Day, and Republic Day, which were established to consolidate the 
Transdniestrian people through the celebration of shared values and ideals.121 As a result, 
although Constitution Day contributes to the formation of a national identity in the TMR, its 
particular role for shaping citizens’ perceptions of identity remains to be studied further. 
Along with public discourse, Transdniestrian officials also have invoked the entity’s 
constitutional framework during the negotiation process to determine their status and 
recognition. Sometimes, TMR officials refer to the Transdniestrian constitution to bolster the 
legitimacy of their representatives during negotiations122 or, as the external actors see it, to avoid 
discussions on substantive issues.123 As a result, Transdniestrian authorities have used the 
existence of their constitution and its democratic nature as part of their general public discourse 
                                                 
120 The date of adoption of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR was celebrated as December 5 from 1936 until 1977. 
The date of adoption of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR was celebrated as October 7 between 1977 until 1991. 
Both days were holidays for workers.  
121 In contrast to the other holidays listed, though, a Constitution Day is not a day off work. See Article 112, 
Trudovoi Kodeks, N161-З-III (САЗ 02-29) 19.07.2002 [Labor Code of July 19, 2002]. 
122 Personal communications of the former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Valery Litskay (years of service: 1990-
2008), and Vladimir Yastrebchak (years of service: 2008-2012), August 2013. 
123 Personal communication of the representative from the OSCE Mission to Moldova, July 2013. 
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and negotiations to assert Transdniestrian sovereignty, thereby consolidating their position on the 
TMR’s statehood. 
2.2. Constitutional Amendments as Part of the Democratic Process: 
Transdniestrian Practices and the Responses of the External Actors 
Transdniestria has pursued the process of amending its constitution in order to follow its 
goals for sovereignty and to perform state-building tasks. Although there is no evidence that this 
process has impacted the TMR’s recognition, it has had a several other noticeable effects. First, 
the process of constitutional amendment and the constitutional amendments themselves 
(henceforth this work refers to both as constitutional amendments) have contributed to the 
development of statehood in Transdniestria, which in turn has consolidated the entity’s claim to 
independence. Second, constitutional amendments have influenced the approach of the external 
actors toward the Transdniestrian issue. While publicly disregarding the TMR’s constitutional 
system and its provisions, some of the external actors have seen the general idea of amending the 
constitution within the framework of the principle of democratic development and, as explained 
above, have viewed democratic development in Transdniestria as one of the key conditions for 
final settlement of the dispute.124 
The overview of the TMR’s constitutional development suggests that three efforts to 
amend the constitution (two successful and one unsuccessful) were designed to balance internal 
powers within the general constitutional framework without jeopardizing the grounds or goals of 
the TMR’s claim to statehood. These efforts were aimed at consolidating the entity’s internal 
power and providing the basis for entrenchment of the TMR’s statehood. In this regard, the first 
constitution of 1991, which was based on the Soviet constitution, laid the groundwork for setting 
up Transdniestrian state institutions that were compatible with the solution of a federal state 
                                                 
124 Personal communications of representatives of Moldova, the OSCE, and the EU, May-August 2013. 
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within Moldova. Transdniestrian authorities regarded that constitution as a normative element in 
state development, as the basis for internal policy, and a non-negotiable issue.125 After the civil 
war, Transdniestria took steps towards further independence and the development of its own 
state institutions, both of which were elaborated in the new constitution. The 1995 constitution 
thus became a uniting and legitimizing factor for the development of the entire state system and 
again was not an issue open for negotiation.126 The 1995 constitution continued the mixed form 
of governance established in 1991, a presidential and parliamentary republic. The governance 
system included a government as a collective body with a number of decision-making powers 
and a bicameral parliament.  
The first set of constitutional amendments in 2000, widely discussed in the TMR’s 
media,127 introduced a presidential republic. More specifically, the amendments conferred large 
powers on the president; transformed the government into a cabinet of ministers, henceforth a 
consultative body; and reduced the parliament to one chamber.128 The constitutional reform 
attempted to address problematic areas in the legislative branch of the TMR’s government, 
especially the inefficiency and inexpediency of a bicameral parliament in a small republic and 
the excessive complexities of constitutional interpretation that caused imbalance between the 
chambers. The constitutional reform also reflected the desire of then-president Smirnov to 
                                                 
125 Personal communication with Vladimir Yastrebchak, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transdniestria 
(period of service: 2001-2012), August 2013. 
126 Ibid. 
127 See “Osnovnoi vopros-konstitutsionnyi kontrol” [The Key Question is the Question of Constitutional Review], 
Dnestrovskaya Pravda, #4, January 12, 1999; A. Yavorsky, "Obsujdaem proiect popravok v konstitutsiu [The Draft 
Amendments to the Constitution Are Under Discussions], Ibid., #114, October 5, 1999; A. Shablienko, “Obsujdaem 
proekt popravok k kontitutsii, a ne domysly [Lets Discuss the Draft Amendments to the Constitution, Not 
Suppositions],” Ibid., #123, October 26, 1999.  
128 Verhovnyi Sovet PMR. Konstitutsionnyi zakon o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitutsiu PMR N310-
КЗИД, 30.06.2000 [Constitutional Law on Amendments and Additions to the TMR Constitution]. 
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increase the presidential term of office, thus allowing him to stand for a third term, and to have 
mechanisms to control the entity’s increasingly centralized power.129  
Later, in 2003, a constitutional amendment was proposed on the introduction of private 
ownership on land to develop agriculture in the republic. As an important constitutional issue, 
this initiative was subject to a referendum but failed to garner public support and was not 
adopted.130 
Finally, in 2009, Transdniestria saw robust debates on the issue of powers between the 
presidential and legislative branches that led to a constitutional crisis.131 A new generation of 
deputies introduced amendments to limit the presidential powers implemented in 2000 and 
sought to strengthen the role of the parliament and parliamentary control.132 In response, the 
president put forward the idea of a new constitution, hoping to revise and enhance executive 
powers, for example, the power to independently call for a referendum. The discussions ended in 
2011 when, during joint consultations between legislative and executive powers, both branches 
agreed to return to a mixed form of governance.133 
Therefore, the process of constitutional amendment in Transdniestria demonstrates the 
entity’s intensive state-building and consolidation of government institutions. It reveals that the 
active internal interactions between the branches of the government and the government and the 
public have not challenged the basis for the TMR’s statehood. Rather, Transdniestria has 
                                                 
129 Ilya Mil’man, “Pervaya Konstitutsia Pridnestrov’a zadala strategicheskii vector razvitia nashego obschstva” [The 
TMR’s First Constitution Defined a Strategic Vector for the Development of Our Society], Diplomaticheskii 
Vestrnik Pridnestrov’a 5 (2011).  
130 Only 153,140 of voters, or 38,92% of those registered, took part in the referendum. As a result, the turnout was 
less than 50% needed and the referendum was declared invalid. “Po predvaritel’nym itogam, konstitutsionnyi 
referendum po voprosy vvedenia chastrnoi sobstvennosti na zemliu priznan nesostoyavshimsea” [According to 
Preliminary Results, the Constitutional Referendum on the Issue of Introducing Private Ownership on Land Is 
Considered Invalid], Olvia-Press, April 7, 2003. 
131 See e.g., Serghei Markedonov. “Pridnestrov’e: kak vyiti iz konstitutsionnyh tupikov?” [Transdniestria: How to 
Break Constitutional Deadlocks?], Politcom, November 19, 2009. 
132 Mil’man, 2011; Personal communication with Vladimir Yastrebchak, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
Transdniestria (period of service:  2008-2012), August 2013. 
133 Konstitutsionnyi zakon o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitutsiu PMR, N94-KZID-V, 2011. 
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followed the path of constitutional development to strengthen its statehood and use it in support 
of the TMR’s claim to recognition. 
Externally, despite their official public ignorance of the constitutional amendments in 
Transdniestria, some external actors in the negotiation process followed the TMR’s 
constitutional debates, informally discussed them with the other parities in the negotiations, and 
viewed these constitutional developments as relevant to negotiations.134 In particular, one high-
ranking representative of the OSCE Mission to Moldova commented that: 
The Transdniestrian constitution has been in the focus of attention of the OSCE Mission 
to Moldova whenever the substantial constitutional changes were discussed in internal 
Transdniestrian politics that would have had an effect on the powers of the president or 
Supreme Soviet. Thus, the Mission closely followed discussions on constitutional 
changes…135  
Although the particular responses of the external actors to each of the TMR’s 
constitutional reform are unknown, there is a general sense that their approach to the 2000 
amendments was critical, while they were more favorable, but still cautious, regarding the 2011 
amendments. The external actors saw a return to the mixed government as a more promising step 
toward democratic development in the TMR, which could assist in negotiations.136 Therefore, the 
close, albeit unofficial, monitoring of the amendments in the TMR indicates that the external 
actors viewed this process as important for the purposes of the negotiation process and that the 
TMR’s constitutional practices mattered for achieving those goals. As personal communications 
with the external actors also reveal, the participants in negotiations have assumed that democracy 
in the TMR would encourage the accession to power of leaders more willing to negotiate and 
compromise on the TMR’s position. Based on this, the external actors have regarded the TMR’s 
                                                 
134 Personal communications of the representatives of the OSCE and the EU, May-August 2013. 
135 Personal communication of the OSCE representative, March 2013. 
136 Personal communications of the OSCE representatives, March-August 2013. 
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internal constitutional development as part of democratic development that could enable the 
TMR to compromise on its position for the purposes of final settlement of the conflict.137 
2.3. The Protection of Human Rights as Part of the Democratic Process: the 
1995 Constitutional Provisions and Practices in Transdniestria and the 
Responses of the External actors 
2.3.1. Constitutional Provisions on Human Rights 
Similar to many of the post-1990s constitutions in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Bloc, the Transdniestrian constitution has a separate section on human rights and freedoms that 
proclaims a human being and his/her rights and freedoms as the supreme value of a society and 
of a state and places them under the state’s protection.138 The section “The Rights, Freedoms, 
Responsibilities and Guarantees of a Human Being and a Citizen” enumerates key principles 
such as equality, non-discrimination, and the inalienability of basic rights.139 It provides civil and 
political rights and freedoms (the right to life and privacy; freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
inhuman treatment; freedom of movement, speech, association, and religion; the right to elect 
and be elected; and so on),140 as well as social and economic rights and freedoms (the right to 
work, to rest, and leisure; ownership rights; the protection of motherhood, childhood, and the 
family; the right to social security, medical care, education, a healthy environment; and so on).141 
Given the initial circumstances that encouraged the creation of the Transdniestrian state 
(namely, nationalistic movements in Moldova and the use of force against the left bank in the 
1990s), the constitution includes special provisions on ethnic identity. It provides the right to 
keep one’s own ethnic identity and the right to use one’s native language and choose the 
language of communication. It contains a provision that no one can be forced to define and 
                                                 
137 Personal communications of representatives of the OSCE, and the EU, May-August 2013. 
138 Section II, Article 16 (1), the TMR Constitution. 
139 Article 16 (2), Article 17 (1). 
140 Articles 19-25, 27, 30-32. 
141 Articles 26, 35, 37-41. 
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indicate ethnic identity and prohibits insulting ethnic dignity.142 Finally, the constitution 
stipulates the right for judicial remedy and appeal in case of a rights violation. It also emphasizes 
that the rights and freedoms listed should not be interpreted as negation or depreciation of other 
generally recognized rights and freedoms.143 
As a result, the structure and provisions of the Transdniestrian constitution generally 
satisfy contemporary standards on democracy and human rights and follow the general 
democratic path of post-socialist states.  
2.3.2. The Provision of Human Rights as an International Obligation 
To emphasize its commitment to maintaining international relations, Transdniestria set up 
constitutional provisions that showed respect for international obligations, particularly in the 
field of human rights. Although the external actors have ignored the TMR’s constitutional 
commitments as well as the TMR’s official public claims on its compliance with international 
human rights documents, the explicit provisions regarding the TMR’s international obligations 
have shaped the course of Transdniestrian internal democratic development and consolidation.  
Proceeding from the premise that respect for human rights is essential for a state built on 
the principle of the rule of law,144 Transdniestria has undertaken the obligation to respect human 
rights through its constitutional provisions as listed above. In addition, in its aspiration to 
contribute to international cooperation and to respect international jus cogens norms, as early as 
1992 Transdniestria adopted a parliamentary act that notified the United Nations and other 
international organizations about its pledge to respect:  
 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,  
                                                 
142 Article 43. 
143 Articles 45-46. 
144 A statement that is reflected in the preamble of the Parliamentary Act on International Treaties. [Postanovlenie 
Ob otnoshenii Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respubliki k mezhdunarodnym dogovoram i druhim aktam po pravam 
cheloveka, №226 22.09.1992]. 
167 
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Protocols,  
 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and  
 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.145  
Transdniestria declared that its legislation should correspond to the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights and the above-mentioned international treaties. Later, the TMR’s Supreme 
Council also announced that the Convention on Rights of the Child had become the legal 
framework for the protection of children in the entity’s territory.146 
Having observed the increased role that the respect for human rights plays in 
international relations, including in relationships with future members of the international 
community, Transdniestria has taken steps to follow contemporary developments in that sphere 
and to link them to its own statehood. For example, the former president of the TMR stated:  
Our republic does not stand above international norms. We have adopted the constitution 
and set up legislative and executive power that work for the benefit of our people. 
[Contrary to Moldova, which signed international human rights documents but continues 
to exclude non-titular ethnic groups from public life], we exist within the legal 
framework of the civilized community of nations. From the very beginning of the 
creation of our republic, we have followed all international documents on human rights 
and minority rights...We do not employ the notion of “minority” as all people are equal in 
the TMR. […] Our people have an international right to self-determination and have 
freely, legally, and democratically created their own state…147 
Thus, Transdniestria’s commitment to comply with international requirements on human rights 
and their incorporation into domestic laws suggest that Transdniestria has sought ways to 
                                                 
145 Verhovnyi Sovet PMR. Postanovlenie Ob otnoshenii Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respubliki k mezhdunarodnym 
dogovoram i druhim aktam po pravam cheloveka, №226 22.09.1992. 
146 Postanovlenie O priznanii ryada mezhdunarodnyh dokumetov ramochnymi normami prava na territorii PMR 
№579, 23.05.2002 [Resolution on the Recognition of a Set of International Acts as a Legal Framework on the 
Territory of the TMR]. 
147 “Doklad I.N. Smirnova: Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika sostoyalas!” [Smirnov's Report on the 
Occasion of Republic Day: Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic Has Established Itself], Olvia-Press, September 1, 
2000. 
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internalize international norms to improve its image, which also has advanced the TMR’s 
internal development (a topic further discussed below). 
2.3.3. Public Official Discourse on the Protection of Human Rights 
Transdniestrian efforts to ensure the protection of human rights and the attention given by 
the external actors to monitor these human rights practices suggest that the protection of human 
rights as a part of the constitutional framework has influenced the Transdniestrian negotiation 
process. First, the development of the mechanisms for the protection of human rights have 
contributed to the strengthening of the TMR’s statehood and, the TMR believes, served as proof 
that the entity meets the requirement on democracy. Second, similar to the constitutional 
amendments, the idea of the protection of human rights has influenced the external actors’ 
approach to the Transdniestrian issue. For their part, the external actors have viewed the 
practices protecting human rights in Transdniestria as an additional tool to ensure the TMR’s 
democratic development that they hope will assist in agreeing on a final settlement to the conflict 
within Moldovan borders. 
To ensure the protection of human rights, Transdniestria has set up three mechanisms in 
accordance with its constitution: the courts of general jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court 
(which reviews direct complaints from the citizens on violations of their constitutional rights), 
and the Ombudsman for Human Rights. Each of these institutions exercises its own powers and 
has a large number of cases under its consideration. Although not denying the violation of human 
rights in the republic, Transdniestrian authorities have pointed to these existing institutions as 
appropriate responses to such violations.148 They have also referred to the link between the issue 
                                                 
148 For instance, as the Chairman of the Constitutional Court mentioned by reference to the nature of the 
Constitutional Court, “The state of the rule of law is not a state, where violations of the rights of citizens do not 
happen. It is the state where the opportunities exist to restore the rights that have been infringed.” “Konstitutsia- 
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of human rights violations and the unrecognized status of the TMR. The entity’s leaders have 
advanced the idea that the TMR’s non-recognition has meant only limited government resources 
are available, which, in turn, has directly influenced the entity’s efficiency in protecting human 
rights.149  
Finally, Transdniestria has taken steps to improve its system of human rights protection 
by examining the democratization initiatives the external actors have suggested. In particular, the 
institution of ombudsman was introduced in Transdniestria as a response to the 2005 Ukrainian 
Plan, which is discussed in detail in the next chapter.150 Thus, following the general path for the 
legal protection of human rights, Transdniestria has strengthened its statehood and demonstrated 
to the external actors its commitment to democratic principles.  
Although in their official public discourse the external actors have ignored the existence 
of the institutions protecting human rights in Transdniestria and have rejected any claim by the 
TMR to recognition,151 their focus on the practices of human rights violations suggests the 
importance of human rights protection for the negotiation process. In particular, the external 
actors have regarded the cases152 or reports153 concerning human rights violations in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Osnovnoi Zakon gosudarstva,” Olvia-Press, December 11, 2007; “10 dekabrya- Deni Prav Cheloveka [December 
10th is Human Rights Day], Olvia-Press, December 11, 2007. 
149 “Vstreacha parlamentariev s Tomasom Hammarbergom,” Verhovnyi Sovet PMR, Press-Resease, November 6, 
2012. At his meeting, Tomas Hammarberg stated that, “I believe that the rights of a human being should be 
respected regardless the political status of a state-like entity.” 
150 Personal communication of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Yastrebchak, August 2013. 
151 Even though the TMR sometimes claims its recognition on the grounds of meeting the institutional standards of 
human rights protection, these claims remain largely ignored. Personal communications of the representatives of the 
OSCE Mission to Moldova, June-August 2013. 
152 The European Court of Human Rights issued two judgments on human rights violations that occurred on the 
TMR’s territory: 1) Case of Ilascu and others v. Moldova and Russia (Application no. 48787/99), that found 
violations of Article 3 on the prohibition of torture (the treatment and conditions of detention in prisons of the 
TMR), Article 5 on the right to liberty and security (detention of applicants runs “counter the law”), and Article 34 
on the right to petition; and 2) Case of Catan and others v. Moldova and Russia (Applications nos. 43370/04, 
8252/05 and 18454/06), that found a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention, on the prohibition of 
denial of the right to education.  
153 The US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor issued Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 
Moldova from 1996 to 2011. Its section on Transdniestria criticize the human rights’ situation in the TMR (e.g. 
government control of mass media, restricted freedom of association, and limited freedom of the press).   
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Transdniestria as evidence of the entity’s undemocratic nature and often have used this fact as an 
argument against the legitimacy of Transdniestria as an independent entity.154  
The external actors have linked a final settlement to the conflict with the democratic 
development in the TMR. They believe that this will facilitate Transdniestrian agreement on 
consensus and its special status within Moldova. Therefore, they have seen the lack of respect for 
human rights in Transdniestria as an obstacle to a final settlement. As one high-ranking official 
from the OSCE Mission to Moldova noted:  
[T]he democratization of both Transdniestria and Moldova, their respect for human rights 
and the rule of law needs to be pursued to reach a final settlement. Neither the Moldovan 
nor the Transdniestrian side can be ensured that their legitimate interests and the 
legitimate interests of the population on both sides will be respected if there is no 
assurance of the observation of international standards of democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law.155 
Thus, the external actors have expected Transdniestrian authorities to ensure the entity’s own 
democratic development and view the respect for human rights by the TMR as part of this 
process. In this way, the development of human rights protection in the TMR serves the interests 
of the external actors in promoting conflict settlement. While not regarding its progress on 
human rights as a step to granting the TMR’s independence, the external actors view it as a 
factor that contributes to conflict resolution.156  
Furthermore, the external actors have assigned a role to the international community in 
the TMR’s democratic development, suggesting that its involvement could partly contribute to 
the improvement of the human rights situation in Transdniestria that would positively influence 
the negotiation process. While partly linking the improvement of human rights’ protection in 
Transdniestria with the more active involvement of the international community, the external 
                                                 
154 Personal communication of the representative of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, August 2013. 
155 Personal communication of the representative of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, April 2013. 
156 Personal communication of the representatives of Moldova, the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the EU, April-
August 2013. 
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actors have emphasized the inadmissibility of compromising the international position on non-
recognition that such an involvement might appear to cause.157  
This concern evidences the need for international actors to make judgments on whether 
they should engage in relations with Transdniestria, and, if so, what the nature of that 
engagement should be. For example, the United Nations Senior Expert on Human Rights, 
Thomas Hammarberg, prepared a report on human rights in Transdniestria in which he indicates 
a number of issues relevant in the context of the relationship between the constitution of an 
unrecognized state and the negotiation process. First, Hammarberg explicitly states that the use 
of such terms as “Constitution,” “Law,” “President,” “Minister” does not indicate any de jure 
recognition of these acts or of the TMR’s authorities and institutions.158 Second, as he 
acknowledges “the fact that Transnistria is not recognized as an independent state but is run by 
de facto authorities is a factor that cannot be ignored.”159 Third, he expressly notes the existing 
relationship between the search for a solution for Transdniestria’s status and human rights 
protection.160  
Hammarberg’s points also reflect the position of the external actors on Transdniestria and 
the interrelationship between the TMR’s constitutional development and negotiations. On the 
one hand, his report demonstrates the external actors’ engagement with the Transdniestrian 
authorities for the purposes of assessing the human rights situation. On the other hand, along 
with this process, some external actors interpret the direct contact the TMR’s authorities have 
established with the UN as possibly harmful for the negotiation process. They suggest that, by 
cooperating fully with the UN representative and providing him with access to all relevant 
                                                 
157 Personal communication of the representative of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, May 2013. 
158 Thomas Hammarberg, "UN Report on Human Rights in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova," 
(2013), 1. 
159 Ibid., 43. 
160 Ibid. 
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institutions,161 Transdniestrian authorities can take an additional step in the direction towards 
gaining international legitimacy and recognition.162  
As a result, the protection of human rights as part of a constitutional democratic 
framework has influenced the negotiation process. Transdniestrian authorities have used the 
development of the mechanisms to protect human rights to strengthen the entity’s statehood and 
legitimacy. The external actors have considered the protection of human rights an important 
element of the TMR’s overall democratic development that should assist in finding a solution to 
the conflict. The responses of the external actors to the practices of protecting human rights in 
Transdniestria demonstrate their focus on the need for human rights improvement in the TMR 
and interest in the democratic development of Transdniestria for the purposes of re-integrating 
the entity with Moldova.163   
Conclusion 
The assertion of the traditional and contemporary criteria for recognition in the TMR’s 
constitutional provisions has shown no effect on the process of Transdniestrian recognition, but 
instead has influenced Transdniestrian state-building and the process of interaction between 
Transdniestria and the external actors. As illustrated above, Transdniestria has asserted the 
traditional criteria for recognition in its constitutional acts through a set of provisions on 
population, territory, government, and the capacity to enter into international relations. It has also 
constitutionally asserted the contemporary criteria for recognition: democracy, the rule of law, 
                                                 
161 Thomas Hammarberg acknowledges that, “The Transnistrian leadership cooperated fully with the Expert and 
ensured that he could meet those he requested to see and visit institutions of relevance for his task.” UN Report on 
Human Rights, 2013, 4. 
162 Personal communication of the representative of the OSCE, August 2013. 
163 Reintegration, however, does not mean the loss of a particular status for the TMR. As one representative of the 
external actors noted, “it is possible that a genuine development of human rights protection in the [TMR] region 
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Personal communication, August 2013. 
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and the protection of human rights. However, Transdniestria has based its claim for recognition 
on international legal arguments concerning restoration of its statehood and the right to self-
determination, leaving out altogether its constitutional assertion of the criteria for recognition. 
Such a framing suggests that the unrecognized state views the role of its constitutional acts 
primarily as internal in the context of the recognition process. 
This view on the internal focus of the TMR’s constitution is somewhat supported by the 
attitude of the external actors. The external actors have welcomed the possibility of the existence 
of the Transdniestrian constitution in principle. They have found it important for the TMR to 
have a constitution, as it provides for the organization of Transdniestria with “clear, transparent, 
predictable, and just rules.”164 However, as long as the Transdniestrian constitutional acts remain 
the documents of the unrecognized state, the external actors ignore their existence. In addition, 
the external actors have completely disregarded and sometimes explicitly rejected the 
Transdniestrian claims to statehood and recognition. By framing their discourse in terms of 
conflict resolution, the external actors have emphasized the need for negotiation and cooperation 
among all parties in order to achieve a final settlement that excludes recognition. As a result, this 
approach shows the lack of effect of the TMR constitutional system on the recognition of 
Transdniestria. 
 At the same time, the constitutional embedding of the criteria for recognition as well as 
wide public invocation of the constitution in Transdniestria suggests the commitment of the 
TMR to statehood and sovereignty. The assertion of the criteria for recognition in the 
Transdniestrian constitutional acts and their realization in practice have strengthened the grounds 
for Transdniestrian state-building by uniting its people; providing a sense of belonging to an 
entity that has a right to restoration of its statehood and to self-determination; and ensuring a 
                                                 
164 Personal communication of the representative of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, July 2013. 
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legal framework for its further development. In addition, the existence and realization of 
constitutional provisions on democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights has 
allowed Transdniestria to invoke that fact during negotiations and make a claim that these 
positive democratic steps should lead to recognition.165 In this way, the development of the legal 
and institutional grounds for Transdniestrian state building has consolidated its claim to 
statehood.  
The focus of the external actors on the geopolitical aspects of the Transdniestrian issue 
has supported their commitment to promoting international and regional security, as well as the 
key principle of respecting territorial integrity. However, Transdniestria’s decades-long existence 
also has directed the external actors’ attention to the TMR’s internal development and its impact 
on conflict resolution. More specifically, the close attention they have paid to the practice of 
constitutional amendment and the protection of human rights suggests that the external actors 
view the general principle of the democratic development of an entity as an important condition 
for the purposes of negotiations. In this context, the TMR’s constitution plays an important, 
albeit invisible, role for the external actors, since a particular constitutional development in 
Transdniestria could help or hinder the process of negotiating the search for a resolution to the 
conflict.   
                                                 
165 Personal communication of the representative of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, May 2013. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. THE EFFECTS OF TRANSDNIESTRIAN ELECTORAL 
PRACTICES AS A COMPONENT OF THE 
CONTEMPORARY CRITERIA FOR RECOGNITION AND 
THE CLAIM TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE ON THE 
PROCESS OF TRANSDNIESTRIA’S RECOGNITION 
Introduction 
As Chapter 3 showed, Transdniestria has asserted the traditional and contemporary 
criteria for recognition through its constitutional provisions and practices. Although 
Transdniestrian efforts have not resulted in the TMR’s recognition, they have contributed to 
state-building and consolidated its claim to statehood. In addition to its express formulation in 
the Transdniestrian constitution, the requirement for democracy – one of the contemporary 
criteria for recognition – has also evolved in the TMR through its electoral practices. The high 
number of elections and referenda conducted during the two decades of the TMR’s existence 
demonstrates that the TMR clearly has followed its constitution and asserted its sovereignty. 
Between 1990 and 2013, Transdniestria held five parliamentary elections (in 1990, 1995, 
2000, 2005, and 2010) and five presidential elections (in 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011). It 
also held fifteen referenda between 1989 and 2006 on different issues, including the creation of 
the Transdniestrian republic and its independence (1989-1991), the adoption of the 
Transdniestrian constitution (1995), the amending of the constitution (2003), and Transdniestrian 
independence (2006). 
Detailed review of the TMR’s electoral practices after its self-proclaimed independence 
in 1991 and the responses of the external actors towards such practices shows the following. The 
electoral events the TMR has conducted in accordance with its constitution and as part of its 
democratic development have not affected the Transdniestria’s recognition process. The external 
actors have reacted to these constitutional events by publicly repudiating both the electoral 
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practices and their outcomes, reactions that are based on the external actors’ refusal to view 
Transdniestria as an entity separate from Moldova. Whether by totally ignoring or openly 
rejecting the Transdniestrian elections and referenda, the external actors have largely framed 
them as illegitimate and illegal.  
Despite the fact that Transdniestrian constitutional electoral practices have conspicuously 
failed to bring about the TMR’s recognition, these practices still have had other effects. First, 
holding elections and referenda in Transdniestria has consolidated Transdniestrian statehood and 
its claim to recognition. Transdniestrian electoral activities have underscored the legitimacy of 
Transdniestrian statehood for the TMR’s people. Bringing changes in power and holding public 
consultations through constitutional mechanisms have demonstrated to the TMR’s population 
that Transdniestria can function as an ordinary state and have created additional forums for the 
entity’s authorities to assert their claims to statehood for internal and external audiences. These 
practices have also contributed to ensuring that elected authorities in Transdniestria protect the 
constitutional provisions on its sovereign status. In the official public discourse and during the 
negotiation process, Transdniestrian authorities have claimed that, as elected representatives, 
they represent the will of people on Transdniestrian sovereign statehood enshrined in the 
constitution. 
Second, the TMR’s constitutional electoral practices have affected its interactions with 
the external actors. The election or appointment of the Transdniestrian leadership in accordance 
with the constitution has legitimized its status in the eyes of the external actors for the purposes 
of the negotiation process. Despite publicly refusing to recognize elections in the TMR and 
branding them “illegitimate,” the external actors have nonetheless engaged with the 
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constitutionally elected representatives from the TMR in negotiations to find a settlement to a 
conflict.  
Notwithstanding their reluctance to view Transdniestria’s own electoral practices as part 
of democratic development, the external actors have employed it as part of the general concept of 
democracy development for the purposes of negotiations. The majority of the external actors 
have insisted that pursuit of democratic development in Transdniestria is one of the essential 
conditions for the settlement of the conflict and have sought the ways to use elections as a tool to 
achieve that aim. They also have unofficially followed the TMR’s elections and referenda to 
observe whether those practices favor or jeopardize settlement of the conflict based on Moldovan 
territorial integrity. 
Transdniestrian presidential and parliamentary elections and referenda have occurred in 
an unrecognized state within the framework of the negotiation process that has focused on 
finding a resolution to the Transdniestrian issue. As a result, the character of negotiations has 
influenced the context in which the electoral practices took place, the grounds for holding some 
referenda, and the internal and external official public discourses around these events. Therefore, 
this chapter analyzes the effects of the TMR’s electoral practices on the TMR’s recognition and, 
more broadly, on the TMR’s political status in the context of two extended periods of 
negotiations from the point of view of the two main parties to the process, Moldova and 
Transdniestria: 
1) The search for common ground: 1992-2003; 
2) Increasingly different views: 2004-2013.  
Section 1, “The search for common ground,” explores the reactions of the external actors 
to the TMR’s parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as to referenda held between 1992 
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and 2003, when Moldova and Transdniestria discussed options to resolve the conflict. In this 
period, Transdniestria insisted on recognition of its statehood, but was open to a settlement in 
which this goal would be achieved within the borders of Moldova. As a result, while the electoral 
practices did not have an effect on the TMR’s recognition, they consolidated the Transdniestrian 
experience of having sovereignty.  
Section 2, “Increasingly different views,” analyzes the responses of the external actors to 
the TMR’s referendum and the parliamentary and presidential elections held from 2004 to 2013, 
when Moldova and Transdniestria lacked any common ground on how to resolve the conflict. 
While Moldova has been willing to make the TMR an autonomous region, Transdniestria has 
insisted on the recognition of its statehood outside of the Moldovan borders and maintained this 
stance through its electoral practices. During this period, the TMR’s electoral practices have 
contributed to the hardening of its claims to statehood. Although the external actors have not 
changed their position on non-recognition of the TMR, they have engaged with a changing roster 
of elected leaders from the entity. In addition, the external actors have explored the options of 
using the general concept of democratic development for the purposes of negotiations and linked 
the TMR’s democratic development with conflict settlement.  
1. The Search for Common Ground: 1992-2003 
The 1992 Agreement on the Principles of the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict 
set up the process of negotiations between Moldova and Transdniestria.1 The document provided 
for the peaceful resolution of the political status of Transdniestria within Moldova and laid down 
key settlement principles: the termination of armed hostilities, the formation of a Joint Control 
                                                 
1 Agreement on the Principles of the Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict, signed between Moldova and 
Russia. July 21, 1992 (the Moscow Agreement).  
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Commission to ensure the implementation of security measures, and the withdrawal of units of 
the Russian 14th Army in accordance with bilateral agreements.  
Although Transdniestria agreed to discuss its relationship with Moldova within the 
established framework for negotiation, it stood firm on the position of preservation of its state 
attributes. The TMR insisted on exercising control over its territory and population and ensuring 
its own governance. By holding referenda and elections, Transdniestria consolidated its 
statehood, legitimized its government, and ensured that the external actors continued to interact 
with the TMR’s constitutionally elected leaders. The TMR’s electoral practices did not shake the 
external actors’ resolve not to recognize Transdniestria, but did condition their engagement with 
the TMR’s elected and constitutionally appointed leaders. 
1.1. The 1995 Referendum on the Presence of Russian Troops in the TMR  
In an attempt to retain control over its territory and ensure the protection of its 
population, the TMR opposed Moldovan calls to withdraw Russian troops2 and held a 
referendum on this issue in March 1995. The very high number of voters who backed the 
presence of the Russian army in the TMR (94% of nearly 453,000 of voters) showed that the 
TMR’s population largely supported the independence Transdniestria had won in 19923 and 
believed Russian forces were necessary for its existence and protection. In this regard, 
Transdniestria considered unacceptable any steps the guarantors might take that could jeopardize 
                                                 
2 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Russian 14th Army intervened in the civil war on the Transdniestrian side. The 
1992 Moscow Agreement stipulated the presence of Russian peace-keeping forces in the region, with the aim of 
separating the two sides into a Security Zone. According to the 1994 Moldovan Constitution, Moldova is a neutral 
state and, therefore, Moldova called on Russia to withdraw troops from its territory and to reduce the threat to 
Moldovan national security. Transdniestria, on the contrary, saw the 14th Army as a guarantor of its peace and 
security. In addition, it has some claims to the Army’s assets. In 1994, Moldova and Russia signed the Agreement 
Concerning the Legal Status of the Military Formations of the Russian Federation Temporarily Present in the 
Territory of the Republic of Moldova and the Arrangements and Time-Limits for Their Withdrawal. According to 
this Agreement, the troops’ withdrawal had to be synchronized with the achievement of the final resolution of 
Transdniestrian conflict. See Perepelitsa, 2001. 
3 “Time for Independence May Have Passed,” Financial Times, March 27, 1995.  
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the entity’s security.4 However, the external actors either officially ignored or repudiated the 
TMR’s referendum. The OSCE and Russia disregarded the referendum,5 whereas Moldova 
explicitly rejected it, stating, “[t]his referendum is unlawful and will have no legal 
consequences.”6 As a result, the first referendum held after the 1992 war revealed the TMR’s 
potential to function as a sovereign entity through the mobilization of the Transdniestrian people 
to address issues essential to the TMR’s existence. It also allowed the TMR’s leaders to enlist 
public support for guarantees of the TMR’s security and to use the evidence from the referendum 
on the people’s preferences in their discussions with the external actors.7 
1.2. The 1995 Parliamentary Elections and Referenda on the Adoption of 
the New Constitution and Joining the Commonwealth of Independent 
States  
Transdniestria continued its state-building efforts by holding its parliamentary elections 
and a referendum on the adoption of the new constitution, which provided for independent 
foreign and domestic policies on December 25, 1995. The TMR also signaled its commitment to 
a separate statehood by following the initiative of many of the former Soviet republics, which 
had created a new union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Hence, in addition to 
holding parliamentary elections and a referendum on adopting a new constitution, the TMR held 
a referendum on the issue of joining the CIS.8  
                                                 
4 As Igor Smirnov, the TMR president, explicitly stated, “The Russian leadership won't pull out the army against the 
wishes of the local population.” “Slavic Enclave in Moldova Backs Presence of Russian Troops,” Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, March 27, 1995. 
5 At the same time, it is possible that the referendum influenced the May 1995 decision of the State Duma to 
postpone the ratification of the agreement on the withdrawal of the 14th Army signed by Moldova and Russia until 
final settlement of the issues between Moldova and Transdniestria.  
6 Statement of Moldova's Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandru Burian. Paola Messana, “Russians in a Breakaway 
Region of Moldova Voted Massively to Keep Russian Troops,” Agence France-Presse, March 27, 1995. 
7 Igor Smirnov, footnote 4 above. 
8 The Commonwealth of Independent States was created on December 8, 1991, as a regional organization to regulate 
relations between the former members of the Soviet Union. See www.cis.minsk.by. 
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While the TMR’s population took an active part in all three political events,9 voting in 
favor of a new constitution (82% of votes) as well as for joining the CIS (90% of votes),10 their 
participation did not affect the position of the external actors, whose reactions remained few in 
number and negative in nature. The leadership of Moldova saw these referenda and the 
parliamentary elections not only as invalid, but also as complicating the search for an agreement 
to peace talks that respected Moldovan territorial integrity. According to the speaker of the 
Moldovan Parliament, it was illogical to conduct a referendum on joining the CIS because 
“Moldova already is a CIS member,” and “the Transdniestrian region is part of Moldova.”11 
Moldova did not envision any other concessions to Transdniestria except its autonomous status, 
“because the problem can only be solved by maintaining territorial unity.”12 Similarly, the 
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized the Russian position that the Transdniestrian 
region was part of Moldova and expressed his doubts that the CIS could accept the 
Transdniestrian application.13 
Thus, the approach of the external actors showed no evidence of the effect of the TMR’s 
elections or referenda on their position regarding the Transdniestria’s political status. Regardless 
of the external actors’ awareness of the results of the parliamentary elections and the agenda of 
parties running,14 as well as their observation of public approval for a new sovereign 
                                                 
9  The turnout was 58%. The total electorate for the elections and referenda included 489,000 voters out of a 
population of 780,000. Konstantin Kirochko, “Self-proclaimed Russian-speaking Moldavian Republic Votes on 
Sunday,” Agence France-Presse, December 23, 1995. 
10 Smirnov has declared that the referendum is the first step in the efforts to restore the USSR. Natalya Roslova, 
“Tiraspol Has Conducted Two Referendums And Parliamentary Elections,” Russian Press Digest, December 26, 
1995. 
11 Statement by Piotr Luchinsky. Ibid. 
12 Statement of an adviser to Mircea Snegur, Moldovan President. “Moldova Refuses Concessions to Dniestr 
Republic,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur-Moscow,  December 25, 1995. 
13 Ibid. The TMR declared its intent to join CIS multiple times. The TMR’s Parliament applied in December 1991, 
May 1992, and January 1993, and the TMR president applied again in January 1994 and May 2006. “Litsom k litsu. 
Predsedatel Komiteta Soveta Federatsii po delam SNG Vadim Gustov.” Radio Svoboda. October 26, 2008. 
14 For example, all three parties running for election supported the statehood of Transdniestria. However, their views 
varied regarding the specific form the TMR’s statehood should take: complete independence with the close ties with 
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constitution, they either disregarded or rejected those events. Instead, the external actors stood 
firm in their search for a settlement that would provide a status for Transdniestria within 
Moldova and without recognizing the TMR’s statehood.  
In Transdniestria, however, the adoption of a new constitution at the referendum 
established the grounds for “a sovereign, independent, and democratic state based on the rule of 
law”15 and ensured its public legitimacy. It also asserted the TMR’s commitment to pursue its 
sovereign development based on wide public support. In addition, holding the referendum on 
joining the CIS created an additional avenue for Transdniestria to claim its sovereignty and 
eligibility for membership in the community of states.  
1.3. The 1996 Presidential Elections 
While it actively pursued negotiations with Moldova, Transdniestria continued to take 
steps to build an independent state, attaching a great importance to the issue of the TMR’s 
economic independence. In particular, in 1996, Transdniestria signed a Customs Services 
Protocol with Moldova16 and agreed to remove customs posts at the entrance to the region on the 
Moldovan side to receive, in return, the right to process cargos with a customs stamp issued by 
the Republic of Moldova. This provision not only legalized Transdniestrian foreign trade, but 
also ensured in part the TMR’s economic independence and viability. As a result, the 1996 
Protocol became the legal basis for one of the TMR’s key statehood claims: to have a secured 
right to conduct an independent foreign economic policy. Therefore, whenever the TMR has 
seen a threat to this right (as shown below throughout the chapter), it has used this right to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Russia, statehood within Moldova, or a republic within Russia. “Self-proclaimed Russian-speaking Moldavian 
Republic Votes on Sunday,” Agence France-Presse, 1995. 
15 “Dnestr Constitution Signed,” BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, January 19, 1996. 
16 Full name: Protocol Decision on Resolution of Problems that Appeared in the Field of Functioning of Customs 
Services of the Republic of Moldova and of Transdniestria, signed in February 7, 1996, in the presence of 
representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE [Protokol’noe reshenie po razresheniu voznikshih problem v 
ovlasti deiatel’nosti tamozhennyh sluzhb Respubliki Moldova i Pridnestrov’a].  
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harden its position and argued for more independence. The TMR also referenced the imposition 
of limitations on its economic sovereignty (whenever it occurred) during its electoral discourse 
in order to consolidate its claim to statehood. In this way, these economic considerations became 
an important backdrop for the TMR’s electoral practices and a powerful force behind TMR’s 
claim to recognition of its statehood. 
Besides signing the Customs Services Protocol in 1996, Transdniestria continued to work 
closely with Moldova to define the TMR’s status during the process of drafting of the 
Memorandum on Determination of the Political Status of Transdniestria (later adopted as the 
Memorandum on the Bases for the Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova 
and Transdniestria). At the same time, the TMR followed its own constitutional provisions and 
held presidential elections. In the 1996 presidential campaign, neither of two candidates for the 
presidency questioned the TMR’s independence as their main foreign policy goal, thereby 
confirming the TMR’s position on its search for recognition.17 In addition, candidate and then-
president Igor Smirnov placed special emphasis on nation-building in the TMR centered on the 
concept of creating inter-ethnic consent in society that would ensure the respect of human rights 
and democracy and avoid prioritizing certain ethnicities at the expense of others.18 In his 1996 
election platform, Smirnov pointed out that national policy should be built on the principles of 
“the national parity of ethnic groups, including equality in using one’s own language in official 
relations, public and cultural life; the right to ethnic culture…[and] state support of programs 
focused on regeneration and the development of national cultures.”19  
                                                 
17 The two candidates for presidency were then-president Igor Smirnov and Vladimir Malakhov. Malakhov’s 
separatist discourse was similar Smirnov’s. After casting his vote, Malakhov acknowledged that, “In that regard, my 
political program did not differ much from Smirnov’s.” “Scrutin Présidentiel en Transnistrie,” Reuters, December 
22, 1996. 
18 Guboglo, 1999, 58-59. 
19 Election agenda of the candidate for the post of TMR President, Smirnov, December 17, 1996. In Gryzlov, 1997.  
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Winning reelection with 71.94% of votes,20 Smirnov used this electoral event as a 
medium to assert Transdniestrian claims to statehood and to call on the international community 
to recognize the republic. He stated that:  
…The election demonstrated the people's wish for independence and would be another 
step towards legal recognition for our republic. We have existed for seven years. Our 
state exists de facto even though it had not been recognized in the “euphoria of the 
struggle against communism.”21  
While he accepted in principle the need for negotiations with Moldova, Smirnov was careful to 
define the TMR’s approach towards negotiations as one of a meeting of equals. He emphasized 
that “We will go for talks with Moldova on defining the status of the republic only if Moldova 
puts us on an equal footing. We will not accept any status imposed from above.”22 
Although Transdniestria clearly demonstrated its decisive position on sovereignty, it did 
not succeed in convincing the external actors to reconsider their approach to the conflict. While 
Moldova rejected any legal consequences of these elections and insisted on finding a solution 
“within the constitutional framework of Moldova” that included the right to broad autonomy,23 
the Moldovan Mission of OSCE viewed the elections only as internal in nature and emphasized 
its steadfast position on Moldovan sovereignty and indivisibility under international law.24 Two 
other external actors, Ukraine and Russia disregarded both the elections and the claims of the re-
elected president25 and focused, together with the OSCE, on finding an acceptable formula for a 
final settlement.  
                                                 
20 The electorate for the 1996 presidential elections consisted of 428,000 people with a turnout 57.1%. The second 
candidate, Vladimir Malakhov, captured 19.89% of votes. “Scrutin Présidentiel en Transnistrie,” Reuters, 1996.  
21 “Turnout in Dniestr Elections Reported over 50 per cent,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 22, 1996. 
22 “Dniestr Vote will Have no Legal Consequences, Says Lucinschi,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 23, 1996. 
23  Ibid.  
24 “Hard-liner Smirnov Re-elected in Breakaway Dniestr Region,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 23, 1996. 
25 Although observers from Belarus, Abkhazia, and a delegation of the Russian Duma (comprised mostly of 
nationalist deputies) were unofficially present at the elections, media coverage did not report their reactions. 
“Observers to Monitor Elections in Dniestr Republic of Moldova,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 18, 1996. 
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As a result, the experience of the 1996 presidential elections contributes to the general 
argument about the effects of the TMR’s constitution on Transdniestrian recognition. On the one 
hand, the Transdniestrian rhetoric and the results of the electoral period reflected the TMR’s 
devotion to the provisions of its own constitutional framework. First, the TMR showed its 
commitment to protect the identity of its statehood based on the parity of ethnic groups and to 
pursue the state’s aspirations of recognition. Second, the TMR’s leaders used electoral venues to 
assert the claim to the TMR’s statehood, a message that they targeted especially at external 
audiences. On the other hand, the scant attention paid by the external actors to the TMR’s 
elections and their explicit rejection of the elections’ outcomes suggest the elections had little 
impact on the positions of the external actors regarding the TMR’s status. However, the 
following interactions of the external actors with the constitutionally elected leader of the TMR 
indicated that the external actors have viewed such a leader as a legitimate partner with whom to 
negotiate the conflict settlement. 
In particular, Smirnov’s participation in negotiations, his agreement with Moldovan 
counterparts and the efforts of the external actors led to a second distinct stage in the negotiations 
and the signing of the Memorandum on the Bases for the Normalization of Relations between the 
Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria in 1997 (or the Moscow Memorandum).26 This 
agreement defined Moldova and Transdniestria as equal parties in the process of establishing a 
common state within the borders of Moldovan SSR as they stood in January 1990. Both parties 
agreed to continue working on the foundational document of their relations based on the 
                                                 
26 Memorandum on the Bases for the Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and 
Transdniestria. May 7, 1997, signed in Moscow, between Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi and Transdniestrian 
President Igor Smirnov in the presence of the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine (the guarantor countries), and a 
representative of the OSCE (a mediator). The Russian and Ukrainian presidents also signed a joint statement in 
which they welcomed the signing of the Memorandum as an important step towards a fair, comprehensive 
settlement of the Transdniestrian problem and emphasized that the provisions of the Memorandum should not be 
interpreted and applied in contradiction to existing international treaties. See Boţan, The Negotiation Process, 2009, 
120. 
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principles of mutual decision-making, delimitation and delegation of powers, guarantees of 
mutual security, and the right of the TMR to independent foreign economic activity. However, 
the document also introduced a controversy by leaving undefined the concept of a “common 
state.” It allowed Transdniestria to advance its claim to statehood and a possible confederal 
status between the entities, while it simultaneously gave Moldova grounds to insist on the 
TMR’s autonomous status within a unitary state. 
1.4. The 2000 Parliamentary Elections 
While the negotiation efforts continued after the signing of the Moscow Memorandum,27 
by 2000, Moldova had largely shifted its focus to domestic problems due to its own 
constitutional crisis. As before, Transdniestria pushed forward with its own internal 
constitutional development by holding its parliamentary elections. 
As in previous years, the turnout for the third parliamentary elections in Transdniestria 
remained high - 45%.28 But, in contrast to those earlier elections, this one received a more mixed 
reception from the external actors. For the first time, the delegation of the State Duma of the 
Russian Federation, which consisted of representatives from all factions, officially observed the 
elections29 and noted their good organization and quiet atmosphere.30 During a press conference, 
a representative of the Russian State Duma and the head of the delegation sidestepped the issue 
of recognition of Transdniestria, pointing instead to the framework of the 1997 Moscow 
                                                 
27 From 1998 to 2000, Moldova and Transdniestria held numerous meetings, exchanged a number of drafts on the 
framework for the common state, and also signed several documents, for example, the Agreement on Confidence 
Measures and the Development of Contacts between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria, signed by 
Moldova, Transdniestria, Russia and Ukraine in the presence of the OSCE on March 20, 1998 (Odessa Agreement). 
28 According to the TMR’s Central Election Commission, 183,381 people (or 45.1%) voted in the elections for the 
Supreme Council, out of 406,570 voters listed on electoral registers. “G.Marakutsa v tretii raz stal Predsedatelem 
Verhovnogo Soveta PMR,” Olvia-Press, December 27, 2000. The legislature consisted of the representatives of 
three parties plus several independent politicians. See Bomeshko, 2010, 104-105. 
29 “Deputaty Gosudarstvennoi Dumy RF nabliudaiut za vyborami v Berhovnyi Sovet PMR” [The deputees of the RF 
State Duma monitor the elections to the TMR’s Supreme Council], Olvia-Press, December 10, 2000. 
30 Svetlana Antonova and Georgy Stoilik, “Elections of the Supreme Council Underway in Trans-Dniestria," RIA 
Novosti, December 10, 2000. 
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Memorandum.31 Yet, he noted that, on the ground, Transdniestria had complete control over its 
territory, a fact that confirmed its sovereignty and independence.32 The reasons behind the 
Russian State Duma’s new status observing the election were unclear based on available data. 
However, such a move fit the pattern of the State Duma’s increasing support for Transdniestria.33 
Regardless of the actual reasons, the presence of the Russian observers at the 
Transdniestrian parliamentary polls raised serious concern for the Moldovan Foreign Ministry, 
which delivered a note of protest to the Russian Embassy. It stated: 
the presence of Russian lawmakers as observers in the polls of the unrecognized Dniestr 
republic is a new attempt to defy the efforts laid by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the states mediating the settlement of the conflict in 
the region.34 
To Moldova, the actions of the Russian legislators cast “doubt on the credibility of the Russian 
Federation, which is a mediator in the settlement negotiation” between Chisinau and Tiraspol.35 
The Transdniestrian elections also received attention from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the United Kingdom, which was already indirectly involved in negotiations through its 
membership in the OSCE. Interested in the results of the elections and the prospects of a 
Moldovan-Transdniestrian settlement, the Ministry’s delegation had met with the speaker of the 
                                                 
31 Georgy Tikhonov, then Chairman of the Russian State Duma Commission for Assistance to the Economic and 
Political Settlement of the Transdniestrian Conflict, stated that the task of the State Duma was to adopt legislation 
that ensured the economic development of the region within the provisions stipulated by the Moscow Memorandum, 
while the issue of recognition was beyond that framework. “Press-konferentsia nabliudatelei sledivshih za hodom v 
Verhovnyi Sovet PMR” [Press-conference of International Observers at the Elections to the TMR’s Supreme 
Council], Olvia-Press, December 10, 2000. 
32 “Press-konferentsia nabliudatelei sledivshih za hodom v Verhovnyi Sovet PMR,” Olvia-Press, 2000. Similar 
position was expressed by the observers from Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, who stated that ten 
years of independence is a fact that must be taken into consideration. Ibid. 
33 For example, on May 24, 1995, at hearings in the State Duma on the agreement between Moldova and Russia on 
the withdrawal of the 14th Army, ratification of the agreement was postponed until a final settlement of issues 
between Moldova and Transdniestria could be reached. See Boţan, The Negotiation Process, 2009, 118.  
34 “Moldova Protests at Presence of Russian Observers at Dnestr Region Polls,” BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
Soviet Union, December 13, 2000. 
35 Ibid. 
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Transdniestrian parliament, yet kept private its comments on this visit.36 The Transdniestrian 
side, on the contrary, reported on the results of the meeting and outlined the position of its 
parliamentary speaker, Grigory Marakutsa. His position suggests that the TMR used the British 
delegation’s visit as an opportunity to pursue the TMR’s agenda for independence with an 
outside actor. Marakutsa emphasized the Supreme Council’s stance on the TMR’s sovereign 
foreign policy and shared the Supreme Council’s view that the relationship between Moldova 
and Transdniestria most resembled those between two independent states.  
Thus, the TMR’s electoral practice has had an impact on the consolidation of the TMR’s 
statehood and the external actors’ engagement with it. Domestically, the elections proved the 
TMR’s capacities to function as an ordinary state, going through the usual practices of their 
organization, management, and monitoring. Also, the parliamentary elections created an 
additional forum for the TMR’s authorities to show to the external actors the entity’s 
determination to build a sovereign and independent state beyond the Moldovan borders.37 By 
pushing forward this agenda, the elected leaders demonstrated their commitment to protect the 
TMR’s constitutional provisions on its sovereign status. Overall, Transdniestria was able to 
gradually gain international notice for its elections, receive post-election international publicity,38 
and move forward with consolidating its statehood. 
Externally, the elections have not changed the approach of the external actors on the 
Transdniestria’s status as an integral part of Moldova: they either explicitly rejected the 
                                                 
36 Research for sources within the British Embassy in Moldova and English mass-media did not return any relevant 
information. 
37 “Vstrecha Britanskih diplomatov s Predsedatelem Verhovnogo Soveta Pridnestrov’a” [The Metting of British 
diplomats with the Chaiman of the TMR’s Supreme Council], Olvia-Press, December 13, 2000. 
38 The official observers from the State Duma were joined by British NGO’s and officials from the unrecognized 
republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. They found that the parliamentary elections complied 
with international norms on democratic elections and reported only minor violations. “Zayavlenie gruppy 
mejdunarodnyh nabliudatelei o resultatah vyborov v Verhovnyi Sovet PMR; Zayavlenie gruppy nabliudateleei 
Britanskoi Helskinskoi Gruppy po pravam cheloveka,” Olvia-Press, December 10, 2000. 
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elections, as Moldova did; largely ignored them, as Ukraine and the OSCE did; or acknowledged 
that the elections took place without endorsing the TMR’s claims, as Russia did. However, 
Transdniestrian electoral practices have affected the engagement of the external actors with the 
TMR, as seen in the increasing international attention on elections in the form of monitoring and 
in the external actors’ subsequent interactions with the elected leaders of the TMR.  
1.5. The 2001 Presidential Elections 
The relationship between Moldova and the TMR noticeably deteriorated after the former 
introduced new customs stamps in 2001. These new stamps invalidated the stamps 
Transdniestria had been using since 1996, making it impossible for Transdniestrian enterprises to 
legally export goods while circumventing Moldovan customs. Although Moldova justified this 
step as part of its adoption of World Trade Organization standards, the TMR viewed it as an 
economic blockade;39 a blatant violation of its right to sovereign social and economic 
development that it sought to protect;40 and an argument to claim further recognition of its 
statehood during the Transdniestrian 2001 presidential elections. 
During the elections, which saw high turnout (63%),41 the TMR’s voters re-elected then-
president, Igor Smirnov with 81.85% support.42 As suggested above, the newly imposed 
Moldovan economic limitations on the TMR only strengthened Transdniestria’s calls for 
statehood. At his inauguration ceremony, Smirnov declared: 
                                                 
39 International Crisis Group, “Moldova: No Quick Fix,” 2003. 
40 “Zayvlenie Ministerstva inostrannyh del PMR k Rossii, Ukraine i OBSE s pros'boi vosstanovit' pravo 
Pridnestrov'a na samostoyatel'noe reshenie voprosov sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo razvitia respubliki” [The 
Statement of the TMR’s Minitry of Foreign Affairs asking Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE to Restore the TMR’s 
Right to Independent Social and Economic Development of the Republic], Olvia-Press, September 17, 2001. 
41 The turnout for the third presidential elections, which was held on December 9, 2001, consisted of 254,863 people 
or 62.89% of 405,248 registered voters. “Okonchanetl'nye itogi vyborov presidenta i vise-presidenta PMR. 
Soobschenie Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'noi Komissii PMR,” Olvia-Press, December 14, 2001. 
42 Igor Smirnov received 208,617 (or 81.85%) of the votes. The two other candidates, Tom Zenovich and Alexandr 
Radchenko received 17,018 (or 6.68%), and 11,853 votes (4.65%), respectively. Ibid. 
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The path of independent development and the strengthening of the Transdniestrian 
Moldovan Republic will be followed…Present-day Transdniestria is a self-sufficient and 
democratic state, a fact proven by the recent presidential poll…We are not asking 
anybody for anything, and are capable of ensuring our security ourselves.43 
Transdniestria particularly welcomed the observers from Moldova, Romania, Belarus, the 
Russian State Duma, Ukrainian Rada, Poland, and others who did not refuse, as opposed to the 
OSCE, for example,44 to monitor the elections, despite the Moldovan government’s appeal.45 
Regardless of the official or personal capacities in which the observers came, their presence 
provided the TMR with an opportunity to showcase its concern over Moldova’s unilateral 
actions that the TMR believed had led to an economic blockade and gave another reason to the 
TMR to harden its line on statehood. 
The external actors closely scrutinized this election, but they either explicitly rejected its 
legitimacy or refused to comment publicly on it. The Moldovan government declared the 
Transdniestrian elections illegal and unconstitutional46 because the Central Electoral 
Commission of Moldova, the only body authorized to hold elections within the territory of 
Moldova, did not oversee it.47 The Moldovan government also urged the Transdniestrian people, 
diplomatic missions, foreigners, and nongovernmental organizations to refrain from participating 
in the election and emphasized its negative impact on the sovereignty of Moldova48 and on 
possible resolution of the Transdniestrian conflict.49  
                                                 
43 “Transdniestrian President to Follow Republican Independence Line,” RIA Novosti, December 24, 2001.  
44 “Strongman Smirnov Re-elected to Run Renegade Region Trans-Dniestr,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 
10, 2001. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin publicly stated that the presidential elections in Transdniestria would not 
be declared valid. Alexandra Bor, “Smirnov Prevailed in Trans-Dniestria,” Russian Press Digest (Izvestia), 
December 10, 2001. 
47 Lyudmila Rybkina, “Moldova Declares Upcoming Election in Transdniestria Illegal,” RIA Novosti, December 5, 
2001. 
48 Ibid. 
49 “Moldova Urges not to Send International Observers to Transdniestria's Presidential Election,” RIA Novosti, 
December 1, 2001. 
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Along with Moldova, Romania, which has not been an official participant in the 
negotiations, also publicly rejected the presidential elections. The Romanian Foreign Ministry 
released a statement on its non-recognition of Transdniestria’s actions, which it viewed as a 
violation of democracy and human rights. It stated:  
In connection with the holding of elections in Transnistria on December 9, 2001, 
Romania reasserts its non-recognition of the separatist actions of the regime in Tiraspol 
and voices full support [for] maintaining the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
Moldova within its borders of 1991. The electoral initiative of the separatist group in 
Tiraspol is in violation [of] the elementary rules of democracy, human rights and 
international law, and is aimed at imposing illegitimate statehood, with a negative impact 
on stability and security in the neighbouring region. Romania also reasserts its support 
[for] a sustainable solution to the Transnistrian issue that will entail[] both sides meeting 
their pledges made within the OSCE and in keeping with international standards and 
maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova.50 
The government of the United States, not yet an official party to the negotiation process, 
explained its refusal to send observers to the election in order “to avoid validating Transnistria’s 
claim of statehood.”51 In contrast, the representatives of the Russian State Duma delegation 
differentiated between monitoring the elections and validating the TMR’s claim to statehood 
and, together with other observers, issued a report that found the elections in compliance with 
international electoral standards and norms. No mention was made of the TMR’s status claims.52  
Transdniestria saw the statements of the external actors regarding the illegal or 
undemocratic character of the elections as unfairly biased against the entity. Newly re-elected 
president Smirnov rejected any suggestions that the elections were illegitimate53 and reaffirmed 
                                                 
50 “Romania Reasserts Non-recognition of Separatist Actions in Tiraspol,” Rompres, December 10, 2001. 
51 Human Rights U.S. Bureau of Democracy, and Labor, “The 2001 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: 
Moldova,” (2002). The lack of official monitoring did not prevent the US government, however, from listing 
violations related to electoral process in its report. Some of the violations listed included the shutting down of a 
youth group, the closing a leftist party newspaper, and the seizure of a press run. 
52 “Protokol raboty gruppy mezhdunarodnyh nabliudatelei na vyborah Presidenta PMR” [The Protocol of the 
Working group of International Observers at the TMR’s Presidential Elections],” Olvia-Press, December 12, 2001.  
53 In response to Moldovan statements that Transdniestria, its governing bodies, and their decisions are illegitimate 
because they are not specified by the Moldovan Constitution, the Transdniestrian authorities argued that the 
Moldovan Constitution was adopted without regard for the Transdniestrian position. See N. Prihodko, 
“Ev.Levitskyi: Kompromis doljen byt’ oboiudnym. Interv’u Spetsial'nogo predstavitelea Ukrainy v peregovorah 
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his rigid position on the TMR’s foreign policy. As he explained, “the high participation [of 
voters] in elections…suggests that Transdniestria has its statehood, because there are real, not 
virtual people who are living here.”54 Speaking on the legitimacy of the TMR’s elections, 
chairperson of the Supreme Council Marakutsa added:  
[I]n accordance with the TMR’s Constitution, which is the legislation in force for the 
people of Transdniestria, and for our state as a whole, these elections are more than 
legitimate. They showed that there has been no serious violations that could have called 
into question the voting results, and consequently, have served as a basis to consider them 
illegal. This fact was confirmed by more than 40 international observers…Therefore, we 
consider the elections […] to be a solid and firm brick in the foundation of statehood [of 
our republic].55  
As a result, the presidential elections confirmed the TMR’s functionality as a separate 
state and provided an additional venue for the TMR’s leaders to further assert the claim to 
statehood and their commitment to implementing the constitutional provisions on the TMR’s 
sovereignty. While it did not have an impact on the external actors’ approach to the TMR’s 
recognition, the public election of the TMR’s representatives nonetheless ensured further 
interactions between the external actors and the entity’s elected leaders for the purposes of 
negotiations. 
Overall, during the first stage of its negotiations with Moldova, Transdniestria used 
constitutional means to assert its sovereignty by holding a number of elections and referenda56 
and explicitly linking them to the recognition of the TMR’s statehood. Although the external 
actors confirmed their non-recognition of Transdniestrian statehood by publicly disregarding or 
rejecting the TMR’s electoral practices and any claims based on them, they also paid close 
                                                                                                                                                             
[Ev.Levitsky: Compromise Must Be Mutual. An Interview of the Special Representative of Ukraine in 
Negotiations], Dnestrovskaya Pravda, #95, August 19, 1999. 
54 “Igor Smirnov: K Pridnestrov’iu ne primenim termin separatism” [Igor Smirnov: The Term Sepatism is not 
Applicable to Transdniestria], Olvia-Press, December 11, 2001.  
55 L. Chebotarenko, “Po nelegkomu i ternistomy puti priznania” [Along the Difficult and Thorny Path to Gain 
Recognition], Pridnestrov’e, #244, December 12, 2001. 
56 In addition to the 1995 referenda, Transdniestria also hold a constitutional referendum in 2003, as described in 
previous chapter. 
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attention to domestic developments in Transdniestria and engaged with the TMR in different 
ways. 
At this stage, no evidence suggests that it was the TMR’s constitutional development that 
prompted the external actors to interact with the TMR. Rather, they simply could have engaged 
with the TMR simply due to the purposes and constrains of the negotiations. But even so, such 
engagement influenced the Transdniestrian leaders’ perception of their legitimacy. The activities 
of the external actors – the OSCE’s presence at all of the TMR’s elections and referenda (even if 
in an unofficial capacity); the lack of the Russian opposition to the elections;57 the Russian State 
Duma’s gradual official monitoring of elections; the meeting between the British official 
delegation and the speaker of the TMR’s parliament; the attendance of deputies of the Russian 
State Duma, Ukrainian Rada; and officials from the Russian and Ukrainian embassies in 
Chisinau at the presidential inauguration ceremonies58 – all suggest that the external actors 
accepted the results of the elections and the authority of elected leaders and were willing to 
engage with them in settling the conflict. On this basis, Transdniestrian leaders came to believe 
that they had legitimacy and de facto recognition by the external actors.59 
During this first stage of negotiations, notwithstanding the tense relations between 
Moldova and Transdniestria after the former introduced new custom stamps, both parties 
continued to discuss the principles of a federal settlement. This occurred in the context of two 
important initiatives. First, at the beginning of 2003, officials from the OSCE, Moldova, and 
Transdniestria started developing a model of asymmetrical federation.60 Second, later in the year, 
                                                 
57 For example, in his meeting with the electorate, candidate Smirnov noted that one piece of evidence of de facto 
recognition of the republic was a statement by Igor Ivanov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that there would 
not be any Russian opposition regarding the upcoming presidential elections in Transdniestria. Ibid. 
58 “Transdniestrian President to Follow Republican Independence Line.” RIA Novosti, December 24, 2001. 
59 All Transdniestrian respondents pointed to de facto recognition of Transdniestrian institutions by the external 
actors. August 2013. 
60 Hill, 2012.  
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Russian experts under the leadership of Dmitry Kozak began working with the Moldovan and 
Transdniestrian sides on an alternative document, “On the Basic Principles of the State Structure 
of a Common State.” 
After the second document, known as the “Kozak Memorandum”, received the approval 
of both sides, it was presented to the negotiating parties on November 17, 2003.61 Despite public 
promises from both Moldovan president Voronin and Transdniestrian president Smirnov to sign 
the document, at the last minute, Voronin reneged on his pledge under pressure from 
international partners and organizations, notably the OSCE, EU, and USA.62 Their main 
objections to the Memorandum included the lack of coordination between the two initiatives 
mentioned above and the nature of the division of powers that could undermine the federal 
government’s authority. In addition, they were concerned with the exclusion of the external 
actors from negotiation on the Memorandum, since they had a stake in “some of the issues to be 
resolved by the provisions of the comprehensive political settlement.”63 Many Moldovan 
political figures and experts also strongly opposed the Memorandum and its federal basis, 
claiming it would recognize the illegal Transdniestrian regime. However, the representatives of 
the OSCE saw this criticism as counterproductive to the final aims of negotiations, noting that: 
Whatever questions there may be about the legitimacy of its origins, the Transdniestrian 
regime has been in place now for…decades; political settlement negotiations with it have 
been ongoing since 1993. Any question of de facto acceptance (not de jure recognition) 
                                                 
61 Ibid.  
62 The OSCE Mission to Moldova provided an in-depth analysis of the weaknesses of the memorandum.
 
On this 
basis, the OSCE Dutch Chairman met with leading member states, specifically other EU member states and the U.S. 
The U.S. Ambassador to Moldova informed Voronin of Washington's reservations. The Secretary General of the 
Council of the EU, Javier Solana, told Voronin that, “signing the memorandum would not advance Moldova's 
European aspirations.” International Crisis Group, "Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria," (2004), 24-
25. 
63 William Hill, former head of OSCE Mission to Moldova, in Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lessons from 
the Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict, 2012, 141, 157-158. One such issue that was at stake was the withdrawal of 
the Russian troops. In light of this, the Western parties opposed the Memorandum’s provision on keeping a Russian-
led peacekeeping operation in the area until 2020, with the possible participation of Ukrainian troops and 
international observers. International Crisis Group, 2004, 25. 
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has long since become moot. Negotiating with the Transdniestrians over a federal 
arrangement is in this sense no different from negotiating over broad autonomy within a 
unitary state.64 
The Transdniestrian side regarded the Moldovan failure to sign the Kozak Memorandum 
against the backdrop of disagreements over the structure of federal governance between Moldova 
and the TMR in the beginning of the 1990s. It interpreted this move as one more sign of 
Moldovan unwillingness to settle the conflict within the framework of a common state and as a 
roadblock in the negotiations. As a result, Transdniestria opposed the continued search for 
common ground and distanced itself from the negotiation process. Instead, having gained 
experience functioning as a state, in part through holding elections and referenda, Transdniestria 
sought to further entrench its claims to statehood.65  
2. Increasingly Different Views: 2004-2013 
2.1. The 2005 Democratization Initiative and Parliamentary Elections 
After 2003, negotiations between Moldova and Transdniestria entered a new phase. First, 
the distance between the positions of two sides widened, a development that forced the external 
actors to seek new approaches to the negotiations. Second, political changes in the post-Soviet 
region, including the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004,66 highlighted the importance of 
democratic legitimacy and political pluralism. This drew attention to the question of the 
democratic legitimacy of the Transdniestrian authorities.67 Finally, low support for new 
Moldovan proposals,68 the lack of any other settlement plans, and the EU’s enlargement in close 
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Press, November 25, 2003. 
66 Political developments in that period also included the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, and Tulip Revolution 
in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. 
67 Oleg Protsyk, “Moldova’s Dilemmas in Democratizing and Reintegrating Transnistria,” Problems of Post-
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proximity to the conflict zone69 prompted the external actors not only to pay closer attention to 
the general principle of democratic development, but also to support the 2005 Ukrainian plan 
that linked democratization in the TMR with negotiations. 
After Viktor Yushchenko took power in Ukraine, that country started to play a more 
active role in the negotiation process.70 In particular, Ukrainian President Yushchenko proposed 
a new plan for the peaceful resolution of the Transdniestrian issue in May 200571 based on 
democratization in the TMR. The plan called for holding parliamentary elections in 
Transdniestria under an international monitoring mission in order to establish a legitimate 
government in the TMR that would contribute to effective negotiations. After the elections, 
Chisinau and Tiraspol, with Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as intermediaries, were to agree on a 
law stipulating the TMR’s status and the separation of powers between the Transdniestrian and 
Moldovan authorities. Under this plan, the elections were to be preceded by demilitarization of 
                                                                                                                                                             
country should sign the Stability and Security Pact for the Republic of Moldova (SSPRM). According to the 
Moldovan side, implementing this initiative would have led to compromise between Russia, the US, Romania, 
Ukraine, and the EU on a range of key issues for Moldova and would bring long-term stability to the region. They 
included the territorial integrity of Moldova; cultural, ethnic and language diversity as a fundamental value of the 
multiethnic Moldovan state; and guarantees for strategic neutrality. See Boţan, The Negotiation Process, 2009, 123. 
69 Beginning in 2003, the EU has paid closer attention to Moldova and its “frozen” conflict. The EU saw the conflict 
as a security threat to its border because of several developments. First, the OSCE placed the resolution of frozen 
conflicts high on its agenda and hoped that at least the Transdniestrian issue could be solved. Second, the EU 
became increasingly interested in the stability of its neighbors in light of the EU’s enlargement and Romania’s new 
membership. As a result, the Council of the European Union appointed an EU Special Representative for the 
Republic of Moldova on March 23, 2005. It was planned to focus his mandate on coordinating the EU’s role in the 
resolution of the Transdniestrian conflict. Third, the Moldovan government did not receive the support it expected 
from Russia in settling the conflict and, therefore, prioritized its contacts with the EU and US. Jos Boonstra, 
“Moldova, Transnistria and European Democracy Policies,” (FRIDE), 2007, 3. 
70 Although some authors regard Ukrainian involvement as positive or neutral, others believe that, through this 
initiative Ukraine simply sought to further its own interests. See Protsyk, 2006 (on positive/neutral approach of 
Ukraine); Nantoi, 2005 (on approach to Ukraine as an interested actor). 
71 The Initiative was discussed on May 16 and 17, 2005, in Vinnita, Ukraine, during a round of negotiations between 
the parties in conflict and with the mediators in the settlement process of Transdniestrian issue. The Ukrainian Plan 
on settlement of the Transdniestrian issue was made public on May 20, 2005. See generally, Boţan, Reglementarea, 
2009, 36-47. 
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the breakaway republic, disbandment of its security structures, and creation of “favorable 
conditions” for free elections.72 
Yushchenko’s plan received wide support from the external actors and was accepted in 
principle by Transdniestria. The Moldovan parliament adopted a special decision that welcomed 
the plan and urged the TMR to pursue democratization and demilitarization.73 Both sides reached 
an agreement on the international assessment mission to evaluate conditions for free and fair 
elections in Transdniestria.74 The EU and the US – which had only just joined the negotiations as 
observers that year – also extended their support. The EU viewed democratization in 
Transdniestria and the creation of democratic conditions there as mechanisms that could help to 
settle the Transdniestrian conflict.75 Without any specific plan of its own, the EU was prepared to 
support a proposal for settling the Transdniestrian issue that would ready the grounds for further 
solutions for the separation of powers between the center and the periphery.76 In addition, the EU 
favored the initiative because of its geopolitical interests, namely, a resolution to the conflict on 
its borders.77 The United States also supported the assessment mission initiative and expected to 
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review the OSCE Mission’s plan and to evaluate the prospects for free and fair democratic 
elections in Transdniestria.78 
However, despite the overall support for the initiative, its realization became problematic. 
While agreeing in principle to the Ukrainian plan,79 Transdniestria insisted on holding 
parliamentary elections in December 2005,80 as provided by its own constitution and electoral 
laws. The timing of these elections did not allow the OSCE adequate time to organize its 
international mission.81 Also, even though Transdniestria submitted its electoral laws to Russia 
and the OSCE for inspection, the TMR refused to alter them prior to the elections. With respect 
to that move, Ukraine was of the opinion that it was less about the law per se and more about 
general democratic conditions, suggesting that, “[i]t is necessary to create conditions to make the 
media really free and independent, to let civil society develop, and to take due account of all 
elements of democracy.”82 
Transdniestria justified its refusal to postpone the election and to modify existing laws by 
its commitment to following the TMR’s constitutional provisions.83 In addition, Transdniestria 
pointed to numerous unilateral actions by Moldova during the negotiation process, such as the 
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Interfax News Agency, June 21, 2005. 
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introduction of the new custom stamps in 2001, the failure of Moldova to sign the Kozak 
Memorandum in 2003,84 and the country’s adoption of the Law on the Special Legal Status of 
Transdniestria in 2005. This last law mandated the autonomous status of the TMR within the 
unitary state of Moldova.85 Showing its consent to the Ukrainian plan, the TMR invited the 
mediators in the Transdniestrian settlement to observe the voting and its media coverage, 
pointing out that, “What counts most for the international community is that the elections here be 
transparent and fair, and we fully support this desire."86 
In sum, the Yushchenko initiative underscores the importance of democratization for 
conflict resolution and contributes to scholarly understanding of the interactions between the 
constitutional framework and the recognition process. First, the external actors’ almost complete 
disregard for extant Transdniestrian constitutional institutions suggests that these institutions 
have had little influence on the TMR’s search for recognition. As this work demonstrates, the 
external actors have been reluctant to openly accept and engage with the TMR’s constitutional 
framework, seeking to avoid accusations of legitimizing the TMR’s statehood. Second, electoral 
practices as part of the entity’s democratic development have mattered for the external actors. In 
particular, the external actors have employed the general principle of democracy and linked the 
idea of Transdniestria’s democratic development with the negotiation process. As their private 
communications suggest, the external actors partly saw the success of the negotiation process as 
tied to the democratic development of the region, which could only be accomplished through the 
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guarantee of free and fair elections under an international assessment mission. Through this 
process, the external actors hoped to find leaders capable of compromise and mutually 
acceptable solutions on the Transdniestrian status with due respect to Moldovan territorial 
integrity and sovereignty.87  
At the same time, the external actors’ assumptions on the role of democratic development 
in Transdniestria as promoting a pro-integration agenda lacked support in practice. Instead, 
electoral practices and the introduction of reforms in Transdniestria have only hardened the 
TMR’s position on its sovereignty. In particular, Transdniestria used the 2005 parliamentary 
elections to advance state building and to interact more closely with the external actors. With 
traditionally high voter turnout (over 50%),88 the TMR elected 43 members of the legislature, all 
of whose positions on the TMR’s foreign policy fell increasingly in line with one another. Either 
as independent candidates or representatives of one of the entity’s four political parties, the 
newly elected legislators shared a common stance on the TMR’s independence from Moldova 
and disagreed mainly on economic issues.89 Therefore, then-president Smirnov expressed 
confidence that the new parliament would continue efforts to win international recognition for 
Transdniestria.90 
In casting his vote at the elections, Smirnov referenced the TMR’s 1995 Constitution as 
an act that asserts Transdniestrian statehood and demonstrates true democratic features: 
First of all, there is an understanding in Transdniestria that the people themselves decide 
their future and that is what has been happening for the past 15 years. After the 
disintegration of the great nation, all our laws have relied on a very respectful attitude to 
human rights. The constitution of Transdniestria very clearly states that it guarantees all 
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rights and obligations. Questions of personal freedom can be changed only by a 
referendum, not by parliament or even the president.91  
Smirnov also expressed his strong objections to the Law on Transdniestrian Status that Moldova 
had adopted unilaterally. He emphasized that the opinion of the local population should instead 
be the basis for any resolution to the conflict: 
Under the constitution, Transdniestria is an independent state, and the fact that the 
Republic of Moldova and the OSCE mission are trying to establish a confederation goes 
against the will of the people of Transdniestria in one way or other. Moldova cannot be a 
single-nation state as Transdniestria has never been a part of Bessarabia. Therefore, the 
adoption of the Law on the Status of Transdniestria by the Moldovan parliament that 
disregards the opinion of our people aggravates the situation.92  
However, despite the TMR authorities’ public statements and official reports by local and 
foreign observers93 that the voting was calm and well organized,94 the views of the external 
actors on the TMR’s election and its results remained similar to those on previous elections. In 
the opinion of Moldova and the OSCE, the polls were not free and fair. The Moldovan 
government still regarded the election in Transdniestria as “illegal” and invalid, whereas the 
OSCE refused to recognize it or send its observers.95 Although Transdniestrian leaders 
referenced the electoral practices in other countries, pointing out that no international rule 
mandates recognition of elections in the first place,96 the external actors ignored that argument. 
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Instead, the Ukrainian side repeated its previous position on the ongoing lack of proper 
conditions for holding democratic elections in the region.97 It presented a view in line with those 
of the mediators in the Transdniestrian settlement and representatives of the European Union and 
the United States on illegitimacy of the 2005 parliamentary elections: 
Neither we nor the international community consider these elections to be legitimate and 
we believe it was necessary to create and send an international evaluation commission 
under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to 
Tiraspol. This commission would give recommendations on what must be done to create 
the conditions necessary for free and democratic elections to the parliament.98  
While acknowledging the absence of its own observers to monitor the elections, a US report on 
human rights practices still concluded that, “Transnistrian authorities interfered with residents’ 
ability to participate in elections […], and the elections were not considered free and fair.”99  
Thus, all the external actors involved in the negotiations, except Russia, described the 
elections as illegitimate (illegal) and/or unfree (unfair). The external actors did not clearly 
distinguish between these categories or apply them consistently in their rhetoric; however, the 
different nature of the categories suggests that they were used for different purposes. Since 
Transdniestria is a breakaway region seeking its recognition, the description of elections as 
illegitimate indicates that, in the eyes of the external actors, the TMR is not legally able to hold 
elections. The usage of the term free or unfree elections, however, is possible in the context of 
any state-like entity, regardless of whether it is recognized. Calling the elections/referenda free 
and fair, then, suggests the approval of the legitimacy of internal leadership or of referenda 
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outcomes, whereas calling them unfree and unfair implies the undermining of the leadership’s 
legitimacy or disapproval of referenda results.  
Therefore, by describing the TMR’s elections or referenda as illegitimate, the external 
actors voiced their attitude towards the electoral practices based on the TMR’s international non-
recognition. In this way, they confirmed their position on the TMR’s status, which they 
continued to view as an integral part of Moldova. The external actors’ description of the TMR’s 
elections as unfree and unfair likely served different purposes. First, the external actors called 
both the 2005 and previous Transdniestrian elections unfree and unfair without actually 
monitoring them. When asked by the TMR’s leaders to share examples of electoral violations, 
the external actors kept silent or referred to isolated instances of violations that should not 
necessarily have led to a negative conclusion on the general character of the elections.100 Such 
descriptions, therefore, allowed the external actors to refuse to acknowledge the elections and to 
avoid considering them free and fair. The latter would have forced the external actors to 
reexamine their position on the outcomes of elections and referenda, which might have then 
required them to reconsider their position on the TMR’s non-recognition.  
Second, the TMR has established a semi-authoritarian regime, in part for the purposes of 
consolidating and preserving Transdniestria as a separate entity.101 As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
constitutions in authoritarian regimes fulfill a set of meaningful functions, such as the power to 
coordinate and constrain. In Transdniestria, these functions have had similar effects on the 
TMR’s leaders and have assisted in strengthening Transdniestrian statehood. Yet externally, the 
establishment of a semi-authoritarian regime has contributed to the overall negative image of the 
                                                 
100 Personal communication of the representatives of the TMR’s government. August 2013. 
101 Protsyk, 2006. 
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TMR. As a result, the external actors might have called the TMR’s elections unfree and unfair in 
response to this image. 
Contrary to the reactions of the rest of the external actors to the TMR’s elections, the 
Russian side sought to view them and, in particular, the 2005 parliamentary elections, in a larger 
context. The representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized the lack of 
international recognition of the TMR and the need to search for a settlement to the conflict that 
would be based on the respect for the territorial integrity of Moldova. Together with this, he also 
suggested assessing the extent to which the elections conformed to international norms, which he 
saw as a key part of the settlement. In this regard, the Russian side viewed the elections as 
competitive, well organized, lacking serious violations,102 and as resulting in the victory of 
young politicians. The Russian side suggested that, without changing Russia’s position, the 
election still “will have a positive effect on the democratic development of that region.”103 
As a result, the introduction of the criteria on democratization into the negotiations, the 
parliamentary elections, and the reactions of the external actors to these developments in 2005 all 
confirm the underlying argument of the present work. The TMR’s electoral practices do not 
provide evidence that the constitution has influenced the prospects for the TMR’s recognition. 
However, the TMR’s elections have had other important effects, such as consolidating the 
TMR’s statehood and influencing the external actors’ engagement with the TMR.  For its part, 
the Transdniestrian side, first, has used its elections as an additional forum in which to advance 
its statehood and recognition. Second, the TMR has viewed the presence of a large number of 
foreign international reporters at the parliamentary elections as yet more evidence of, as Smirnov 
                                                 
102 Otvet ofitsial’nogo predstavitelea MID Rossii, 2005. 
103 Statement by the head of the CIS observers and a senior member of the State Duma, Akhmed Bilalov, on the 
results of the parliamentary elections. “Duma Member: Transdniestria Election Results ‘Predictable’,” Interfax News 
Service, December 12, 2005. 
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called it, “a form of Transdniestria’s recognition.”104 The external actors have used the general 
concept of democratization as a mechanism to facilitate final settlement to the conflict. Although 
the Ukrainian initiative did not produce its intended outcomes, it nonetheless emphasized the 
importance of the TMR’s democratic development for the purposes of its political status. In 
addition, the parliamentary elections held in Transdniestria defined the key leaders in the 
legislative authority with whom the external actors have continued to interact. This indicates that 
the TMR’s constitutionally elected authority has mattered for the external actors in the context of 
negotiations.  
2.2. The 2006 Independence Referendum and Presidential Elections 
Challenging political and economic relations between Moldova and Transdniestria, new 
regional realities, and internal electoral tensions allowed the TMR to use its September 2006 
referendum on independence as a mechanism to harden its stance on recognition. The 
referendum, the second of its kind, drew significant reactions from all the external actors, who 
remained firm on non-recognition of the TMR but also feared its potential negative effects on the 
negotiation process. 
First, Moldovan-Transdniestrian tensions in the economic sphere, which had emerged 
earlier105 but continued unabated in 2006, led to more disagreements between the sides and 
increasingly decisive steps on the Transdniestrian part. An agreement signed between Moldova 
and Ukraine in March 2006 that required all Transdniestrian goods to receive customs clearance 
                                                 
104 “Transdniestrian Settlement Must Have Support of Local Population – Leader.” Interfax News Service, 2005. 
105 The main tensions lay in the sphere of custom services. As mentioned earlier, from 1996 to 2001, the TMR used 
Moldovan custom stamps, a practice based on the Protocol Decision on the Settlement of Issues that Arose in the 
Practices of the Custom Service of Moldova and Transdniestria, signed on February 7, 1996. After Moldova 
introduced new customs stamps in 2001, the stamps Transdniestria had been using since 1996 were invalidated. The 
new stamps became the means of implementing a Moldovan policy of economic pressure. It effectively prohibited 
Transdniestrian enterprises from exporting goods legally while circumventing Moldovan customs, creating what 
Transdniestria viewed as an economic blockade. See Protokol’noe reshenie po razresheniu voznikshih problem v 
oblasti deiatel’nosti tamozhennyh slyzhb Moldovy i Pridnestrov’a; International Crisis Group, 2003. 
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in Moldova106 hampered Transdniestrian efforts to pursue an independent foreign economic 
policy, which the 1997 Moscow Memorandum and the 1996 Protocol had provided. Although 
Moldova justified this measure on the grounds of combating widespread smuggling107 and the 
loss of revenue from taxes and duties, it created what Transdniestria viewed as an economic 
blockade for the second time. Transdniestrian officials were also alarmed by the joint military 
exercises between Moldova and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and viewed 
them as an act of intimidation.108 As a result, Transdniestrian deputies, independent politicians 
and the president raised the issue of having a referendum that led to widespread public 
discussions.109 
Second, the Transdniestrian leadership used to its advantage the changing realities of the 
European map. Immediately after Montenegro held a referendum on its independence from the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in May 2006, it was fully recognized by Serbia and the 
international community.110 Transdniestrian leaders hailed the referendum and called its positive 
outcome a cause for celebration.111 Transdniestrian activists additionally declared that the 
Montenegrin referendum made “inadmissible any discussions and arguments that Transdniestria 
cannot be sovereign and independent” and that “the fact of separation of Serbia and Montenegro 
                                                 
106 Kabinet Ministrov Ukrainy. Postanovlenie, napravlennoe na vypolnenie moldavsko-ikrainskogo soglashenia 
N112-Р, 2006 [The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Act aimed at the Implementation of the Moldovan-Ukrainian 
Agreement]. 
107 Later, however, the European Union Border Monitoring Mission concluded that Moldovan officials had inflated 
the extent of cross-border criminal activity. “Breakaway Transnistria Wants New Life with Russia,” Inter Press 
Service, October 16, 2006. 
108 For Transdniestria, such an act by a neutral state like Moldova was not acceptable. Ibid. 
109 The Russian side also supported the idea of the importance of holding a referendum for determining the people’s 
will on significant issues. The Ambassador at large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, V. 
Nesterushkin said in one of his interview that the referendum itself has a special significance in international 
relations and plays an important role in determining the position of the population, on the basis of which the 
leadership has to make its decisions. See Ministerstvo Inostrannyh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “Intervieu posla po 
osobym porucheniam MID Rossii V.M.Nesterushkina o situatsii v Pridnestrov’e agenstvu RIA Novosti,” June 2, 
2006. 
110 The referendum was conducted in accordance with the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro of 2003. 
111 “Moldovan, Georgian Separatists Hail New Montenegro,” RFE/RL, May 23, 2006. 
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shows the prospects for Transdniestria to gain independence.”112 As a result, Montenegro’s 
independence through referendum demonstrated “the perceived utility and legitimacy of 
referendums”113 and contributed to the potential power of a referendum in unrecognized states. 
More specifically, along with providing “legitimacy to the outcomes of previous referendums in 
post-Soviet de facto states,” the Montenegrin referendum spurred the TMR’s leaders to hold a 
new referendum in Transdniestria.114 
Third, then-president Smirnov made a decisive electoral move. As 2006 was the year of 
the presidential elections, he sought to use the political and economic situation to his advantage 
to secure popular support by holding a referendum.115 
As a result of these interrelated factors, the TMR’s Supreme Council adopted a decision 
supporting the president’s initiative and set September 17, 2006, as the date for the 
referendum.116 The TMR’s legislature defined two questions to be asked at referendum: whether 
Transdniestrians (1) support the independence of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic and its 
future free accession to the Russian Federation; and (2) consider it possible for the 
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic to give up its independence and then join the Republic of 
Moldova.117 
                                                 
112 Dmitrii Soin, Director of the Transdniestria section of Russia’s National Strategy Council. “Pridnestrovskii 
politolog: chernogorskii pretsedent uvelichivaet shansy na priznanie nezavisimosti Pridnestrov’a” [Transdniestrian 
Political Scientist: Montenegrin Precedent Increases the Chances of Recognition of Transdniestria’s Independence], 
Regnum, May 23, 2006. At the same time, there was an understanding in Transdniestria that, despite allowing 
Montenegro to gain independence through a referendum, “the international community will not 
allow…Transdniestria the same right.” See “Kosovo Example Spurs Hopes for Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh,” 
Tiraspol Times, July 18, 2007. 
113 Rick Fawn. “The Kosovo – and Montenegro – Effects,” International Affairs 84, no. 2 (2008), 275. 
114 Ibid., 279. 
115 Personal communication with a high-ranking official from the Smirnov administration, August 2013. 
116 Decision of the TMR Supreme Council on Supporting the Initiative of the President Regarding Holding the 
Referendum on the Question of the TMR’s relationship with Moldova and Russia, of July 12, 2006. “Vsenarodnyi 
referendum v Pridnestrov’e sostoitsea 17 sentyabrea. V chisle ego voprosov- vosmoznost’ prisoedinenia PMR k 
Rossii,” Olvia-Press, July 12, 2006. 
117 In Russian, the questions were: 1. Поддерживаете ли Вы курс на независимость Приднестровской 
Молдавской Республики и последующее свободное присоединение Приднестровья к Российской 
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The external actors responded swiftly to this move. As the available data suggest, they 
viewed the issue of referendum in the context of the negotiation process and, therefore, 
dismissed any thoughts on recognition of its results if it took place. In particular, in his 
confidential correspondence with the Embassy of the United States in Moscow, then-Russian 
negotiator on Transdniestria V. Nesterushkin backed the TMR’s decision to hold a referendum, 
explaining it as Transdniestria’s response to the injustices of Moldova’s new custom rules and a 
way to resist this pressure.118 But he was also convinced that:  
the referendum would have no political effects -- except on the December “presidential” 
elections in Transnistria; rather, it just indicated a “vector” that the leadership was 
already following and for which it wanted to show the backing of the people.119 
Similarly to Russia, the EU members adopted a position on non-recognition of the referendum, 
making it clear in their statements well before the event itself. EU members expressed their 
support for Moldova as well as for the general position of the EU and OSCE on non-recognition 
of the referendum and refusal to send observers to the referendum. For example, Spain “agreed 
with the US position that the referendum is poorly worded and a bad idea in general.”120 The 
chairperson of the European Parliament from Estonia stated that, “[t]he region has no 
international recognition and the referendum is therefore illegal.”121 And the Secretary General 
of the Council of Europe commented that, “the referendum announced by the secessionist 
authorities of the Transnistrian Region of Moldova has no legal validity.”122  
                                                                                                                                                             
Федерации? 2. Считаете ли Вы возможным отказ от независимости Приднестровской Молдавской 
Республики с последующим вхождением Приднестровья в состав Республики Молдова? Ibid.  
118 US Embassy in Moscow (Russia). “State Classified Document: Transnistria. Independence Referendum,” 2006. 
119 Ibid. 
120 US Embassy in Madrid (Spain). “State classified document: Spain On Transnistria’s Proposed Independence 
Referendum,” 2006. 
121 Statement of the Chairperson of the European Parliament from Estonia, Marianne Mikko. “EU/ EP/Transnistria: 
Concern about Referendum on Independence,” Agence Europe (Brussels), September 7, 2006. 
122 Statement of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Terry Davis. He also added that, “The Council of 
Europe supports the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and calls for the renewal of the negotiating 
process.” Ibid. 
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At the same time, the external actors were divided over the issue of the democratic 
character of the process of the TMR’s referendum. Moldova, Ukraine, the OSCE, the EU, and 
the US regarded it a priori undemocratic and shared the view that democratic conditions were 
lacking in the TMR.123 Russia, in contrast, advised that no conclusions be drawn until the 
monitoring of the referendum was complete. In particular, Russia invited the US to use this 
referendum as means to contribute to democratization in Transdniestria. It said:  
a referendum represents the will of the people, and the U.S. should engage with the 
Transnistrians about how to make it as democratic as possible; the time to criticize and 
call it non-democratic would only come after an objective monitoring of the conduct of 
the referendum.124 
The United States, as well as other external actors, however, ignored the Russian suggestions and 
continued to view the referendum as lacking any legal validity. 
Regardless of the public and private statements by the external actors warning the TMR 
that the vote would not be recognized, Transdniestria held its referendum on independence. The 
TMR used this mechanism to assert the legitimacy of the will of its people on independence and 
to advance its claim in the presence of 174 observers registered to monitor the referendum.125 
The very high turnout to the referendum (78.6% of the total of 389,000 registered voters) 
suggested the wide concern the TMR’s population shared over Transdniestrian political status. 
The results of referendum revealed a clear preference for independence and eventual union with 
Russia, with 97.1% support. Only 3.4% favored integration with Moldova instead.126  
                                                 
123 The actors shared the view of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Terry Davis, that, “Before you can 
have a valid referendum you need a political agreement on settlement. You also need to put in place the minimal 
Council of Europe democratic standards.” Ibid.  
124 US Embassy in Moscow (Russia). “State Classified Document: Transnistria. Independence Referendum,” 2006. 
125 After issuing a large number of invitations for foreigners to observe the referendum, the TMR registered 
observers from Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Germany, France, Italy, Serbia, and a number of international 
organizations. “Monitoring referenduma v Pridnestrov’e vedut 174 mejdunarodnyh nabliudatelya,” Olvia-Press, 
September 17, 2006. 
126 “Pridnestrov’e progolosovalo za prisoedinenie k Rossii. Za eto vyskazalis’ bole 97% grajdan respubliki, 
uchastvovavshih v referendum,” Olvia-Press, September 18, 2006. 
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These results allowed Smirnov not only to reiterate the vision of the Transdniestrian 
people for close interrelations with Moscow in the future,127 but also to announce plans to bring 
social, customs, financial, and education policies in line with Russian ones to facilitate an 
eventual merger128 and to begin molding the TMR’s legislation and the government structures to 
the Russian ones.129 Most importantly, the outcome hardened the TMR’s stance on its statehood, 
gave the TMR a greater confidence in negotiations, helped to bolster the administration’s 
authority, and maintained the status quo in anticipation of the presidential elections in December 
2006.130 
The referendum also confirmed the external actors’ rejection of Transdniestrian claims 
and their position on ignoring the TMR’s constitutional structures as seen earlier. The external 
actors judged both the organization of the referendum and its outcomes against the backdrop of 
the TMR’s unrecognized status and its relationship with Moldova. In this way, all external actors 
except Russia ignored the TMR’s internal constitutional structures and the actual practices of 
voting, calling the referendum unfree and unfair even in the absence of monitoring missions. 
Seeking to preserve their position on the territorial integrity of Moldova, the external actors 
avoided any references to legal developments in the TMR that could even implicitly legitimize 
the entity. While Russia supported the view of its colleagues in the negotiations on non-
                                                 
127 Smirnov stated, “The Dniester people are pinning their hopes for the future firmly on the Russian Federation.” 
Michael Mainville, “Breakaway Vote Boosts Russia’s Hand over ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Province Chooses to Stay 
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128 “Breakaway Transnistria Wants New Life with Russia.” Inter Press Service, October 16, 2006. 
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130 Statement of Valery Litskay, the TMR’s Foreign Minister at the time. Ben Wetherall, “Moldovan Separatist 
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recognition of the referendum’s results, it regarded the process of public consultations as an 
important element in building a civil society that required the respect of the external actors.  
However, this position did not find any support and the approach of the rest of the external actors 
remained unchanged. 
The Moldovan government in particular reacted in a strongly negative way both to the act 
of holding a referendum and to its results. Before the referendum, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Moldova adopted a declaration condemning “th[e] pseudo-referendum, which flagrantly 
violates the principle of territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova [, and the] anti-
constitutional action [that] defies democratic values and standards.”131 The declaration appealed 
“to the international community to firmly condemn this illegal initiative of the separatist regime” 
and reiterated “that neither the idea of the ‘referendum’ nor its results can be recognized in any 
way [and that the] Moldovan authorities will consider as interference in internal affairs any 
attempts to legitimize the ‘referendum’ by monitoring it or by other actions.”132 After the 
referendum was held, the Moldovan government viewed this event as a breakdown of talks on 
Moldovan unification; labeled it a “political farce,”133 the outcomes of which would not be 
accepted;134 and called on other countries not to acknowledge the vote.135  
Following its previous foreign policy, Ukraine aligned itself with the EU Declaration on 
the Referendum, which reiterated the EU’s position on non-recognition of both the referendum 
                                                 
131 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of The Republic of Moldova. The Declaration on the Issue 
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132  Ibid. 
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or its outcome.136 At the same time, Ukrainian politicians considered a broader set of issues 
raised by the referendum. They pointed to the need for convening an all-European conference on 
security to establish a common approach to this kind of referenda137 and expressed concern that 
holding such a referendum negatively affected the settlement of the conflict, which could only 
occur within the framework of Moldovan territorial integrity.138 Ukrainian leaders also received 
public criticism from some Ukrainian observers at the TMR referendum for refusing to recognize 
its results. Based on their monitoring, the observers emphasized the democratic character of the 
free and fair referendum. As one stated, “we finally saw a civilized referendum...Transdniestria 
had every right to hold such a referendum because the most important thing is the expression of 
the will of the people.”139  
The OSCE Mission in Moldova refused to recognize the vote, claiming it was neither free 
nor fair,140 calling the referendum meaningless,141 and finding it suspicious that 97% of citizens 
would have the same position on this important issue.142 It faulted the referendum for being 
unilateral and conducted in undemocratic conditions.143 However, Transdniestrian officials 
refuted the OSCE’s statements and accused the organization of making unsubstantiated claims 
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given that it turned down the TMR’s invitation to monitor the elections.144 The TMR’s leaders 
emphasized that the referendum showed precisely the unity of people on the issue and called for 
respect of the people’s will.145 
Furthermore, the EU and the US, both observers in the negotiation process, stressed their 
non-recognition of the results of the referendum.146 The European Union regarded the TMR’s 
referendum as running contrary to internationally recognized principles of the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of Moldova and declared its non-recognition of the referendum and its 
outcomes.147 The EU stood firm on its position that the conditions in the TMR did not allow for 
the free expression of popular will148 and strongly denounced the Transdniestrian region’s 
attempt “to establish its independence in a unilateral way by organising a so-called 
referendum.”149 Along with sharing the international position on the TMR’s non-recognition, the 
United States emphasized the negative influence that the referendum had on Moldova, stating, 
“As the international community has made clear, Transnistria is a part of Moldova, and efforts 
by the Transnistrian regime should not be recognized as anything other than an attempt to 
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destabilize Moldova."150 The US Mission to the OSCE issued a statement further elaborating this 
point: 
... As we stated emphatically in July here at the Permanent Council and since then in 
other venues, we do not recognize the referendum in any way. It cannot be taken 
seriously or treated as a legitimate vote. No one recognizes the so-called Transnistrian 
authorities as a legitimate government. As the international community has made clear, 
Transnistria is a part of Moldova and the referendum should not be recognized as 
anything other than an attempt to destabilize Moldova. 
As President Bush noted [earlier], the Transnistrian conflict must be resolved in a way 
that guarantees Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity. […] We again urge the 
Russian government to inform the Transnistrian authorities immediately, and to state 
publicly, that it will not recognize any claims to independence or support any move to 
annex Transnistria to the Russian Federation…151 
Finally, the Russian side called for a more balanced approach to address the TMR’s 
referendum and regarded the declarations of Chisinau and some other European capitals on the 
“illegitimate” and “provocative” character of the vote as rash. First, the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) suggested that the decision of Transdniestria’s leaders to hold a 
referendum must be viewed in the larger context of the political and economic leverage 
employed by Chisinau and Kyiv in breach of the earlier agreements reached during negotiations. 
In the Russian MFA’s opinion, the new customs regime led to serious economic and social 
problems, inevitably provoking a frustrated reaction from Transdniestrians.152 As a result, the 
TMR’s national poll became “a reaction to the factual blockade” that had negatively affected the 
economy, and the people of the region.153 
Second, the Russian MFA saw public consultations on key political issues as the 
realization of an important democratic principle, a requirement for building civil society, and as 
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the expression of the will of the Transdniestrian people.154 The Russian executive and legislative 
branches agreed that, “[the referendum] was supervised by a hundred observers from the CIS and 
Europe [who] could see for themselves what Transdniestrians want.”155 Having been conducted 
“in conditions of political instability and economic blockade, [the referendum] expresses the 
public will and reflects the desire of the population to live in stability and predictability.”156 On 
these grounds, the Russian legislature suggested that the international community take notice of 
the population’s choice and stop “ignoring such a strong political reality as the sentiments of the 
people of Transdniestria.”157 
Third, the Russian MFA emphasized that, although unrecognized by international law, 
Transdniestria was nonetheless an equal party to the negotiation process and, therefore, its 
decision to hold a national poll should be respected by the international community. For the 
Russian MFA, the referendum’s results were yet further proof that a solution should be built on 
the basis of all existing agreements:158 
The various statements about the negative consequences of the plebiscite for the 
prospective solution to the Transdniestrian conflict distract from what matters most - the 
need for the quickest normalization of conditions for the foreign economic activity of 
Transdniestria, for which the Russian side has been urgently calling, and restoration of 
the negotiation process with the participation of Chisinau and Tiraspol to develop a 
comprehensive and sustainable political settlement model.159 
                                                 
154 Russian MFA Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding Referendum in Transdniestria, 2006. 
155 Interview of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Serghei Lavrov. “Transdniestrian Referendum Met Democratic 
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Russian President Vladimir Putin summarized his country’s position as one concerned with 
developing a comprehensive view of the Transdniestrian issue and elaborating a shared, 
consistent approach:  
Our position is that we should adhere to principles of international law, one of which is 
the principle of territorial integrity. As for the referendum that was held there, we should 
find where we stand together with our partners, including Europe, as to what we value 
most in international affairs - the principle of territorial integrity or so-called political 
expediency. We should look for solutions that would satisfy all people living in this or 
that territory, especially in Europe."160 
Thus, the 2006 referendum did not affect the central position of the external actors on 
non-recognition, but brought their closer scrutiny to the negotiation process. In particular, 
American representatives were optimistic about the prospects of a settlement, despite the 
referendum’s results in favor of secession. To them, the increased attention high-level officials in 
the United States and elsewhere paid to the Transdniestrian issue and a customs agreement 
between Ukraine and Moldova, which “lent strength to Moldova's sovereignty,”161 suggested that 
a solution might be near.162 The OSCE also announced a new negotiation initiative right after the 
referendum, in September 2006. The reunification plan it proposed to Transdniestria’s 
government marked a significant concession in the negotiations. The OSCE plan, which was 
sponsored by the Belgian Foreign Minister and drew on that country’s successful experience 
with a multi-ethnic government, advanced semi-independent status for Transdniestria in a 
Moldovan federation.163  
The 2006 referendum also evidenced the importance that the external actors have 
attached to the general concept of democratic development for the purposes of negotiations. All 
                                                 
160 “Russia Adheres to Territorial Integrity Principle in Transdniestria – Putin,” Ukraine General Newswire, 
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161 David Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (USA). “State Department 
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the external actors except Russia saw the creation of democratic conditions in the TMR as 
necessary for any public consultations to take place and emphasized the need for a coordinated 
approach towards such an event in the case of its potential realization. To them, the development 
of democracy in the TMR represented a way of steering the negotiation process in the direction 
of conflict settlement within a re-integrated Moldova. Russia’s position differed not so much 
regarding the settlement outcomes as concerning the role of the TMR’s referendum itself. Russia 
saw public consultations as already contributing to democratic development in the TMR and, as 
such, deserving of the respect of the external actors. As a result, while not having any effects on 
Transdniestria’s recognition, the TMR’s referendum has increased the importance of democracy 
for the external actors in the context of negotiations.  
Contrary to the assumption of some of the external actors that increased attention to the 
TMR because of its referendum has brought a settlement within reach, Transdniestria has 
decisively hardened its position. The practice of holding the referendum has instead contributed 
to the consolidation of the TMR’s statehood in several ways. First, the TMR’s population 
witnessed that the TMR can implement the ordinary functions of a sovereign entity by 
organizing and holding the referendum. Second, the referendum represented an additional venue 
for the TMR’s leaders to make the TMR’s claims to statehood to an international audience: to the 
observers at elections, the international media, and the parties to the negotiations. Third, it 
showed the commitment of the TMR’s elected authorities to protect the TMR’s constitutional 
provisions. They insisted that the results of the referendum confirmed the vision for statehood 
laid out in the Transdniestrian constitution and solidified their claims. As the TMR’s former 
foreign minister, Valery Litskay, noted:  
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We have set our course towards independence and Russia, and no talks can change 
that…The Transdniestrian people have spoken clearly on this matter, and it is up to us 
politicians to respect their opinion.164  
The consistent approach of Transdniestrian leaders toward the TMR’s foreign policy, 
including in negotiations, suggests their commitment to respect the will of people enshrined in 
the constitution and referenda. Not excluding other factors that could guide their decisions on 
foreign policy, the available evidence suggests that the shared interests of the TMR’s people and 
their elected leaders on the issue of the statehood serve as the basis for Transdniestrian leaders to 
exercise their powers in compliance with the constitution. As a result, while the 2006 referendum 
has not actually affected the TMR’s potential to receive international recognition, it has 
contributed to strengthening of the TMR’s statehood and hardening of its claim to recognition.  
After the referendum on independence, Transdniestria continued to distance itself from 
Moldova and reiterated its claim for independence in the context of its 2006 presidential election. 
As in previous elections, no candidate questioned the issue of independence for Transdniestria, 
and the differences among the candidates mainly concerned domestic policies.165 In particular, 
candidate and then-president Smirnov repeatedly stated his intention to harmonize 
Transdniestrian legislation with that of the Russian Federation. This goal was partially realized 
through the cooperation protocol signed between Moscow and Tiraspol in the diverse areas of 
industry, financial markets, and social protection.166 Before securing his re-election with 82.4% 
of votes,167 Smirnov declared that: 
                                                 
164 Statement of Valery Litskay, the TMR’s Foreign Minister (period of service: 1990-2008). Ibid. 
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I.N.Smirnov], 2006. 
167 Voter turnout was 257,810, or 66.1%. Compared to previous presidential elections, the number of candidates 
increased to include four candidates in 2006: Andrey Safonov, editor of the main opposition paper “Novaya 
Gazeta,” who won 3.9% of votes; Petr Tomayly, a businessman, who gained 2.1% of votes; and Nadezhda 
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Moldova has made its choice to move towards NATO and Europe without asking its 
people. We have also made our choice, but on the basis of the people's will. The 
[Transdniestrian] region will develop jointly with great Russia.168  
While the elections were widely monitored by representatives from Russia,169 Moldova, 
France, Italy, Poland,170 international electoral NGOs,171 and others,172 most international 
organizations followed Moldova’s appeal and ignored the election to de-legitimize the 
Transdniestrian claim to sovereignty.173 The specific responses of the external actors toward the 
TMR’s presidential elections arose from their staunch position on non-recognition of the entity. 
As such, they remained negative and confirmed the lack of evidence on the elections’ effects on 
the Transdniestrian recognition. Moldova called on the international community to consider the 
results of the vote illegitimate174 and did not recognize the vote itself,175 labeling it a 
“provocation.”176 Ukraine and the European Union supported Moldova by calling the vote 
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illegitimate, declining to send its official observers,177 and publicly refusing to recognize the 
presidential election.178 Ukraine also viewed the presidential elections as inconsistent with 
international rules and regulations, as well as with UN and OSCE principles.179 To Ukraine, such 
elections only prevented a settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict based on the principles of 
Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.180 Similarly, the United States viewed the 
elections in Transdniestria as a potential source of destabilization in the region and noted: 
[The] international community and the US consider Transnistria a part of Moldova. The 
so-called elections conducted by the Transnistrian regime are an attempt to destabilize 
Moldova. No state has recognized “presidential” elections of a separatist regime. The US, 
EU and OSCE have repeatedly called for the negotiations on the settlement of the 
Transnistrian issue that would respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova.181  
As a result, both the 2006 referendum and presidential elections led to increased attention 
from the external actors on the Transdniestrian issue. Although the external actors continued to 
regard the electoral practices as unrelated to Transdniestrian status and confirmed their non-
recognition of the TMR, they continued to engage with the TMR’s elected leaders. This 
electorally eventful year in the TMR also contributed to the consolidation of Transdniestrian 
statehood. Transdniestria continued on the path of hardening its claims on recognition. And it 
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viewed its independence referendum and its constitutionally elected authorities as potential 
leverage to achieve that claim within the negotiation process. 
2.3. The 2011 Presidential Elections 
With growing political and economic tensions between Transdniestria and Moldova, the 
two parties suspended their negotiations and ceased official interactions from 2006 to 2011. 
While a number of initiatives182 and unofficial meetings between the leaders of Moldova and the 
TMR occurred during this period,183 they did not lead to any significant outcomes and the parties 
maintained their opposing positions. With the support and facilitation of mediators and 
observers,184 Moldova and Transdniestria resumed the negotiation process in late 2011.185 
However, the new working agenda included only social, economic, and humanitarian issues:186 
both parties saw the issue of settlement as a potential final goal of the negotiations, but limited 
the resumed negotiation process to the small steps necessary to build trust and confidence. 
Although such an approach appeared the most appropriate after the stalemate, it also evinced the 
significant gap that had persisted between the two parties: Moldova, which continued to insist on 
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the TMR’s autonomous status, and Transdniestria, which remained firm on advancing 
recognition of its statehood.  
In this context, the external actors continued watching the domestic electoral 
developments in Transdniestria, including the 2010 parliamentary and the 2011 presidential 
elections. Although the 2010 parliamentary elections187 confirmed Transdniestrian aims for 
independence188 and attracted a large number of observers,189 who noted their democratic 
nature,190 the elections had relatively little effect on the reactions of the external actors when 
compared to the impact of the 2011 presidential elections. 
The 2011 elections drew considerable domestic and international attention due to the 
unexpected change in Transdniestrian leadership. They also proved that, public non-recognition 
of the elections’ legitimacy notwithstanding, during negotiations, the external actors have 
worked with the officials elected through internal constitutional processes. After two rounds of 
balloting191 and high voter turnout (58.9% in the first round and 51.7% in the second),192 
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Yevgeny Shevchuk, a former parliamentary speaker, was elected the president of the entity with 
73.88% of the vote.193 His rival in the second round, incumbent parliamentary speaker Anatoly 
Kaminsky, received only 19.6% of the votes194 despite alleged Russian support.195  
In his presidential campaign statements, Shevchuk’s rhetoric differed somewhat from that 
of Smirnov’s, as Shevchuk referred to the need for Transdniestria to modernize and integrate into 
the regional economy, a position that implied the potential for improved relations with 
Moldova.196 However, he strongly emphasized that he “is determined to continue the policy of 
independence for Transdniestria and closer relations with Russia that is consistent with the will 
expressed by the people of Transdniestria in the referendum of 2006.”197 In his inaugural speech, 
Shevchuk also reiterated his intention to seek international recognition for the republic and 
strengthen strategic relations with Russia and neighborly relations with Ukraine and Moldova. 
To him, the TMR’s presidential election – both how the election was conducted and the fact that 
it was held at all – “strengthened the image of Transdniestria on the world stage.”198   
Elections observers199 judged the second round of the Transdniestrian presidential 
election to be fair, generally well governed, and democratic, with only minor violations.200 One 
of the observers from the Russian delegation emphasized the peaceful and democratic handover 
of power in the TMR: 
                                                 
193 Ibid. 
194 In addition, 4.45% voted “against all.” Ibid. 
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the elections went on in a well organized manner and without any major violations that 
could have affected the electoral outcomes… The most important thing is that 
Transdniestria passed the exam for democracy with excellence. The opposition candidate 
beat the incumbent president at the elections, and the republic keeps developing calmly 
on the basis of democratic European values.201  
The difference in the responses of the external actors to the 2011 presidential elections in 
comparison to all previous elections lay in their favorable approach towards the results. Although 
none of their statements explicitly recognized the elections or the Transdniestrian state, they 
largely lacked previous references to their “illegitimate and illegal” character, except for the 
Moldovan statements. The Moldovan Prime Minister at the time stated that, regardless of the 
outcome of the presidential elections, Chisinau would continue its efforts to settle the conflict: 
These elections are illegitimate, as well as the proclamation of the Transdniestrian 
republic. Therefore, I do not care about the results of these elections. At the same time, a 
settlement of the Transdniestria conflict is a priority for our country. We will work 
toward this with the person elected by the people on the left bank of the Dniester River.202  
In addition, the Moldovan government expressed hope that the change in power would lead to 
invigorated talks on the conflict and give impetus to settlement of the Transdniestrian issue. The 
Moldovan government further noted that, “The policy was the same with Smirnov for many 
years. Now we are ready to look for new approaches in order to resolve disagreements between 
Chisinau and Tiraspol.”203  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation released a statement that also 
noted the democratic nature of the elections: 
…International experts attested that the vote was democratic and election procedures 
were organized at the level of accepted international standards. […] The candidate’s 
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stated desire to implement systemic changes in the socioeconomic sphere and seek a 
viable compromise in relations with Chisinau now as president will be tested in 
practice…The Russian Federation looks forward to continuing its traditionally close 
contacts with the representatives of Transnistria aimed at assisting its development and 
maintaining stability in the region.204 
The rest of the participants in the negotiation process similarly viewed the outcomes of 
the elections positively. The Ukrainian side saw in the elections results the opportunity to restart 
the negotiation process, noting that, “[t]he recent elections in Transdniestria will create good 
prospects for accelerating the negotiating process and simplifying the search for solutions 
acceptable for both sides.”205 The United States reported the landslide victory of Yevgeny 
Shevchuk without invoking the terms it has used in the past, “illegal” or “not free/unfair.”206 In 
its reference to the presidential elections in Transdniestria, the European Commission reported 
that, “a new generation has come to power, giving rise to hopes of a closer dialogue between 
Tiraspol and Chisinau.”207 Finally, the former Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, William 
Hill, commented that, “Transnistria may not have free and fair elections but they certainly have 
had competitive elections in the past. And this one was certainly competitive.”208 
As a result, the experience of the 2011 presidential elections, part of the TMR’s two- 
decades-long electoral development, strengthened the TMR’s statehood. The newly elected 
leader, who came to power through an election typical of the democratic processes in recognized 
states, confirmed his commitment to protect the TMR’s constitutional provisions on its sovereign 
status for internal and external audiences. While lacking any evidence of the effects on the 
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potential for the TMR’s recognition, the 2011 elections revealed two ways in which the TMR’s 
electoral practices has influenced the external actors. First, it showed that, for the purposes of 
negotiations, the external actors have interacted with Transdniestrian officials elected in 
accordance with the TMR’s constitutional framework, regardless of their public claim that the 
elections were illegitimate, illegal, not free, and unfair. Second, by closely monitoring the 
TMR’s electoral practices, the external actors have also reacted favorably to those elections in 
which they viewed the outcomes as beneficial for the negotiation process. This approach has 
proven that the external actors consider the principle of democratic development in 
Transdniestria as an important step for the purposes of negotiations, despite their public 
disregard for the TMR’s existing constitutional framework. 
Conclusion 
The development of electoral practices in Transdniestria and the reactions of the external 
actors towards them demonstrate that the TMR’s constitutional practices and their democratic 
nature have not affected the TMR’s recognition, but have had other important effects both 
domestically and internationally. Domestically, first, the high voter turnout in Transdniestrian 
elections and referenda points to the concern of the people for building their own state and their 
involvement in the entity’s constitutional practices. Second, through elections and referenda, 
Transdniestria has legitimized the entity’s authority and the policies that elected leaders have put 
into practice, including those on the Transdniestrian sovereignty and independence. Third, 
Transdniestria has used electoral events and plebiscites as additional forums to claim recognition 
and to state the TMR’s position on its independence for an international audience. Fourth, 
Transdniestria has demonstrated its commitment to democratic principles, the rule of law, and 
the protection of human rights, seen partly through the TMR’s respect for electoral norms and 
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the peaceful, transparent handover of power. Finally, Transdniestria has interpreted the responses 
of the external actors to its electoral practices, such as engagement in the negotiation process209 
and lack of sanctions,210 as implicitly legitimizing the TMR’s government. All of these factors 
have strengthened Transdniestria’s own sense of statehood and provided additional leverage in 
its claim to recognition during the negotiation process.  
Internationally, Transdniestrian constitutional practices have had a few noticeable and 
important effects as well. First, the TMR’s electoral practices have influenced the process of the 
external actors’ engagement with the TMR. For the purposes of negotiations, the external actors 
have interacted with those Transdniestrian representatives who were elected in accordance with 
the TMR’s constitutional framework. Second, the external actors have linked democratic 
practices in the entity with an efficient negotiation process that could resolve the issue while 
respecting the territorial integrity of Moldova. The majority of the external actors have explicitly 
repudiated the TMR’s constitutional framework and denied recognition of its elections, referenda 
and their outcomes, but they have admitted in principle the importance of democracy in the TMR 
for the purposes of settlement. The representatives of Moldova, the OSCE, Ukraine, the EU, and 
the US have tied the democratic process in Transdniestria to the entity’s status and have viewed 
Transdniestrian democratic development as an important factor contributing to rapprochement 
with Moldova and other parties in the negotiation process.211 For them, the democratic 
                                                 
209 The negotiation process that started in 1992 has proceeded in fits and start until now. During this period, 
Smirnov, who was re-elected president three times, his successor, Yevgeny Shevchuk, the elected MPs to the 
Supreme Council and their chairmen (G. Marakutsa, Y. Shevchuk, A. Kaminsky, M. Burla), and the appointed 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs (V. Litskay, V. Yastrebchak, N. Shtanski) were all involved in different capacities on 
behalf of the TMR in the negotiation process.  
210 Representatives of the Transdniestrian authorities consider the absence of sanctions from the external actors as an 
important indicator that Transdniestria has undertaken lawful actions and received de facto recognition of its 
institutions. Personal communication with the former Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Transdniestria Valery Litskay 
(period of service: 1990-2008) and Vladimir Yastrebchak, (period of service in the MFA: 2001-2012), August 2013. 
211 Personal communication of the representatives of Moldova, August 2013; the OSCE Mission to Moldova, April-
August 2013; the EU, July 2013. 
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development of Transdniestria could lead to more interaction between the TMR and Moldova, as 
well as between the TMR and other parties in the negotiation that would open the way for a more 
flexible, inclusive consensus on the settlement. As one high-ranking representative of the OSCE 
Mission to Moldova put it, “the development of real democracy on the left bank would facilitate 
resolution of the conflict.”212 At the same time, these external actors have emphasized that 
Transdniestrian democratic development is not related to its recognition213 and that settlement 
could only occur within the framework of a reintegrated Moldova.214 They have expressed the 
belief that democracy would also contribute to the stability of a reintegrated Moldovan state that 
recognizes some degree of autonomy for Transdniestria.215 Only one external actor, Russia, has 
accepted the importance of the principle of democratic development, but has not linked it 
directly to settlement of the conflict and has instead urged other external actors to respect the 
TMR’s existing domestic electoral practices and the will of the people as expressed through 
those practices. 
All of the external actors have also officially or unofficially followed Transdniestrian 
electoral events to stay abreast of the TMR’s internal constitutional practices and react promptly 
if they favor or threaten the negotiation process. In particular, the OSCE Mission to Moldova has 
stayed current on both the general and specific provisions of the Transdniestrian constitution and 
has regularly monitored elections and referenda through the observation of “public order” in 
Transdniestria and through submitting the reports on violations, if identified, to the OSCE head 
                                                 
212 Personal communication of the representative of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, July 2013. 
213 Personal communication of the representatives of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, July 2013 and May 2013. 
214 Personal communication of the representatives of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, April 2013, May 2013, July 
2013, one of whom noted that, “no one is contemplating recognition” for Transdniestria. 
215 Roper, 2004, 529. 
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office.216 This observation adds to the suggestion of the importance of Transdniestrian 
constitutional development for the purposes of negotiations. 
Overall, the explicit and implicit responses of the external actors to Transdniestrian 
constitutional provisions and practices suggest that the Transdniestrian practice of holding 
elections and referenda have had some effects on the negotiation process. This practice has 
consolidated the desire for statehood among the Transdniestrian population, legitimized its 
government, and bolstered its claim to sovereignty. It has also engaged the external actors, 
whose behavior in negotiations have been in some measure responsive to the shifts in personnel 
and power in Transdniestria that are themselves functions of TMR’s internal constitutional order.  
                                                 
216 Personal communication of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the TMR, Valery Litskay (period of 
service: 1990-2008), August 2013. 
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CHAPTER FIVE.  RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
SCHOLARSHIP 
1. Summary of the Doctrinal Framework and the Case Study of Transdniestria 
1.1. A Constitution’s Potential for the Recognition Process: Implications 
from the Existing Literature 
The existing literature in international and constitutional law does not discuss the 
interactions between constitutional functions and the process of diplomatic recognition. 
However, the vast scholarship on each of these discrete subjects has laid the theoretical 
groundwork for carrying out an interdisciplinary analysis of this relationship. The result of just 
such an analysis on the idea and functions of a constitution and international legal doctrines, 
which was presented in Chapter 1, reveals a close link between the criteria for recognition and 
the constitutional development of a state-like entity. Although a state’s recognition remains 
largely a political process, both the literature’s claims regarding the criteria for recognition and 
some states’ practices lead to the expectation that a constitution matters during a state-like 
entity’s search for recognition. 
In particular, the fact that the constitutional affirmation of territory, statehood, and 
sovereignty speaks directly to the traditional criteria for recognition – which require the 
existence of a defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter 
into relations with other states - confirms the relationship between a constitution and the 
recognition process. The constitutional organization and institutionalization of a polity, as well as 
constitutional legitimization and limitation of governmental authority, also correspond to the 
contemporary criteria for recognition. In this regard, a democratic constitution becomes a 
mechanism for organizing governance in accordance with the principles of democratic 
participation, the separation of powers, the protection of human rights, and for respecting 
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international jus cogens norms, all of which help ensure the fulfillment of the contemporary 
criteria for recognition. 
Political and legal doctrines and practices regarding the recognition of states, 
governments, and the admission of states to international organizations demonstrate two main 
ways in which a constitution plays a part in the recognition process. First, the entity seeking 
recognition as a state employs a constitution as a tool to establish a convincing sovereign 
presence for other nations and assert the criteria for statehood recognition. In addition, to pursue 
its recognition or to gain membership in an international organization, a state employs a 
constitution as a mechanism to assert the entity’s conformity to international expectations about 
its reliability as a participant in international relations. Second, the constitutional assertion of 
statehood and democratic principles predisposes states that are considering granting recognition 
to favorably view the entity’s claim for recognition. 
A number of international legal and constitutional developments confirm the importance 
of a constitution during the recognition process and bolster the expectation that it matters in 
dealing with claims for and decisions on an entity’s recognition. First, the requirement of a 
government’s constitutionality during its ascension to power, the need for the existence of a 
constitutional mechanism to fulfill the traditional criteria for statehood, and the explicit reference 
to the constitutional character of a state in its search for recognition and acceptance into the 
community of sovereign states all make a constitution an important element in the recognition 
process. It also appears that the world community uses a constitution as part of a broader effort to 
ensure a global membership that is peaceful and compliant with international obligations. 
Second, membership norms in an international organization have explicitly and 
frequently evaluated an aspiring state’s constitutional regime for its respect for the principles of 
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democracy and protection of human rights. Many international documents have enshrined a 
vision of international society that promotes a system of democratic states whose internal 
governance is based on constitutional principles. In this regard, such principles have become the 
key requirements for a state’s accession to an international organization and for it to gain 
recognition as its member. As this dissertation has argued, the adoption of a democratic 
constitution has become one of the essential tools to meet these criteria. 
Finally, the experience of some states has demonstrated that a constitution and its 
provisions could become important and influential in the decision-making of external actors 
regarding the decision to grant recognition. As a result, the existing literature and examples of 
some states have shown that the constitutional system of a state-like entity should typically 
matter for the process of its international recognition.  
1.2. The Limited Effects of a Constitution on the Recognition Process in the 
Case Study of the TMR 
In contrast to the expectations raised by the analysis of existing literature and recent 
practices, Transdniestria’s constitutional assertion of the traditional and contemporary criteria for 
recognition and its establishment of a democratic framework have not favored the recognition of 
this state-like entity. Chapters 3 and 4 have shown that the external actors have continued to 
deny recognition to Transdniestria, despite its constitutional respect for all the criteria for 
recognition and its state-like behavior. However, the overall development of the Transdniestrian 
constitutional system has had other effects, examination of which provide a more nuanced 
picture of the role that a constitution plays in an unrecognized state.  
First, the TMR’s constitutional framework has consolidated the entity’s statehood by 
ensuring its internal organization, the regulation of the TMR’s polity, and the internal 
legitimation of the TMR’s authority. Transdniestria’s constitutional electoral practices, for 
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example, have clearly demonstrated Transdniestria’s ability to function as an ordinary state. 
They have also constituted additional venues for the TMR’s leaders to assert their claims for 
recognition to internal and external audiences. Related to this consolidation effect is the 
constitution’s contribution to the sustainability of the TMR’s existence, which has led to 
extended interactions with external actors. 
 Second, the existence of the Transdniestrian constitution has served as the basis for the 
Transdniestrian authorities to promote the policies on independence enshrined in that document. 
This factor seems to have contributed to the hardening of the TMR’s position and its statehood 
claims during the negotiation process. Seeking to respect the provisions of the constitution 
adopted during the entity-wide referendum, Transdniestrian leaders have increasingly insisted on 
pushing for separation from Moldova and for the TMR’s independent statehood. 
Third, the constitutional framework has created a procedural justification for the external 
actors’ engagement with representatives of the TMR. For the purposes of negotiations, the 
external actors have interacted with officially unrecognized, but constitutionally elected or 
appointed, leaders. Despite the external actors’ refusal to publicly recognize the TMR’s state 
activities, such as elections, they have nonetheless engaged with the constitutionally elected 
representatives from the TMR to find a settlement to the conflict. 
Finally, although they have not acknowledged the Transdniestrian constitution itself, the 
very idea of the entity’s constitutional democratic development has shaped the external actors’ 
approach towards the Transdniestrian negotiations. Those actors have viewed the democratic 
development of Transdniestria as an important contributing factor to the settlement of the 
conflict, albeit one that would restore Moldovan territorial integrity. Therefore, the external 
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actors have closely followed the internal constitutional practices of Transdniestria in order to 
observe whether those practices favor or jeopardize a final settlement. 
2. Research Implications for Future Scholarship 
The findings of the present research on the Transdniestrian case have largely opposed the 
literature’s suggestions that the constitutionality of a state-like entity generally affects its 
prospects for recognition. Regardless of the constitutional system elaborated in the TMR, which 
asserts both the traditional and contemporary criteria for recognition, the entity has kept its status 
as a breakaway, separatist, and unrecognized state. At the same time, the present research has 
revealed a few effects, unobserved and unstudied earlier, about the role that a constitution plays 
in an unrecognized state. Most notably, the existence of the constitution and constitutional 
mechanisms has consolidated Transdniestrian statehood, procedurally affecting and increasing 
the external actors’ engagement with the TMR.  
Following these outcomes, the research has identified three main directions for future 
scholarship. The first concerns the reasons for the limited effects of a constitution on recognition. 
Why is it the case that, despite the typical pattern scholars espouse, the constitutional 
development in this de facto state has not favored its diplomatic recognition and has had only 
limited effects? The second direction centers on the general applicability of the outcomes of the 
Transdniestrian case for other unrecognized states. Are the limited effects of a constitution seen 
in this case commonly shared among unrecognized states? Finally, the third direction explores 
the influence that the constitution of an unrecognized state has on the process of conflict 
settlement. Does it contribute to conflict resolution? Does it have an impact on the particular 
design of conflict resolution? Further analysis of these issues could provide better insight into the 
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interrelation between the internal developments of de facto states and the external responses 
towards them for the purposes of conflict settlement. 
2.1. Analysis of the Causes of the Differences between the Case Study and 
the Literature 
The study of Transdniestria has shown that its constitutional development has not 
facilitated the TMR’s diplomatic recognition and had only limited effects on negotiations over its 
status. This case thus provides insight into the possible factors that could have influenced such an 
outcome and frames the issue for further discussion. In the Transdniestrian case, the 
constitution’s lack of impact on the recognition process could have been shaped by two main 
factors: the firm position of Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, the EU, and the US that the 
TMR could only be a part of Moldova, on the one hand; and, on the other, the belief of these 
actors that not all available options for conflict resolution have yet been pursued. 
First, from the very beginning and throughout the negotiations, all of the external actors 
have proceeded from the premise that the principle of territorial integrity should be respected; 
therefore, they have never viewed granting recognition to Transdniestria as possible.1 The 
external actors have viewed the TMR only within the Republic of Moldova, the borders of which 
have existed since the twentieth century and which the external actors have seen no reason to 
change.2 The external actors argued that, since Transdniestrian independence resulted from a 
conflict and lacked Moldovan consent, they have not even considered the idea of the TMR’s 
                                                 
1 Personal communication of the representatives of Moldova, Ukraine, the OSCE, and the EU, March-August 2013. 
2 Michael Kirby, former US Ambassador to Moldova, “Interview to Kommersant Plus.” US Department of State: 
reviewed on April 15, 2008, released on November 12, 2009. In his interview, Kirby stated, “I fail to understand 
why it would be in the interest of a “big state” to want the breakup of Moldova. The borders of what is now the 
Republic of Moldova were established long before the breakup of the Soviet Union and there is no reason for those 
borders to change. […] [T]he United States is optimistic about an eventual resolution to the Transnistrian conflict 
based on the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova. It’s hard to imagine that in the 21st 
century people would support, even tacitly, the prolongation of these frozen conflicts.” 
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separation.3 While referencing the need to uphold international stability, security and order, the 
external actors have consistently underlined the need to preserve the territorial integrity of 
already-recognized states. As the former Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, William Hill, 
noted, “in principle all the countries of the world recognize the Transnistrian region as a part of 
the Republic of Moldova…[a]nd… there is no one that is attempting or contemplating a change 
to that principled stand.”4  
Second, the external actors believe that Transdniestrian steps towards its independence, 
including the 2006 referendum, have contravened both general international law and agreements 
signed between Moldova and Transdniestria that provide the basis for conflict resolution within 
Moldova. General international law notably favors the exhaustion of all possible options for a 
conflict settlement that respect territorial integrity before the pursuance of other options. Specific 
to the Transdniestrian case, the 1997 Moscow Memorandum stipulated the building of the 
relationship between Moldova and Transdniestria “in the framework of a common state within 
the borders of the Moldavian SSR as of January 1990.” Along with this Memorandum, the 
Common Declaration of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine also specified that:  
…the provisions of the Memorandum cannot contradict the generally accepted norms of 
international law, and also will not be interpreted or acted upon in contradiction with the 
existing international agreements, decisions of the OSCE, and the Joint Declaration of 19 
January 1996 of the Presidents of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Republic of 
Moldova, which recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Moldova.5  
                                                 
3 Personal communication with the representative of the TMR’s government, August 2013. 
4 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: U.S. Helsinki Commission. “Moldova: The Growing Pains of 
Democracy.” (Federal News Service), 2012.  
5 Joint Statement of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in Connection with the Signing of the 
Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria. 
Moscow, May 8, 1997.  
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These and subsequent documents have underlined the significance of international legal 
principles and reinforced the idea that a settlement between Transdniestria and Moldova must be 
found within the framework of a common state.  
In addition, Transdniestria and Moldova have never had a mutual agreement on the 
admissibility of the TMR’s independence from Moldova that could have served as a potential 
form of conflict resolution. This contrasts, for example, to the former union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, which, while distinct from the case of Moldova-Transdniestria on other grounds,6 
suggests that recognition of an entity might become an option for external actors when there is an 
explicit agreement between the parent state and succeeding entity. In particular, the possibility of 
Montenegro’s referendum on independence was grounded in the Belgrade Agreement that 
established the political State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.7 According to that agreement, 
the Serbian central authorities formally consented to the terms by which Montenegro could seek 
independence, and later recognized Montenegro’s independence in 2006.8 Since Transdniestria 
has neither experienced a settled status within Moldova nor reached a similar agreement with the 
national government in Chisinau, the external actors have viewed the TMR’s state-building 
actions and its 2006 independence referendum as taking place outside of the agreed-upon 
framework of a common state and, consequently, as illegal and illegitimate. The external actors 
consider the options for re-integration still possible; therefore, they have dismissed any thoughts 
of Transdniestria’s recognition.9   
                                                 
6 One of the key difference concerns their status. Before the break-up of Yugoslavia, Montenegro enjoyed the status 
of a federal republic within the SFRY and later the FRY, whereas Transdniestria lacked any particular status in 
Moldova as part of the USSR. 
7 Agreement on Principles of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro within the State Union, signed on March 
14, 2002. 
8 Fawn, 2008, 276. 
9 Personal communication with the representatives of the OSCE and the EU, July-August 2013. 
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As a result, the external actors have viewed the domestic constitutional process in 
Transdniestria (as well as the TMR’s economic, social, and other processes) within the general 
framework of Moldovan developments, and, by virtue of that, as issues of internal 
Transdniestrian concern, distinct from any admissible final resolution. In this context, the 
external actors’ adherence to the principle of territorial integrity has shaped their approach in 
disregarding the internal constitutional development of Transdniestria. The nature of the 
conflict,10 which created the illusion that it might be quickly resolved within the boundaries of 
Moldova, also came into play and added to the external actors’ determination to reject the 
TMR’s claim for recognition.11 
The peculiarities of the Transdniestrian case, however, do not fully account for the role of 
the principle of territorial integrity and the unexplored possibilities for conflict resolution in 
defining the behavior of the external actors and explaining the limited effects of the 
Transdniestrian constitution on the recognition of the TMR. The analysis of the isolated case of 
Transdniestria indeed reveals the strong influence of these factors on the external actors. 
Following the principles of territorial integrity and exhaustion of all options for settlement, their 
decision to view Transdniestria as an integral part of Moldova has conditioned the nature of their 
interactions with the TMR. Seeking to avoid any steps that would jeopardize their position on 
non-recognition, the external actors have limited their engagement with Transdniestria.  
                                                 
10 As Chapter 2 showed, the Transdniestrian conflict has a number of causes, but it lacks a strongly pronounced 
animosity or hostility between the people living on two banks of the river Dniester. People enjoy relatively free 
movement between Moldova and the TMR, have close familial ties on both banks, and tend to avoid conflicts. This 
situation differs from the cases of, for example, Abkhazia or Nagorno-Karabakh, where the ethnic controversies are 
much stronger and differences are much sharper. 
11 Philip Remler, “Negotiation Gone Bad: Russia, Germany, and Crossed Communications.” Carnegie Europe, 
August 21, 2013. The author points out that, “[s]ince there are few ethnic or religious differences separating the two 
sides, neophytes often believe this is the easiest of all frozen conflicts to resolve – the ‘low-hanging fruit’ that might 
provide a mediator with a quick and easy accomplishment.”; Matthew Rojansky. “‘Frozen’ Transnistria Conflict 
Begins to Thaw.” World Politics Review, April 17, 2012. Rojansky mentions that, “the perception that this is a 
‘solvable’ conflict” has inspired some European leaders to declare Transdniestria as “a ‘test case’ for a new, 
inclusive model of European security” and contributed to their cooperation in seeking the ways to settle the conflict 
without compromising Moldovan territorial integrity.  
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Nonetheless, the available evidence does not clearly show that the intention to respect the 
principle of territorial integrity or to exhaust all options for conflict resolution have been the true 
causes or motives of Western actors’ behavior, as opposed to merely reflecting the consequences 
of their decision to follow a pre-determined strategic path. To understand the general causes that 
explain the limited effects of a constitution on the process of recognition, it is important to 
explore how the guiding principles the external actors expressed in this case have operated in 
other cases of unrecognized or partly recognized states.  
For example, the conflict settlement in Kosovo evidenced the prevalence of the right of 
people’s self-determination, rather than the principle of territorial integrity, in the approach of 
external actors. The case of Kosovo demonstrates the possibility that the principle of territorial 
integrity is not always strictly followed and created a model to which other unrecognized states, 
including Transdniestria, may appeal. At the same time, the external actors have dismissed all 
the Transdniestrian claims that the right to self-determination should similarly prevail in the case 
of the TMR.12 Instead, the external actors have insisted that the two cases are significantly 
different and stressed the uniqueness of Kosovo’s situation. They have emphasized that, contrary 
to Kosovo, Transdniestria did not experience, first, ethnic cleansing and the scale of the 
Kosovo’s human rights violations, and second, the direct involvement of the United Nations.13 
                                                 
12 In particular, the Transdniestrian Foreign Ministry issued a statement emphasizing that, “…[D]eclaration and 
further recognition of Kosovo are essential, since they create a new model of conflict resolution that is based on the 
prevalence of the right of people’s self-determination. Transdniestria believes that this model should be consistently 
applied to all conflicts that have similar political, legal, and economic basis.” Ministerstvo intostrannyh del PMR. 
Zayavlenie. 19.02.2008 [Statement of the TMR’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. 
13Adrian Jakobovits de Szeged, former EU representative to Moldova noted, “We believe that the problems of 
Kosovo and Transdnistria cannot be compared. [Transdniestria] does not have ethnic and religious problems. Also, 
the Kosovo problem is being resolved by the Security Council where Russia has a vote. Therefore, comparing these 
situations would be totally incorrect because this would lead to wrong conclusions.” Mykola Siruk, “Adrian 
Jakobovits de Szeged: Tiraspol’s current policy is a dead end for Transdnistria”, The Day, №37, November 21, 
2006. Also, Michael Kirby, former US Ambassador to Moldova, stated that, “Kosovo is a special case for several 
reasons. [It experienced crimes condemned by the international community, ethnic cleansing, displacement of large 
sections of the population, and direct involvement by the United Nations]. Circumstances in Transnistria are not at 
all like Kosovo's, and therefore we reject these arguments given by special interest groups in Transnistria and in 
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The external actors, therefore, appear to contextualize the application of the principles of 
international law and their own behavior as dependent on a variety of factors and conditioned by 
the specifics of a case. As Kosovo’s experience suggests the principle of territorial integrity does 
not explain the behavior of the external actors all of the time and that certain factors may take 
precedence in their decisions on whether to recognize an entity. 
As a result, the external actors’ focus on the principle of territorial integrity and the 
potential for conflict resolution in the case of Transdniestria does not reveal the full picture of the 
driving forces for their non-recognition of this entity. The minor role that similar principles 
played in the case of Kosovo, for instance, suggests that the external actors’ behavior regarding 
the recognition process has been driven either by their preferences or by other hidden forces. 
This question requires further research and a closer focus on the factors shaping the approach of 
external actors in considering the political status of other unrecognized or partly recognized 
states. Such work may provide answers to what forces condition the behavior of external actors 
and why constitutional development may matter for the purposes of recognition in some 
instances but not in others.  
2.2. Assessing the Effects of a Constitution in Other Unrecognized States 
The Transdniestrian case demonstrates the limited effects of a constitution on the 
recognition process of a de facto state. Such an outcome raises the question of its generalizability 
among unrecognized or partly recognized states and requires closer analysis of the constitutional 
and international practices of those entities. The available evidence suggests that the experience 
of other de facto states, such as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Somaliland, likewise show that a constitution has only limited 
                                                                                                                                                             
other countries for tearing away Transnistria from Moldova. Michael Kirby, “Interview to Kommersant Plus.” US 
Department of State, 2008. 
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effects.14 These entities have claimed international recognition and have employed a number of 
institutional and legal tools, including constitutions,15 to achieve that aim. The limited evidence 
available appears to suggest that, similar to the Transdniestrian case, the constitutions of these de 
facto states do not favor the entities’ recognition but instead have other effects, for example, the 
consolidation of their statehood. 
First, several cases of partially recognized states, such as the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, have shown that geopolitical factors rather than 
the constitutional mechanisms of those de facto states have played the decisive role in the 
recognition process. There are no reasons to believe that either Turkey, which extended 
recognition to the Turkish Cypriot republic,16 or Russia, which granted recognition to Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia,17 did so because of their focus on the constitutional structures of those state-
like entities. The very fact that the overwhelming majority of international actors does not 
recognize such de facto states at all also shows the lack of a possible “constitutional recognition 
effect.” 
                                                 
14 De facto states are defined according to the typology presented in Chapter 2. 
15 The details on the constitutions of de facto states are as follows: The Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia 
was adopted by the Supreme Council on November 26, 1994, and approved in a referendum on October 3, 1999. 
The first Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia was adopted by the referendum on November 3, 1993, and 
the second (current) Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia was adopted by the referendum on April, 8, 2001. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh was adopted by referendum on December 10, 2006. Prior to 
that, a number of constitutional laws defined the issues of sovereign statehood and governance. The Constitution of 
the Turkish Republic of the Northern Cyprus was passed by the Constituent Assembly of Northern Cyprus after its 
declaration of independence on November 15, 1983, and was approved in a referendum May 5, 1985. The 
Constitution of Somaliland was adopted by the Houses of the Parliament of Somaliland on April 30, 2000, and was 
approved in a referendum on May 31, 2001. 
16 The Turkish Government appeared to grant recognition for the purposes of finding a peaceful settlement. It 
considered the declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot republic to have been inevitable. Turkish Foreign 
Minister Ilter Turkmen declared that, ''We must now turn our attention to the search for a peaceful settlement. We 
hope that all concerned governments will contribute to efforts in that direction. The adoption of a negative attitude 
toward the newly established republic will only serve to eliminate the possibilities of agreement.'' “Turks Recognize 
the New Nation,” New York Times, November 16, 1983.   
17 Russia claimed that it extended its recognition in response to Georgian aggression. In an interview, former 
Russian President Medvedev noted that there was a widespread understanding among his interlocutors in 
conversations and meetings that diplomatic recognition was granted to Abkhazia and South Ossetia for this reason. 
Pravitel’stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Vstrecha s predstavitelyami regional’nyh sredstv massovoi informatsii. [Meeting 
with the Representatives of the Regional Mass-media], RF Government News Release, November 18, 2008. 
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Second, external actors’ acknowledgement of the much-improved conditions for 
democracy in Nagorno-Karabakh18 and the “significant strides on the road to democracy”19 in 
Somaliland (unlike in its parent state Somalia) evidently has been insufficient for the purposes of 
official recognition. In all these cases, the external actors have insisted on making territorial 
integrity a precondition for resolution of the conflict and accepted only the legitimacy of de jure 
boundaries.20  
Third, despite the lack of effect of a constitution on the recognition process, research on 
the nature and evolution of the Caucasian de facto states21 in the context of international affairs 
shows that their legal institutions have contributed to state building processes and strengthened 
state apparatuses in ways somewhat similar to what this research has found for the TMR.22 This 
study has further advanced the idea that an entity’s legal framework affects the dynamics of the 
development of statehood leading to the consolidation of states’ institutions.  
These observations suggest that the limited effects of a constitution seen in the case of 
Transdniestria could also be a feature shared by other de facto states. This assumption is based 
on the fact that, throughout the last several decades, the international community has largely 
continued to disregard both de facto states’ claims to democratic legitimacy as part of their right 
to statehood, as well as their appeal to the world’s commitment to democracy. Instead, the 
international community has mainly insisted on respect for international policies on territorial 
                                                 
18 Laurence Broers. “The Politics of Non-Recognition and Democratization.” In The Limits of Leadership: Elites 
and Societies in the Nagorny Karabakh Peace Process, 17, (London: Conciliation Resources), 2005, 71. 
19 Oisin Tansey. “Does Democracy Need Sovereignty?” Review of International Studies 37, no. 4 (2011): 1515-36, 
1527. 
20 Broers, 2005, 71. 
21 Namely, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.  
22 Ara Ghazarians, “From Frozen Conflicts to Unrecognized Republics: The de facto States in the Emergent Region 
of the Post-Soviet States of the South Caucasus.” PhD, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2007, 309. 
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integrity, except for a very few cases.23 Therefore, establishing a constitution and promoting 
democratic progress in other de facto states may not impact their chances of international 
recognition.24 At the same time, there is some evidence that legal instruments have strengthened 
statehood in a number of de facto states, which suggests that, as in Transdniestria, constitutional 
frameworks in other unrecognized states may have some limited effects. As a result, further case 
studies of the relationship between constitutional development and the criteria for recognition in 
other unrecognized or partially recognized states are necessary to discern the contours of the 
limited effects of a constitution as a common feature of unrecognized states. Alternatively, these 
studies could identify and explain the distinct, case-dependent nature of the outcomes for each 
unrecognized state. 
2.3. Analysis of the Impact of an Unrecognized Constitution on Conflict 
Resolution 
The case of Transdniestria has also raised specific questions about the relationship 
between the constitutional system of an unrecognized state and the prospects for a settlement of 
its political status. First, does the constitutional framework of an unrecognized state create an 
environment that facilitates conflict resolution? And second, does the constitutional framework 
of an unrecognized state influence the particular design of the political settlement? A close 
examination of these issues could provide a better understanding of the nature of unrecognized 
states and, possibly, encourage a reconsideration of the approach international actors employ 
toward such entities in the process of conflict settlement. 
                                                 
23 Tansey, 2011, 1516. Kosovo is one such exceptional case. Some scholars favor these non-recognition strategies 
by international actors and only call for the revision of the general aspects of international engagement with de facto 
states. For example, some scholars have discussed the problematic issue of Abkhazia’s absorption into Russia. They 
have urged Western diplomats to continue to refuse recognition of Abkhazia’s independence and instead to develop 
a new approach toward the entity in order to prevent its complete dependence on Russia. Alexander Cooley and 
Lincoln Mitchell. “Abkhazia on Three Wheels.” World Policy Journal (2010): 73-81, 80. 
24 Nina Caspersen. “Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 50, no. 4 
(2008): 113–36. 
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2.3.1. The Constitutional Framework and Democratization in an 
Unrecognized State: A Help or Hindrance to Conflict 
Resolution? 
The literature suggests that democratic regimes favor the resolution of conflict over 
armed engagement. Democratization, which is partly achieved through constitutional tools, is 
said to contribute to leaders’ willingness to terminate rivalries25 and to seek out peaceful 
settlements.26 Democracy opens the way for resolution an entity’s problems through dialogue 
and allows ordinary people to influence the government’s decision-making to find better 
solutions.27 The Transdniestrian case, however, has revealed the ambiguities this framework 
encounters when dealing with the constitutional and democratic development in an unrecognized 
state involved in conflict resolution. While the TMR’s democratization has contributed to peace 
on the ground, it has actually made the settlement of the conflict more difficult. 
On the one hand, Transdniestrian constitutional structures are intended to organize the 
polity, provide legitimacy for and limitations on the government, and create the basis for an 
internally legitimate leadership to interact with the external actors to reach a settlement. These 
implications indeed have proven beneficial for negotiations, as they have contributed to peaceful 
dialog, order, stability, and the TMR’s gradual democratic development. On these grounds, the 
                                                 
25 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Paul F. Diehl. “Caution in What You Wish for: The Consequences of a Right to 
Democracy.” Stanford Journal of International Law 48 (2012), 314. 
26 William J. Dixon. “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict.” The American Political 
Science Review 88, no. 1 (1994): 14-32; Russell J. Leng, and Patrick M. Regan. “Social and Political Cultural 
Effects on the Outcomes of Mediation in Militarized Interstate Disputes.” International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003): 
431-47; Paul K. Huth, and Todd L. Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century, 
(UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 277-97, 282. 
27 Molly Beutz. “Functional Democracy: Responding to Failures of Accountability.” Harvard International Law 
Journal 44 (2003), 405. The dominant approach toward democracy and the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the 
existing literature is based on research on inter-state, not intrastate conflicts. Although some scholars point out that, 
in intrastate conflicts, the correlation between the democratization of authoritarian regimes and level of conflicts 
might be different because they lack the systemic factors that account for peace or peaceful settlement between 
liberal democracies, the prevailing idea of “democratic peace” influences the conceptualization of the relationship 
between democracy and settlement in intrastate conflicts. See Anne-Marie Slaughter. “Pushing the Limits of the 
Liberal Peace: Ethnic Conflict and the “Ideal Polity”.” In International Law and Ethnic Conflict, edited by David 
Wippman. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 128-144. 
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external actors have supported a separate constitution for Transdniestria; they also have 
considered the TMR’s democratization an important precondition for conflict settlement.28 To 
them and, consistent with what the literature suggests about the role of democracy in peaceful 
settlements, the democratic development of the TMR should have led to a more accountable and 
flexible leadership, which was willing to compromise and ready to pursue a settlement based on 
international norms. 
On the other hand, contrary to both existing literature on the topic and the external actors’ 
expectations, the TMR’s democratization has not led to progress in resolving the conflict. The 
entrenchment of a constitutional and democratic system in Transdniestria has consolidated its 
statehood, hardened its claims to independence, and contributed to the stabilization of the 
situation, which has led both sides of the conflict to stand firm in their positions. The reluctance 
of both sides to change the status quo has also added to difficulties for the mediators and 
observers to the negotiations. Attempts by the external actors to avoid the tensions and to watch 
for an opportunity to pursue the reintegration agenda have spurred dialog, but have not resulted 
in a settlement. 
Therefore, although the TMR’s democratization has partly ensured the stability and the 
maintenance of peace between the two sides, it has not actually solved the conflict. Rather, along 
with the quiet, peaceful situation and the lack of common ground for the settlement between 
Moldova and Transdniestria, democratization has actually further frozen the conflict. This 
suggests that the democratic development of a de facto state, which is based on its constitution, 
may not necessarily promote a conflict settlement and pro-reintegration agenda as the external 
actors envision. By consolidating the unrecognized state internally, it may also harden that 
state’s negotiating position and prevent resolution of the conflict.  
                                                 
28 Personal communication with the representatives of the OSCE and the EU, May-August 2013. 
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The 2011 elections of Transdniestrian president Yevgeny Shevchuk demonstrate 
precisely that point. The external actors widely welcomed Shevchuk’s victory due to his open-
minded and pragmatic approach to a number of issues. The external actors expressed hope that a 
new, democratically elected leader who represented a younger generation of politicians could 
compromise on the TMR’s position and bring reintegration closer. However, some of 
Shevchuk’s decisions have not met the external actors’ expectations of renewed progress in the 
negotiations. Instead of encouraging a dialog on reintegration with Moldova, Shevchuk has 
continued his predecessor’s policy of promoting independence and seeking recognition. Not only 
did he explicitly declare his respect for the will of the people provided in the TMR’s constitution 
regarding Transdniestrian independence,29 but also he announced two initiatives that sought to 
distance the TMR even further from Moldova.  
First, during the conference on confidence-building measures organized by the OSCE 
Mission to Moldova for the participants of the “5+2” negotiations on the Transdniestrian issue, 
Shevchuk stated that the key to the conflict settlement lies in the “civilized…divorce” between 
Moldova and Transdniestria, similar to the cases of Czech Republic and Slovakia or Serbia and 
Montenegro.30 In his speech, he emphasized that international recognition of Transdniestria 
would yield only positive outcomes, such as stability in the region and the strengthening of 
peaceful partnerships with neighboring states.31  
                                                 
29 “Moldova Hopes for Invigorated Talks on Transdniestria Settlement.” ITAR-TASS, December 26, 2011; Lyudmila 
Alexandrova. “New Dniester Leader Beats Moscow-backed Rival, but Vows to Be Pro-Russian,” ITAR-TASS World 
Service, December 27, 2011. 
30 “Yevgeny Shevchuk obratilsea s rech’iu k uchastnikam Konferentsii, posvyashennoi meram po ukrepleniu 
doveria” [ “Yevgeny Shevchuk Gave a Speech at the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures,” Press Service 
of the TMR’s President], Press-slujba Presidenta PMR, October 30, 2013. 
31 Ibid. 
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Second, based on the results of the 2006 referendum, Shevchuk submitted to the TMR’s 
Supreme Council an initiative on adding a new article to the TMR’s constitution.32 In it, he 
proposed the introduction of the federal legislation of the Russian Federation on the territory of 
Transdniestria and its incorporation into the Transdniestrian legal system, alongside the TMR’s 
own legislation, the general principles and norms of international law, and international 
treaties.33 The Transdniestrian president explained his initiative as meeting the aspirations of the 
Transdniestrian people to integrate into the Russian space34 and tackling new regional 
challenges.35  
Thus, the developments in Transdniestria suggest that the constitutional framework of an 
unrecognized state has the potential to contribute to the stability and peaceful coexistence of 
people in the region as well as to harden the positions of parties and even freeze the negotiations. 
In literature on the subject, the idea that the role of democracy is not entirely positive in the 
context of conflict settlement is not completely new. Scholars point out that the implications of 
democratic development depend on the “cultural depth and institutional strength” of a political 
community.36 They argue that the democratization of autocracies opens the ways for increased 
                                                 
32 “President PMR vnes na rassmotrenie Verhovnogo Soveta PMR proekt konstitutsionnogo zakona “O vnesenii 
dopolnenia v Konstitutsiu Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respubliki. [ “The TMR’s President Submitted to the TMR’s 
Supreme Council a Draft of Constitutional Law ‘On addition to the Constitution of the TMR’”, Press Service of the 
TMR’s President], Press-sluzhba Presidenta PMR, December 4, 2013. 
33 Draft of the proposed Art. 58-1 to the TMR’s constitution. Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 In part, Shevchuk’s steps were conditioned by the increasingly close interactions between Moldova and the EU, 
and the initiation of the Association Agreement between the EU and Moldova on November 29, 2013. This 
Agreement aims, inter alia, to promote political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova 
and to establish conditions for enhanced economic and trade relations. The latter entails the gradual integration of 
the Republic of Moldova into the EU Internal Market, including the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area, which would provide for far-reaching regulatory approximation and market access liberalization.  
See Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part, version of 26/11/2013. “Moldova a 
Parafat Acordul de Asociere cu Uniunea Europeană,” Serviciul de Presa al Guvernului RM, November 29, 2013. 
36 Diane F. Orentlicher. “Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims.” Yale Journal of 
International Law 23 (1998), 62. See also, Carol Skalnik Leff. “Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational 
States: The Breakup of the Communist Federations.” World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999): 205-235 (suggesting that the 
political context for transition in multinational states offers multiple arenas of political contestation that could have 
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ethnic mobilization,37 and that weak institutional structures and resource scarcity may result in a 
conflictive outcome.38 An illustrative example of the negative impact of democratization is the 
introduction of free elections in Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1990s. Voters largely elected 
nationalist candidates who, instead of smoothing out the differences among the federal entities, 
promoted policies that exacerbated them.39  
The limited evidence from the Transdniestrian case does not conclusively support the 
argument that a direct negative correlation exists between democratization and conflict 
settlement. However, the present research has identified the problem of the TMR’s increasingly 
firm position on independence, which runs contrary to the external actors’ expectations that its 
democratic development would lead to reintegration with Moldova. Similarly, other de facto 
states have used democratization to strengthen their own claims to independence.40 Such 
outcomes as these suggest the need to look more closely at the effects of democratization in 
unrecognized states on the process of conflict settlement. Further work should take into account 
both the positive and negative effects of democratic reforms on conflict resolution. Additional 
research may yield more information about the factors that condition the stability and peace 
ensured by constitutional structures, as well as their effects on the positions adopted by de facto 
states regarding recognition during negotiations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
mixed implications for the state’s stability); Dawn Brancati. “Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the 
Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?” International Organization 60, no. 3 (2006): 651-685 (arguing that 
decentralization may either decrease ethnic conflict and secessionism or increase them through indirect 
encouragement of the growth of regional parties that consequently reinforces ethnic and regional identities and 
mobilize them for secessionism). 
37 Fareed Zakaria. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs (1997): 22-43, 38. 
38 Ted Robert Gurr. “Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts” (Washington D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 137-138. 
39 Paul C. Szasz. “The Bosnian Constitution: The Road to Dayton and Beyond.” In Amy J. Berks and Zivin Kara 
(eds) “Yugoslavia.” American Society of International Law Proceedings 90 (1996): 471-86, 486. 
40 Broers, 2005, 68-71 (discussing the example of Nagorno-Karabakh, which projects its “democratic statehood to 
the outside world in support of Karabakh’s claim to sovereignty”), 70. 
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2.3.2. The Political Settlement of a Conflict: Does the Constitutional 
Framework of an Unrecognized State Influence the 
Settlement’s Design?  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the literature is largely silent on the constitutional systems of 
de facto states, as well as on their legal systems more generally. In the context of conflict 
resolution, scholarship mainly focuses on the attempts of conflicting parties to use a constitution 
as a peacemaking tool and analyzes different variables pertaining to drafting a constitution that 
ensure peacemaking.41 The experience of Transdniestria and other unrecognized states 
underscores the value of exploring the relationship between a constitution and conflict resolution 
from a different perspective. First, the lack of common ground for a settlement makes 
discussions of a peace deal and the drafting of a common constitution problematic. There exists, 
therefore, a need to understand all internal factors affecting both parties to the conflict, including 
their constitutional structures, in an attempt to draw these parties closer. Second, the lengthy 
existence of de facto states offers a new and nuanced perspective on the impact of the entities’ 
own legal mechanisms on the process of conflict resolution. The study of Transdniestria in 
particular has raised intriguing questions about the relationship between the democratic nature of 
an unrecognized constitution and political settlement. Does it matter for the design of the 
settlement that a constitution is democratic? Does a positive correlation exist between the 
constitutional system and the particular status that the de facto state is likely to receive?  
First, the evidence from the Transdniestrian case is insufficient to demonstrate the 
potential significance of a democratic constitution for the purposes of pursuing a particular 
                                                 
41 See e.g., Donald L. Horowitz. “Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States,” 
William and Mary Law Review 49 (2008), 1231-32 (arguing that avoiding exclusion from the constitution-making 
process might help achieve peace and contribute to the success of a constitution); Vivien Hart. “Democratic 
Constitution Making,” United States Institute of Peace, 2003 (suggesting that participation in the constitution-
making process is critical to creating and maintaining a peaceful society); Kim Lane Scheppele. “A Constitution 
Between Past and Future,” William and Mary Law Review 49 (2008) (discussing the relationship between a 
country's pre-constitutional history and post-conflict constitution-making). 
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political status. The TMR has sought to meet contemporary standards for democracy by adopting 
a constitution compliant with the required criteria. However, it is unclear whether this factor has 
played any role in the external actors’ approach towards Transdniestria and the conflict 
settlement. It might have been the case that, had Transdniestria adopted a largely undemocratic 
constitution, the external actors would not have interacted with the TMR at all, or would have 
employed other methods or alternative options for settlement. Although plausible, this 
hypothesis requires its further exploration.  
Second, the research on Transdniestria shows that, while there is no direct positive 
correlation between the TMR’s constitution and its political status, it is possible that the TMR’s 
constitution indirectly affects the proposals for the settlement. The present study has shown that 
the positions of the external actors on the settlement of the TMR’s status have undergone no 
essential change in response to constitutional development in the TMR and the entity’s 
compliance with democratic principles. Rather, their positions have varied with respect to the 
particular proposals for conflict settlement put forward in the course of negotiations.  
For example, the OSCE’s position on the status of Transdniestria in 1993 contains a 
provision for “a special status for the left-bank Dniester area … within the Republic of Moldova 
as a basis for talks between both parties to the conflict.”42 The OSCE ruled out such options as 
(a) a unitary centralized state of Moldova, in which Transdniestria is governed from the center; 
(b) the division of Moldova and granting recognition to the TMR; and (c) the coexistence of two 
separate states within a “confederation” of Moldova.43 Instead, the OSCE suggested setting up a 
special region of Transdniestria that would enjoy considerable self-rule with its own regional 
                                                 
42 The CSCE (OSCE) Mission to Moldova Report No.13, 1993, 1. 
43 Ibid., 3. 
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executive, elective assembly, and court.44 In 2004, another set of proposals from mediators from 
the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine suggested the creation of a federal state with the Transdniestrian 
region as a federal subject. The proposals detailed exclusive and joint responsibilities and 
provided residual authority for federal subjects.45 In 2006, after the Transdniestrian 
independence referendum, the media announced a new OSCE plan, which proposed a semi-
independent status for Transdniestria within a Moldovan federation.46 Although the OSCE 
rhetoric evinces some changes in the form of conflict resolution, it is unclear whether there has 
been any actual increase of the TMR’s powers within the settlement proposals, let alone if such 
an increase has come in response to the constitutional development of Transdniestria. Further 
work should account for changes to the details of proposals regarding the resolution of an 
unrecognized state in relation to its internal constitutional structures and practices.  
Similarly, the other key actors, Moldova, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, have 
referred in various documents to a special status for Transdniestria within Moldova, each giving 
its own particular meaning to this term at different stages of the negotiation process. The idea of 
a “common state” put forward in 1997 explicitly provided Transdniestria with the right to 
conduct independent economic, scientific, and cultural activities, as well as to participate in 
Moldovan foreign policy making.47 The 2003 draft of the Kozak Memorandum suggested 
creating an asymmetrical federation, in which Transdniestria as a federal subject would have its 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 1. 
45 Proposals and Recommendations of the mediators from the OSCE, the Russian Federation, Ukraine with regards 
to the Transdniestrian settlement, CIO.GAL/11/04, February 13, 2004, distributed at the request of the Bulgarian 
Chairmanship. 
46 “OSCE Proposing the Reunification Plan to Transnistria,” Deutsche Press-Agentur, October 10, 2006. The 
proposal was sponsored by Belgian Foreign Minister, Karel De Gucht. 
47 Memorandum on the Bases for the Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and 
Transdniestria, signed on May 7, 1997, in the presence of the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine, and a representative 
of the OSCE. 
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own governing bodies and would participate in federal structures.48 The 2005 Ukrainian plan49 
and the 2005 Moldovan law50 stipulated the creation of a Transdniestrian autonomous region 
with a special status and division of powers established in organic special-status law. The 2005 
law also provided Transdniestria with its own legislative and executive bodies, a range of 
competencies, and three official languages.51 Although there are some indications that the status 
offered to Transdniestria by the external actors after a decade of its de facto existence has 
become more autonomous, these provisions are inconsistent and lack a clear connection to the 
development of the TMR’s constitutional framework. 
Overall, all the external actors’ proposals on establishing relations between Moldova and 
Transdniestria have had similar underlying principles. First, they have all sought to find a 
settlement of the Transdniestrian issue within a single economic, social, and legal space. Second, 
the OSCE’s 1993 Report, the 2003 Kozak Memorandum, the 2004 Mediators’ Proposal, and the 
2005 Ukrainian Plan all provided an option for Transdniestrian secession. Whereas some 
external actors, such as the OSCE, suggested the right to “external self-determination” for 
Transdniestria should Moldova renounce its statehood and merge with another country,52 others, 
such as Russia, added to this option the condition of Moldova’s loss of its neutrality, in which 
case “the Russian Federation would return to the issue of the enjoyment by the TMR of the right 
to self-determination.”53 
                                                 
48 Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of a Common State, drafted under the Russian 
mediators and the leadership of Dmitry Kozak, and presented to the negotiating actors on November 17, 2003. 
49 The Ukrainian Plan on Settlement of the Transdniestrian Issue, made public on May 20, 2005. 
50 Law on the Basic Provisions of the Special Legal Status of Localities from the Left Bank of Nistru (Transnistria), 
#173, 2005 [Parlamentul Republicii Moldova. Lege cu privire la Prevederile de Bază ale Statutului Juridic Special al 
Localităţilor din Stînga Nistrului (Transnistria) Nr.173 din 22.07.2005]. 
51 Ibid. 
52 The CSCE (OSCE) Mission to Moldova Report No.13, 1993, 1. 
53 Serghei Gubarev, the representative of the Russian Federation in the negotiation process. “Utrata Moldovoi 
statusa neitraliteta ili svoiei gosudarstvennosti privedet k priznaniu nezavisimosti Pridnestrov’a” [Serghei Gubarev: 
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As a result, a general overview of the proposals suggests that the external actors have 
employed different options in framing the Transdniestrian settlement while keeping the principle 
of a specific status for the TMR within the borders of Moldova unchanged. A closer look into the 
details of these proposals and the conditions of their introduction during the negotiations could 
clarify the question of the interplay between providing a more autonomous status for 
Transdniestria and its constitutional development. Further research could also explain several 
issues that are currently unclear, such as whether the democratic character of the Transdniestrian 
constitution has influenced particular delineations of powers, or the introduction of particular 
competencies for Transdniestria. More broadly, additional research may suggest answers to the 
question of whether the position of external actors regarding other unrecognized states changes 
in response to the nature of their constitutional development and, if so, what factors condition 
these changes. Future work might also further elaborate the correlation between democratization 
and specific proposals for settlement in other de facto states and trace, if appropriate, the general 
principles for such a relationship. 
To conclude, the findings of the Transdniestrian case provide a more nuanced picture of 
the role that a constitution plays in an unrecognized state. The present study suggests that this 
foundational legal document not only strengthens the statehood of a state-like entity and defines 
the nature of its interactions with external actors, but also hardens the position of the de facto 
state in negotiations over its status. These outcomes both contribute to scholarship on 
international and constitutional law and raise a range of questions for further interdisciplinary 
analysis. First, the research shows that an unrecognized state undertakes considerable efforts to 
satisfy the traditional and contemporary criteria for recognition through different means, 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Loss of Neutrality Status or Its Independent Statehood by Moldova Would Lead to Recognition of 
Transdniestria’s Independence], Moldnews, October 13, 2012. 
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including its constitution. This fact alone, however, is not enough to gain international 
recognition, as this decision remains within states’ discretion and is a politically charged issue. 
Second, the present research reveals that, in the context of an unrecognized state, a constitution 
not only organizes and regulates a polity, ensures the protection of human rights, and limits the 
power of a government, but also serves as a tool to seek international acceptance as a state. 
For the purposes of future interdisciplinary analysis, the conceptual and methodological 
tools of international law, international relations, constitutional law, political science, conflict 
resolution, and anthropology could all help in clarifying the nature of unrecognized states, the 
factors that influence and determine the criteria for their recognition, and the role of a 
constitution in the process of conflict settlement. Finally, this study and further research to come 
could also have important policy implications by helping actors involved in the resolution of 
protracted conflicts to develop a more efficient approach toward negotiations that would ensure 
their peaceful settlement. 
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